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Summary 
The architecture of development assistance for health (DAH) is increasingly complex with the 
arrival of new actors, particularly from the private sector, emerging economies, and global 
health initiatives. Prior to the year 2000, development assistance for health was funded by 
OECD bilateral and multilateral agencies and led by global expert and governance institutions 
in the United Nations (UN). Agendas, strategies, and interventions evolved but remained under 
the umbrella of relatively few financing mechanisms. In 2000, global consensus to support the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) dramatically altered the global health financing 
landscape and sparked accelerated growth in DAH. More than 100 global health initiatives were 
created, and private donors- including philanthropic foundations and corporate social 
responsibility programs- contributed to unprecedented levels of DAH. 
The rise of the so-called BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) has 
provided one more element of change in the landscape of global health and global health 
financing. Due to improved governance and globalization of trade and technology these 
countries, along with other emerging economies, are experiencing remarkable economic 
expansion. Many have shown commitment to development cooperation and have provided 
health assistance to developing countries. 
Overall, DAH has plateaued since 2010, and it remained steady for four consecutive years. In 
2014, it decreased for the first time. Although growth of DAH resumed, it has slowed and isn’t 
projected to increase in the coming years. 
Global monitoring of financial flows for DAH as part of Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) includes traditional Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development – 
Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC) sources and fails to include these pivotal 
new actors, their programme activities, and their influence. The limitations of the ODA tracking 
system are growing due to the gap in data from providers of ODA. There is increasing influence 
outside of the OECD DAC, but, to date, the magnitude of unofficial development assistance is 
unclear. 
Shared roles and responsibilities blur the division among traditional and emerging donor aims 
and responsibilities. This raises concerns about legitimacy, accountability, and international 
cooperation as well as concerns over potential conflicts of interest, divergence from national 
strategies, and lack of harmonization among donors. The influence of increasing plurality of 
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the global health financing system on the coherence, efficiency, and effectiveness of health 
development programmes requires further investigation. 
A growing proportion of development assistance for health comes from unofficial sources and 
therefore isn’t tracked or properly evaluated. Although many emerging donors have expressed 
support for international aid effectiveness principles, the influence of their support at country-
level and there level of adherence to international guidelines has been unclear. 
This thesis aims to contribute to the literature on development assistance for health and the 
influence of emerging donors for health, specifically the Global Fund, philanthropic 
foundations, corporate social responsibility, and emerging economies. It focuses on in-country 
perceptions of the successes and challenges of working with these partners in Chad, Ghana, 
Mozambique, and Tanzania- four countries that span the donor-darling / donor-orphan 
spectrum. Each of the four case-study countries has a different existing relationship with 
providers of official development assistance to health. It was unknown if the trends are reflected 
in relationships with new donors or if donors who act outside of official development assistance 
channels establish their own unique norms. 
In terms of private finance, respondents in the case-study countries conclude that the small-
scale engagement of private donors makes them complementary to large bi- and multi-lateral 
agencies. They are not foreseen to become the predominant providers of health assistance. 
Private donors are not necessarily aligned with country priorities or strengthening country 
health systems and currently contribute to fragmentation due to their narrow focus. Their small-
scale engagement makes harmonization more difficult AND more necessary, but private actors 
are absent in coordination groups at the country-level. Overall, country-level discussions still 
focus on alignment and harmonization of development assistance for health. Although the 
international community has updated aid effectiveness principles, the Paris Declaration is still 
the framework in-country ten years later. 
Country-level discussions on emerging economies highlight that the BRICS countries are not 
the only emerging economies visible in the health sector of sub-Sahara African countries. 
Similar to private actors, the emerging economies are not seen as a potential replacement, but 
rather as a supplement, for traditional aid. They are primarily focused on investment 
opportunities. Overall, due to emerging economies’ lack of coordination, health development 
partners in-country are not well-informed of health-specific engagement. Some government 
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officials welcome this unconventional engagement while development partners can be sceptical 
of the sustainability and the implications for the social welfare of citizens in recipient countries. 
The Global Fund is an example of an emerging donor credited with great successes, even 
compared to traditional bi- and multilateral agencies. In Mozambique respondents see the 
Global Fund’s ability to reform as unique for such a large organization and perceive its approach 
to be continually evolving. That said, respondents believe that there are many challenges that 
remain after its recent reform. The lack of a country office has many negative downstream 
effects including over-reliance on in-country partners. Partnerships provide much needed 
support for Global Fund recipients, but roles, responsibilities, and accountability must be 
clearly defined for a successful long-term partnership. Although the Global Fund emphasizes 
coordination at the higher levels of the organization, the country teams’ engagement with other 
actors is not formalized and is often inadequate. 
In conclusion, we found that private donors and emerging economies are not often not held to 
the same standards as conventional donors in terms of regulation and policies. This culture of 
more relaxed standards begs for more stringent transparency measures. Transparency of 
emerging donors’ financial flows is not only important for understanding the volume of 
assistance these actors provide, but also to mitigate potential corruption. 
This is especially important in light of recent trends in the volume of DAH. Official 
development assistance for health has shown volatility in recent years, and emerging donors 
may find themselves playing a larger role than they had originally anticipated. The development 
community has adapted to the global financial crises, but soon it may be faced with shortages 
due to political crises in OECD countries. Brexit, the recent US presidential election, and 
predictions about upcoming French and German elections all highlight a widespread nationalist 
trend that, among other consequences, could directly affect bilateral assistance programs. This 
places even more importance on developing best practices and increasing inclusivity in aid 
effectiveness fora. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Changes in landscape of development assistance for health  
The architecture of development assistance for health (DAH) is increasingly complex with the 
arrival of new actors, particularly from the private sector, emerging economies (Kickbusch and 
Szabo, 2014), and global health initiatives (Figure 1). This is coupled with the decline in 
influence from the conventional global health leadership of the United Nations System. Global 
monitoring of financial flows for DAH as part of Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
continues to focus on conventional OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development) sources and fails to include these pivotal new actors, their programme activities, 
and their influence (OECD, 2016g).  
Figure 1. Changes in DAH landscape 
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The OECD development assistance committee (DAC) (Table 1) defines ODA as assistance 
from official or executive agencies to multilateral institutions and countries or territories on the 
DAC list of ODA recipients. ODA is concessional and contains at least a 25 percent grant 
element. Its main objective is the promotion of economic development and welfare for 
developing countries (OECD, 2016h). Although ODA is defined by its recipients, the growing 
limitation of the ODA tracking system when trying to understand development assistance for 
health is actually the gap in data from providers of ODA. There is increasing influence outside 
of the DAC, but, to date, the magnitude of unofficial development assistance is unclear. 
Table 1. OECD DAC members 
Australia Greece Poland 
Austria Iceland Portugal 
Belgium Ireland Slovak Republic 
Canada Italy Slovenia 
Czech Republic Japan Spain 
Denmark Korea Sweden 
European Union Luxembourg Switzerland 
Finland The Netherlands United Kingdom 
France New Zealand United States 
Germany Norway   
(OECD, 2016c) 
Prior to the year 2000, development assistance for health was funded by OECD bilateral and 
multilateral agencies and led by global expert and governance institutions in the United Nations 
(UN). Agendas, strategies, and interventions evolved but remained under the umbrella of 
relatively few financing mechanisms (Maciocco and Stefanini, 2008, Sridhar, 2009). In 2000, 
global consensus to support the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) dramatically altered 
the global health financing landscape and sparked accelerated growth in DAH.  
At this time some believed finance was the sole obstacle preventing the success of health 
development goals (Sachs, 2001). The international community vowed to increase their 
financial support and develop the necessary infrastructure to mobilize these resources. As a 
result OECD countries increased the proportion of ODA dedicated to health (OECD-DAC, 
2009, Piva and Dodd, 2009). DAH grew annually at 5.4 percent from 1990 to 2000 and 11.3 
percent annually from 2000 to 2010 (IHME, 2015).  
This call for massive aid injections required private financiers to increase their involvement. 
Overall, private capital flows are now the largest portion of financial flows from developed 
countries to developing countries (Miller and al., 2011), but it is unclear how much of this from 
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remittances, philanthropic groups, and other capital resource transfers motivated by 
development concerns, and how much of that is DAH. 
Since 2000, the DAH arena has also become increasingly crowded by the establishment of over 
100 relatively well-endowed global health initiatives (GHIs), each focused vertically on single 
disease or single intervention strategies such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis 
and Malaria (the Global Fund) and the GAVI Alliance (Samb et al., 2009). They were designed 
to overcome private market and public failures in global public health.  They also had the effect 
to disperse the power of the UN and its agencies (Hein and Kickbusch, 2010a, Buse and Walt, 
2000) (Figure 2). 
Public funding for GHIs was in part shifted from financing that would normally be available to 
the World Health Organization (WHO). This has resulted in a WHO that has become 
increasingly dependent on extra-budgetary sources (i.e. voluntary donations and development 
agencies of member states) rather than core funding and therefore less in control of its own 
agenda and experiencing diminishing credibility as a multilateral leader or driver of global 
health strategies (Shah, 2001, Sridhar, 2009). These changes in financing led to a more disease-
specific global health agenda within the WHO which complemented the vertical programming 
of GHIs (Sridhar and Tamashiro, 2009). At the operational level, these problems are currently 
reflected in unclear definitions, roles, and implementation responsibilities leading to 
inefficiencies in health planning at global, national and sub-national levels.   
Although global health initiatives have become the archetype for development assistance for 
health at country level, there is notable growth in the number of major philanthropic foundations 
with the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) as the predominant example. 
Furthermore, businesses and corporations have developed corporate responsibility 
programmes, and there are spontaneous individual contributions to humanitarian emergencies, 
drug donation programmes, and international aid campaigns (Stoianova, 2012). While private 
financing for health has increased greatly over the last decade there is evidence of extreme 
volatility in both private and public ODA financial flows (Addison et al., 2005). The extent of 
private-DAH volatility is unclear. 
DAH has plateaued since 2010, and it remained steady at approximately US$35 billion for four 
consecutive years. Notably, DAH decreased for the first time in 2014 (-1.6 percent relative to 
2013) (Figure 3) (IHME, 2015). Least developed countries had a particularly pronounced 
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reduction in ODA in 2011 and 2012.  Bilateral aid to sub-Saharan Africa, where many of the 
poorest countries are located, decreased about five percent in real terms in 2014 (UN, 2015). 
Although growth of DAH resumed, it slowed, and any growth was primarily attributable to one 
actor: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) (IHME, 2011, 
Leach-Kemon et al., 2012), a trend which may continue under its new president. 
Simultaneously, in 2011, key bilateral donors such as the United States slowed the growth of 
their assistance, the UN ceased its growth, the Global Fund retracted its call for the next round 
of proposals (Leach-Kemon et al., 2012), and researchers suggested reforms for the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund (Woods, 2009). Additionally, health spending in countries 
that borrow from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) grew at half the speed of non-
borrowers (Stuckler et al., 2011b).  
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Figure 2. DAH by channel in 1990 and 2011, respectively 
(IHME, 2016) 
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Figure 3. Sources of DAH 1990-2015 
(IHME, 2016)
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The rise of the so-called BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) has 
provided one more element of change in the landscape of global health and global health 
financing (Figure 4) (Ponder and Moree, 2012). Due to improved governance and globalization 
of trade and technology these countries are experiencing remarkable economic expansion 
(USAID, 2012). At a combined 40 percent of the global population, (Maia et al., 2012) BRICS 
health financing, both at domestic and international levels, is vital for achieving health 
development goals. 
In 2015 China was the second largest global economy with India and Brazil seventh and ninth, 
respectively (IMF, 2016). These countries have increased their position as potential donors by 
participating in myriad international organizations and international financial consortia such as 
the G-20 (Bliss et al., 2010). They have also investigated more formal South-South 
collaborations and partnerships (Maia et al., 2012, Stuckler et al., 2011b, Sridhar, 2009, Tytel 
et al., 2012), and at some points in the last decade their development assistance has grown 10 
times faster than conventional OECD donors (Tytel et al., 2012, Birdsall, 2012b).   
Global health diplomacy discussions call for a research agenda that illuminates the role of non-
state actors, the interactions between conventional and unconventional actors, and how global 
health diplomacy can enhance collective action (Lee and Smith, 2011, Fidler, 2009, Farag et 
al., 2009). Continual creation of new organizations, rather than strengthening and coordinating 
those that exist, presents a challenge to effective DAH (Sridhar, 2010, de Renzio, 2011, Woods, 
2011). Another important element of the global health diplomacy agenda is a repositioning of 
health in foreign policy negotiations (Labonté et al., 2011, Sridhar and Smolina, 2012). 
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Figure 4. Country contributions to neglected disease research and development 
(Ponder and Moree, 2012)  
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Recent findings show that if European Union (EU) donors implemented the Paris Declaration 
and the Accra Agenda for Action, they would benefit by monetary gains of up to six percent of 
total EU ODA. This includes savings on transaction costs, gains from untying aid and reducing 
aid volatility, as well as other indirect effects (Prizzon and Greenhill, 2012). Both the Paris 
Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action are rooted in systems thinking, and their 
implementation would have two important potential indirect effects: strengthened health 
systems and increased population health that could potentially increase the likelihood of foreign 
direct investment (Desbordes and Azémar, 2008) and the growth of GDP per capita (Martin et 
al., 2012).  
Although private financiers’ and BRICS’ growing influence on ODA is starting to be 
recognized (Lanz, 2012, McCoy et al., 2009, Ravishankar et al., 2009), their influence on DAH 
is unknown. More recently private actors were included in high-level discussions due to the 
complementary role they have assumed in international development. The 2014 Global 
Partnership on Effective Development Cooperation High-Level meeting in Mexico was the first 
high-level discussion in which private stakeholders were included (Partnership for Effective 
Development Cooperation, 2014).    
Despite the increased demand for financial tracking, members of the research community have 
voiced that approximately one of three dollars dedicated to health can be assigned a clearly 
identifiable purpose (Ravishankar et al., 2009).  Much of the literature and analysis, for 
example, at present still neglects the impact and influence of the BRICS countries and private 
financing on global health development – their financial input and input in-kind is not reflected 
in the OECD data (McKitterick, 2012, Addison et al., 2005, OECD-DAC, 2009).  This leads to 
significant underestimation of DAH.  In years past estimates produced by the OECD and the 
World Bank, for example, have differed by up to approximately US$3 billion (Piva and Dodd, 
2009). Understanding the volume, nature, and influence of these new actors is vital as the 
development community shifts its focus to the Sustainable Development Goals. 
On 25 September 2015 the UN General Assembly adopted the resolution “Transforming our 
world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”, also known as the ‘Sustainable 
Development Goals’ (SDGs) (UN General Assembly, 2015). Whereas the MDGs had eight 
goals with three dedicated specifically to health, the SDGs have 17 goals with one dedicated to 
health- SDG Goal 3: Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages (UN, 2016).  
It has 13 targets and 16 proposed indicators (WHO, 2016d). 
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Despite the newly-defined goals, the MDG Gap Task Force does not predict further significant 
increases in official country programmable aid (CPA) through 2018, with CPA for Africa 
remaining below its peak in 2013. CPA accounts for more than half of donors’ bilateral aid and 
is the most predictable part of ODA (UN, 2015). This worrying trend likely extends to the health 
sector and highlights the potentially widening gap that could be filled by emerging donors for 
health. 
In light of future uncertainty of the volume finance and the composition of the actors involved, 
evaluating the effectiveness of assistance becomes increasingly important. In their most recent 
report on the quality of official development assistance (QuODA), the Center for Global 
Development included non-DAC actors and the BMGF. The data on these actors is incomplete 
and does not allow for adequate analysis but begins to examine differences between 
conventional and emerging donors. The QuODA includes 31 indicators across four dimensions 
(Table 2). 
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Table 2. Indicators for the four dimensions of aid quality (Center for Global Development) 
Maximizing 
efficiency   Fostering institutions   Reducing burden   
Transparency & 
learning 
Share of allocation 
to poor countries   
Share of aid to recipients' 
top development 
priorities 
  Significance of aid relationships   
Signatory of 
International Aid 
Transparency 
Initiative 
Share of allocation 
to well-governed 
countries 
  Avoidance of project implementation units   
Fragmentation 
across donor 
agencies 
  
Implementation of 
IATI data reporting 
standards 
Low unit 
administrative costs   
Share of aid recorded in 
recipient budgets   Median project size   
Recording of the 
project title and 
descriptions 
High country 
programmable aid 
share 
  
Share of aid to partners 
with good operational 
strategies 
  Contribution to multilaterals   
Detail of project 
descriptions 
Focus / 
specialization by 
recipient country 
  Use of recipient country systems   
Coordinated 
missions   
Reporting of aid 
delivery channel 
Focus / 
specialization by 
sector 
  Coordination of technical cooperation   
Coordinated 
analytical work   
Share of projects 
reporting 
disbursements 
Support of select 
global public good 
facilities 
  
Share of scheduled aid 
recorded as received by 
recipients 
  Use of programmatic aid   
Completeness of 
project-level 
commitment data 
Share of untied aid   
Coverage of forward 
spending plans / aid 
predictability 
      
Aid to partners with 
good monitoring 
and evaluation 
frameworks 
(Birdsall and Kharas, 2014) 
This framework was developed as a response to the evolving discussions on aid effectiveness 
and notes the importance of not just tracking dollars but examining the effectiveness of the 
organizations that provide finance.  
1.2 Private assistance 
Estimates for private philanthropy in 2013-2014, including corporations, charitable giving and 
philanthropy excluding the BMGF, approximate US$3.4 billion for global health (IHME, 
2015). Overall, private philanthropy has grown more substantially than corporate donations 
over the last decade (IHME, 2015). Corporations were responsible for US$662 million (1.9 
percent) of DAH. Other private sources, including charitable giving and philanthropy excluding 
the BMGF, amounted to US$2.7 billion (7.4 percent) of DAH. If BMGF is included in private 
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philanthropy, this source category accounts for 16 percent of total DAH for 2013, making it 
second only to the US government (Table 3). 
Table 3. Flows of global health financing, 2013 
  Amount (billions, US$) % 
United States 13.0 35 
Other Governments 5.8 15 
United Kingdom 4.0 10 
Other Sources 3.6 9 
Private 
Philanthropy 3.4 9 
BMGF 2.6 7 
Germany 1.8 5 
France 1.6 4 
Canada 1.3 3 
Australia 0.86 2 
(IHME, 2016) 
The BMGF is the largest single source of private finance for global health. In 2014 alone, the 
BMGF accounted for 8.1 percent of total DAH and 46.6 percent of private funding flows for 
global health (US$2.9 billion) (IHME, 2015). Approximately half of BMGF funds are 
unallocable (Figure 5). The remainder is distributed among UN agencies, NGOs and 
foundations, the Global Fund, GAVI Alliance, and in a few cases, countries themselves. Of 
non-BMGF private philanthropy, 74.8 percent was provided to NGOs in 2014 (US$2.5 billion); 
UN agencies and the Global Fund also received shares. 
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Figure 5. Flows of global health financing, 2013 
(IHME, 2016) 
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Development partners agreed to update the five aid effectiveness principles at the Fourth High 
Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, in Busan, South Korea in 2011. This meeting marked the 
first acknowledgement of private actors’ contribution to development (Fourth High-Level 
Forum on Aid Effectiveness, 2011). Analogs of the Paris Declaration pillars of ownership, 
managing for results, and mutual accountability were carried forward, but alignment and 
harmonization were replaced by “inclusive development partnerships”. The most noticeable 
omission is language about alignment of resources with national strategies (Fourth High-Level 
Forum on Aid Effectiveness, 2011).  
In 2012 the OECD Development Centre officially launched the Network of Foundations 
Working for Development (netFWD) (OECD NetFWD, 2014). This global network of 
foundations aims to “support foundations in their efforts to dialogue and partner with 
governments” to increase aid effectiveness. 
The 2014 Global Partnership on Effective Development Cooperation High-Level meeting in 
Mexico included private stakeholders (Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, 
2014). In this same year netFWD developed the Guidelines for Effective Philanthropic 
Engagement. The three pillars- dialogue, data / knowledge sharing, and partnering- aim to foster 
“mutual recognition between philanthropic actors, governments and development agencies on 
the basis of their respective comparative advantages” (Samb et al., 2009). Essentially, this 
document reflects the recognition of the Paris Declaration’s harmonization pillar as the 
foundation of effective engagement. This also suggests that all organizations associated with 
netFWD (Table 4) would abide by this pillar, if none other. Therefore it is surprising that the 
only foundation adhering to the 2011 Busan Partnership principles is BMGF (Adelman et al., 
2011). Although the Busan Agreement does not explicitly address harmonization, foundations’ 
adherence should symbolize their commitment to internationally recognized principles. 
Currently many philanthropic foundations neglect systematic reporting of interactions with 
governmental institutions and other donors operating in-country (Nam et al., 2013). Few 
philanthropic actors appear to be aware of the aid effectiveness principles first outlined in 2005 
(OECD, 2005). 
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Table 4. Members and associates of netFWD, 2016 
Members  Location 
Aga Khan Foundation  Geneva, Switzerland 
Bertelsmann Stiftung  Gütersloh, Germany 
Emirates Foundation for Youth Development  Abu Dhabi, UAE 
FHI Foundation  Durham, USA 
Ford Foundation  New York City, USA 
Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian  Lisbon, Portugal 
Fundación Banorte  Mexico City, Mexico 
Instituto Ayrton Senna  São Paolo, Brazil 
Mo Ibrahim Foundation  London, UK 
Novrtis Foundation  Basel, Switzerland 
Sawiris Foundation for Social Development  Cairo, Egypt 
Shell Foundation  London, UK 
Stars Foundation  London, UK 
The Rockefeller Foundation  New York City, USA 
Total Corporate Foundation  Paris, France 
W.K. Kellogg Foundation  Battle Creek, USA 
   
Associates   
African Grantmakers Network  Accra, Ghana 
Arab Foundaions Forum  Amman, Jordan 
Asian Venture Philanthropy Network  Singapore 
Council on Foundations  Arlington, VA 
European Foundation Centre  Brussels, Belgium 
European Venture Philanthropy Association  Brussels, Belgium 
Foundation Center  New York City, USA 
RedE América  Santiago, Chile 
Worldwide Initiatives for Grantmaker Support  Manila, Philippines 
(OECD, 2016f) 
The most striking features of the netFWD roster are the notable lack of the BMGF, the presence 
of corporate actors, and the diverse geographical representation. So far the netFWD guidelines 
have not led to in increased financial tracking and transparency. The BMGF is the only private 
donor that reports to the OECD, and only American philanthropy can be traced by the US-based 
Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (OECD, 2016g, IHME, 2016). 
In the report for the Third International Conference for Financing for Development in July 
2015, participants acknowledged the contributions from philanthropists but called for increased 
transparency, accountability, and alignment with country strategies and systems (OECD 
NetFWD, 2014). There was no mention of coordinating efforts with these emerging actors. 
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Survey findings suggest that new funding partnerships contribute to philanthropic funding 
priorities (Missika and Romon, 2014, Foundation Center, 2016); this could increase alignment 
around internationally recognized goals. 
Overall, shared roles and responsibilities blur the division between the private and public 
sectors’ aims and responsibilities (Buse and Walt, 2000). This raises concerns about legitimacy, 
accountability, and international cooperation (Hein and Kickbusch, 2010b) as well as concerns 
over potential conflicts of interest (Stuckler et al., 2011a).  
Developing best practices for private actors and an increased inclusivity of development 
effectiveness dialog might be even more important in the coming decades with the growing 
nationalist trend in Western democracies. The US presidential election outcome, Brexit, and 
2017 elections in France in Germany might have direct implications for bilateral assistance 
programs. Private actors could find themselves providing a larger share of global health finance 
than they ever anticipated. 
Philanthropy 
In the last decade there have been significant increases in philanthropic giving. The BMGF was 
third only to the US and UK governments in terms of percent change in DAH between 2004 
and 2015 (Figure 6). 
The volume of assistance coming from philanthropic foundations is expected to continue 
growing considerably over the coming years. In 2010, 40 of America’s wealthiest citizens 
pledged to give away at least half of their fortunes in The Giving Pledge (Strom, 2010). It was 
launched by Bill and Melinda Gates and Warren E. Buffet to stimulate discussion and leverage 
more philanthropic giving. There are currently 156 signed pledges representing billionaires 
from 16 countries (The Giving Pledge, 2016). There are mixed reviews about the effectiveness 
of this non-binding pledge (Coffey, 2015), but if it delivers on its promise, it will mobilize an 
unprecedented level of individual giving. As of 1 March 2016, there are a reported 1,810 
billionaires with aggregate net worth of US$6.48 trillion (Forbes Corporate Communications, 
2016). These billionaires are from 67 countries and territories with the US hosting the most, 
followed by China, then Germany, India, and Russia (Forbes Corporate Communications, 
2016).  If the Giving Pledge managed to mobilize half of the billionaires to donate half of their 
fortunes over the next 100 years, it would amount to US$16.2 billion per year.   
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Figure 6. Percent change in DAH sources, 2004-2015 
(IHME, 2016) 
 
This is not to say that all of this wealth would be dedicated to health, that it would be invested 
effectively and with realistic expectations, or that the Giving Pledge provides any guidance for 
socially conscious billionaires. Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg and his wife Priscilla Chan 
wrote a commitment letter to the Giving Pledge on 9 November 2015 (The Giving Pledge, 
2016) pledging most of US$46 billion in Facebook, Inc. shares. Their pledge was regarded as 
setting a “new giving standard” (Frier, 2015). But as time passes, it is unclear what new standard 
they are setting. On 21 September 2016 they announced their goal of “curing all disease in our 
children’s lifetime” with a US$3 billion investment in scientific research and engineering (Cha, 
2016). To say this is a lofty goal would be an understatement. As a point of direct comparison, 
the BMGF has dedicated US$26.0 billion to global health since 1999 (IHME, 2016). Or to 
compare it to efforts in the profit-driven private sector, Sanofi Pasteur has spent €1.5 billion 
over 20 years in the development of a vaccine for a single disease, dengue fever (Sanofi, 2016).  
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Unrealistic expectations aside, their approach to this “new giving standard” has been called into 
question. Their investment is channelled through the Chan Zuckerberg Initiative, a limited 
liability company (LLC) rather than a charitable trust or private foundation (Singer and Isaac, 
2015).  This exempts them from tax, but it also allows them greater flexibility in how they use 
the money. Under an limited liability company (LLC) the Chan Zuckerberg Initiative can, for 
example, invest in for-profit social enterprises (Dolan, 2015). This model is an example of a 
predicted rise in so-called philanthrocapitalism. In 2006 a young Indian philanthropist 
suggested that his contemporaries would opt for philanthropic models that more closely 
“resemble the capitalist economy” (The Economist, 2006).  
The US spends more money on health per capita and performs poorly in many health outcomes 
(OECD, 2014a). So it is not altogether surprising that wealthy individuals feel that they, the 
technocratic oligarchs, are better suited to allocate resources than a bloated bureaucracy that 
would absorb their fortunes in the name of social protection through taxation. That said, it 
would be prudent for these actors to practice transparency in order to enable proper objective 
measurements of effectiveness. This will benefit recipients as well as contribute to donor 
demands for return on investment.  
Despite growing interest in philanthropic giving, there is a lag in adherence to internationally 
agreed upon principles of development assistance (Chapter 4). Currently the BMGF is the only 
philanthropic foundation to report to the OECD (OECD, 2016g), and the only donor included 
in evaluations on quality of its assistance (Birdsall and Kharas, 2014). Though it scored well, 
the BMGF was only evaluated on nine out of 31 indicators (CGD, 2016). As the relevance of 
these donors increases, the metrics for evaluating assistance should adapt to make conventional 
and emerging donors assistance more comparable. 
It is important to note that this discussion focuses on American philanthropy, and while they 
are the largest cohort, they are not alone. There is an increasing awareness among the ultra-
wealthy outside of the US, and time will tell if the American philanthrocapitalism model will 
be the one that newcomers will assume. 
 
Corporate Social Responsibility 
There is no single definition or set of guidelines for corporate social responsibility, in essence 
it “is a business approach that contributes to sustainable development by delivering economic, 
social and environmental benefits for all stakeholders” (Financial Times, 2016).  
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The UN Global Compact was formed in 2000 and more than nine thousand business have joined 
select UN agencies, civil society organizations, and governments to promote ten principles of 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) (UN Global Compact, 2016a). The ten principles span 
human rights, labor, environment, and anti-corruption (UN Global Compact, 2016b). 
Furthermore in 2011 state and corporate actors have agreed to the UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights to increase corporate transparency and accountability while 
empowering civil society and other advocates (UN, 2011). While rhetoric on health is absent 
among international principles and health in specialized international reports refers only to 
worker health and safety (UNCTAD, 2011, UNCTAD, 2012), corporate giving for health has 
increased (Figure 6).  
There are a number of entry points for corporations in global health. Pharmaceutical companies 
provide support for product involvement, health systems strengthening, mHealth initiatives, 
advocacy and policy, health awareness campaigns, among others (Droppert and Bennett, 2015). 
The success of some CSR programs has resulted in their inclusion in national strategies. For 
example, AngloGold Ashanti’s malaria control program has been scaled up as a part of Ghana’s 
national strategy (AngloGold Ashanti, 2013). Aside from providing services, there has been a 
call to integrate and formalize health impact assessment (HIA) in corporate social responsibility 
programs. Due to the magnitude and pervasiveness of the extractive industry, it is important 
that HIA is universally institutionalized (Lee et al., 2013, Winkler et al., 2013) and that the 
corporate social responsibility arm of the industry coordinates with the national health system. 
CSR for health can also include engagement with more established channels. Coca-Cola, 
Chevron, EcoBank, Standard Bank, Takeda Pharmaceuticals, and Vale are all examples of 
corporations who provide finance to the Global Fund (The Global Fund, 2016q). Additionally, 
some corporations have received finance, as Principle Recipients, from the Global Fund, e.g. 
AngloGold Ashanti in Ghana and Philippinas Shell Foundation in the Philippines (The Global 
Fund, 2016d). Though in such instances, the definition of CSR becomes blurry when the 
corporation is receiving finance from a predominantly publicly funded agency. 
As with philanthropic foundations, corporations with social responsibility programmes do not 
provide data that allow for tracking or evaluation of effectiveness (OECD, 2016g, CGD, 2016). 
Though multiple corporations are associated with netFWD (Table 4), discussions with in-
country partners (Chapter 4), absence from global resource data repositories, and gaps in 
literature all suggest that these actors are not yet adhering to the agreed upon Guidelines for 
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Effective Philanthropic Engagement (Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, 
2014).  
   
1.3 Support from emerging economies 
The OECD acknowledges that non-DAC providers of development assistance play an 
increasingly important role (OECD, 2016e). Twenty non-DAC countries now report to the 
OECD, though many only at the aggregate level; furthermore the OECD estimates the volume 
of development assistance from an additional ten countries (Table 5) (OECD, 2016e). Though 
the data captured are not exhaustive and estimates are not disaggregated by sector (Steensen, 
2014), it is a step in the right direction. 
Table 5. Non-DAC countries captured in OECD statistics 
Report to the OECD  
 Estimates for development 
cooperation 
Bulgaria  Chinese Taipei  Brazil 
Croatia  Thailand  Chile 
Cyprus  Timore Leste  People's Republic of China 
Estonia  Turkey  Colombia 
Hungary  United Arab Emirates  Costa Rica 
Israel    India 
Kazakhstan    Indonesia 
Kuwait    Mexico 
Latvia    Qatar 
Liechtenstein    South Africa 
Lithuania      
Malta      
Romania      
Russian 
Federation   
 
  
Saudi Arabia      
(OECD, 2016e) 
Estimates for non-DAC ODA for 2012/2013 vary widely, ranging from US$11.6 billion to 
US$20 billion (Steensen, 2014, MDG Gap Task Force, 2015). 
 
BRICS 
In 2001 a Goldman Sachs economist coined the acronym BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and 
China) in his discussion on emerging market economies and the need to include them in global 
policymaking forums (O'Neill, 2001). What began as a catchy phrase in an investment bank’s 
research note has developed into a full-fledged institution complete with an arsenal of websites, 
think-tanks, an interbank cooperation, annual summits, and its own development bank. 
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In the beginning there were debates about the cohesiveness of this group (Armijo, 2007). Due 
to their political, regional, and economic differences and diverse interests, did it make sense to 
group these countries together? By now this debate is somewhat obsolete; they have self-
identified as a bloc by launching joint initiatives. The volume, exact nature, and effectiveness 
of emerging donors’ engagement with recipient countries remain unclear. 
Although all countries other than Russia are reported to receive official development assistance 
for health; it is a negligible in terms of total expenditure for health ( 
 
Table 6). Brazil, China, and Russia are all categorized as having high human development and 
India and South Africa with medium human development. 
South Africa’s government has the highest priority for health (using government expenditure 
for health as percent of total health expenditure as a proxy) followed by China. India’s 
government dedicates the least of its budget to health in this cohort. Due to the dearth of DAH 
from these countries it is unclear if these trends in health as a priority extend to development 
assistance abroad.
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Table 6. BRICS comparative indicators 
  Brazil Russia India China South Africa 
GDP per capita, PPP (current intl $) 15,359 24,451 6,089 14,239 13,165 
GDP annual growth rate -3.847 -3.727 7.57 6.9 1.283 
Government expenditure on health as % of total health expenditure* 46.04 52.20 30.04 55.79 48.24 
Government expenditure on health as % of total government expenditure* 6.78 9.49 5.05 10.43 14.23 
Official develop assistance for health disbursements per capita** 1.7 … 22.6 6.6 63.9 
External resources for health as % of total health expenditure* 0.13 … 0.95 0.03 1.84 
HDI† 0.0755 0.798 0.609 0.727 0.666 
HDI rank† 75 50 130 90 116 
 
* WHO estimates, 2014 (WHO, 2016b), ** World Bank Population estimates, 2014 (The World Bank, 2016) and OECD ODA CRS statistics, 2014 (OECD, 2016g), †Human Development Index 
(UNDP, 2015) 
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Brazil and Russia have the largest economies but both have negative growth rates (Figure 7). 
Brazil’s has plummeted from a growth rate of 7.5 percent in 2010; and Russia has also 
experienced a quick decline from a rate of 4.5 percent in 2010 (The World Bank, 2016). China 
has a robust economy that has remained relatively stable, but India’s experienced more 
volatility with a precipitous drop in 2010 and a subsequent rebound in 2012. All have seen 
considerably slowed growth since the global financial crisis. Though this could affect the 
volume of their development assistance for health in the long run, they have carried forward 
with a couple of their joint initiatives. 
The 8th BRICS Summit in October 2016 was hosted in Goa, India (BRICS, 2016a). The Goa 
Declaration renewed its commitment to cooperate to achieve BRICS’ targets for HIV and 
tuberculosis, including research, development, and production of drugs and diagnostics 
(BRICS, 2016b). 
The BRICS Trade & Economics Research Network (BRICS-TERN), a network of five think-
tanks, was established in 2011. It focuses on “network-based policy research and advocacy on 
contemporary developmental issues” with the objective of sustainable development through the 
promotion of fair markets and inclusive growth (BRICS-TERN, 2016). Only one of five reports 
they have produced nominally mentions health development; it touches upon a few social 
determinants of health such as food security and labour-related issues (Singh and Dube, 2012). 
A subset of the BRICS have also established a trilateral free trade agreement, IBSA Trilateral 
(India, Brazil, and South Africa) (IBSA, 2016b), to promote trade and investment opportunities 
among the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), Mercosur, and India. The IBSA Dialogue 
Forum was launched in 2003 to promote South-South cooperation and exchange. It has a Joint 
Working Group for health that signed a trilateral Memorandum of Understanding in 2007 
(IBSA, 2016a). Priority areas include surveillance, research and development, integrating 
regulations, intellectual property for medicines, etc. The Joint Working Group for health has 
not met since 2013 (IBSA, 2016a). 
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Figure 7. BRICS annual GDP growth, 2005-2015 
(The World Bank, 2016) 
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
GD
P 
gr
ow
th
 (a
nn
ua
l, 
%
)
year
Brazil China India Russia South Africa
A. Warren PhD Dissertation                                                             DAH: Stakeholder perspectives on emerging donors in sub-Saharan Africa 
 
25 
 
In 2014 the BRICS announced the launch of the New Development Bank (NDB). It will have 
an initial capital pool of US$50 billion that will be equally divided; it will maintain a currency 
reserve of US$100 billion (Panda, 2014). Its headquarters will be in Shanghai, China, and the 
first president will be Indian. The bank has been established, in part, to challenge the Western 
order maintained by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (Panda, 2014). The 
NDB will focus on infrastructure projects in developing contexts (NDB BRICS, 2016). 
So far, the majority of the bloc’s activity has centered upon economic growth and establishing 
financial and trade relationships. BRICS countries have individually provided foreign 
assistance since the 1950s (Mwase and Yang, 2012). Scholars have identified a number of 
trends in BRICS’ development efforts such as applying principles of South-South Cooperation 
(G77, 2009b) focusing on partnership; avoiding policy conditionality in governance, economic 
policy, or institutional reform; structuring assistance to complement foreign direct investment; 
emphasizing individual project feasibility rather than long-term debt sustainability; and 
applying domestic development lessons (Watson et al., 2013, Mwase and Yang, 2012). The 
intention to develop their own agenda for development assistance is particularly interesting in 
light of the fact that their domestic health sector resource allocation appears to be still highly 
influenced by current multilateral donors such as the World Bank and the Global Fund (Sridhar 
and Gomez, 2011a). 
Brazil 
Brazil defines their foreign assistance as “international cooperation”, emphasizes partnership, 
and focuses on technical cooperation rather than grants or concessional loans (Vaz and Inoue, 
2007). Brazilian civil servants and professionals provide technical assistance and technological 
transfer (Russo et al., 2013); this model could prevent macroeconomic repercussions associated 
with (non-)absorption of traditional aid (Allen, 2005). The Brazilian Cooperation Agency 
(ABC; an adjunct of the Ministry of External Affairs), multiple government ministries, and 
public health institutions all play active roles in international cooperation (Vaz and Inoue, 2007, 
Russo et al., 2013). Though it currently lacks a centralized institution responsible for foreign 
assistance, it is working towards greater inter-agency coordination. 
Brazil prioritizes support for the Lusophone countries, South America, and the Caribbean but 
is expanding its engagement as is evidenced by its participation in BRICS fora and IBSA. 
Brazil’s foreign assistance is openly aligned with, and driven by, foreign policy goals (Saraiva, 
2010, Gomez, 2012). Brazil has called on governments to follow its lead and integrate global 
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health into their foreign policies as an official recognition of the fundamental role of health in 
international relations (Amorim et al., 2007). Its priorities in health, specifically, are determined 
by its foreign policy priorities, health-specific expertise, and the demands of partner countries 
(Tytel et al., 2012). Brazil’s health diplomacy efforts have focused most notably on tobacco 
control and Intellectual Property Rights (Tytel et al., 2012, Oritz, 2011). 
Brazil has formed bilateral partnerships with selected low-income countries to donate 
treatments and transfer technologies and best practices for national HIV/AIDS and access to 
antiretrovirals (ARV) programs based on domestic success starting in the 1990s (Pimenta et al., 
2006). Brazil has become a global leader in nutrition policy and programming due to its 
successes in reducing domestic poverty rates and child hunger (CEBRI, 2010, Leão and Maluf, 
2013). It has also assisted in the development of extensive milk banks across Latin American 
and Africa (Government of Brazil, 2011, Dominican Today, 2007). These banks serve as a tool 
to prevent mother-to-child transmission of HIV while promoting breastfeeding as a means of 
improving infant nutrition (PATH, 2016). It has provided financial and technical support for 
the development of the first public pharmaceutical manufacturing facility in Africa; ARVs are 
now being produced in Maputo, Mozambique  (Government of Brazil, 2011, Russo and de 
Oliveira, 2016). 
Russia 
Russia’s engagement with the other BRICS nations reflects a foreign policy that stems from its 
desire to be a non-Western world power (Mankoff, 2009, Walz and Ramachandran, 2010). 
Surprisingly, Russia has aligned itself with the aid agendas of the OECD-DAC countries, unlike 
other BRICS (Walz and Ramachandran, 2010, Zimmerman and Smith, 2011). Since 2015 
Russia has reported its ODA (Table 5), but there is no data for disbursements for health (OECD, 
2016g). The Ministries of Finance, Foreign Affairs, and Affairs of Civil Defence, Emergencies 
and Disaster Relief oversee all assistance programs (Government of Russia, 2007). Russia 
focuses on global poverty reduction and prioritizes education and infectious disease control 
(The World Bank, 2011). 
One quarter of Russia’s foreign assistance is dedicated to health and is channelled through 
multilateral institutions such as the Eurasian Economic Community, the World Bank, the 
United Nations (Zimmerman and Smith, 2011), the Global Fund, and GAVI Alliance. Russia 
contributes significantly to the Global Polio Eradication Initiative; regional polio eradication 
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has become a major priority in response to outbreaks that have crossed the border from 
neighboring countries (Tytel et al., 2012). 
The majority of Russia’s bilateral assistance targets the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS) and primarily focuses on HIV/AIDS, surveillance systems, and neglected tropical 
diseases (Zimmerman and Smith, 2011). Health security appears to steer priorities (Gómez, 
2009). For example, the highest proportion of bilateral health assistance is dedicated to disease 
surveillance programmes in neighbouring countries (Government of Russia, 2007). Trilateral 
assistance includes malaria control and prevention programmes in sub-Saharan Africa and 
training in Africa, the Middle East, and former Soviet republics (Tytel et al., 2012). 
India 
Like other BRICS countries, India uses foreign assistance for diplomatic purposes and 
emphasizes cooperation, South-South partnership, addressing recipient demand, technical 
capacity building, and sustainability (Jobelius, 2013). The majority of India’s foreign assistance 
is dedicated to sectors other than health, though there is a predicted increase over the coming 
years. Domestic obstacles limit foreign health assistance to strengthening of secondary and 
tertiary care, maternal and child health care, and non-communicable disease prevention and 
management (Tytel et al., 2012). India favors projects for infrastructure, information 
technology, and training; the majority of foreign assistance is technical aid (Jobelius, 2013).  
India primarily uses bilateral channels for foreign health assistance and prioritizes countries in 
South and Southeast Asia, and Africa. It commonly supports the construction or improvement 
of hospitals and clinics, the provision of medical supplies, and the supply of equipment and 
technology. India has also provided faculty support and established medical colleges in 
neighboring countries due to its experience with developing a well-trained health workforce 
(Tytel et al., 2012). A notable project within India’s bilateral framework is the Pan-Africa 
Telemedicine and Tele-Education Network. Best practices are shared with West African 
universities and hospitals (PAeN Project, 2016, AU, 2016). 
The private sector, including the pharmaceutical industry, has been taken the lead in domestic 
global health innovations. Low-cost manufacturing of generic pharmaceuticals coupled with 
vaccine production has been India’s largest contribution (Waning et al., 2010, Government of 
India, 2011), along with its novel approaches to low-cost health service delivery (Inderfurth 
and Khambatta, 2011) such as the initial studies for directly-observed treatment short-course 
(DOTS) that revolutionized the tuberculosis treatment strategy. 
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China 
In recent years, China’s has increased its emphasis on health as a priority for development 
assistance. Some estimates of their DAH place them in the top 10 bilateral global health donors 
(Grépin et al., 2014). Though China has played a significant role in regional discussions on 
public health preparedness and disease surveillance. Its primary foci are health infrastructure, 
human resources capacity building, provision of international medical teams, reproductive 
health and family planning, and malaria control (Tytel et al., 2012). Health assistance is used 
as a diplomatic tool to bolster its image abroad as well as secure access to natural resources 
(Bliss et al., 2010, Huang, 2010).  
Bilateral channels are the primary means of Chinese foreign health assistance with Africa as 
the principle target. The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) serves to strengthen 
trade and development ties (FOCAC, 2016), and the framework includes malaria treatment and 
control programmes (Huang, 2010). Its projects are not currently integrated with other global 
malaria programme (Tytel et al., 2012).  China has been sending medical teams abroad since 
the 1960s; these teams provide free medical care and train local medical staff in areas lacking 
access to health services (Huang, 2010). China funds the construction of hospitals, clinics, and 
pharmaceutical manufacturing facilities, primarily in Africa (Bräutigam et al., 2011). It also 
provides funds for health commodities and medical equipment. 
South Africa 
South Africa must focus primarily on its high domestic burdens of HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis. 
Its chief role in development assistance is arguably as a model for other countries in terms of 
clinical research, advocacy, policy. Though South Africa receives more funds than it donates, 
it does contribute to foreign assistance for health through multilateral agencies, bilateral 
partnerships, and South-South cooperation. Its assistance is delivered mainly in the form of 
grants and technical support to other African countries. South Africa hosts a number of 
important research institutes and is a regional center for research and development of medicines 
and vaccines for various infectious diseases. Generic drugs, including first-line ARVs, are 
produced domestically (Tytel et al., 2012). 
While the BRICS have declared that health collaboration is a priority, they haven’t yet begun 
working collectively to enhance the impact of their assistance programs. Of the bloc, China has 
contributed the largest sum of foreign assistance to low-income countries approximating US$50 
billion, as of 2012 (Grépin et al., 2014, AidData, 2016). Overall, health has been a main focus 
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of Brazil and Russia’s foreign assistance agendas, while it has been less emphasized in the 
agendas of China, India, and South Africa (Tytel et al., 2012). 
 
Non-BRICS emerging economies 
Aside from the BRICS, there are a number of non-DAC countries increasing their official 
development assistance. For example, the United Arab Emirates reached the highest GNI ratio 
of ODA of any country at 1.17 percent (MDG Monitor, 2016). Turkey doubled its aid between 
2011 and 2012 (Figure 8) (Di Commo, 2014). More recently, Hungary, Estonia increased their 
aid between 2013 and 2014 by 24.4, 19.2, and 8.2 percent, respectively (MDG Monitor, 2016). 
In all, ODA from non-DAC providers is approaching 20 percent of total ODA (OECD, 2016e).
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Figure 8. Development finance from non-DAC providers reporting to OECD, 2000–2013 
(billions, US$) (UN, 2015) 
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Currently some of these donors provide data through national reporting systems that are not 
formatted for cross-comparison with other donors, and for others only rough estimates are 
available (Steensen, 2014). Though in-country stakeholders are familiar with many non-
BRICS, non-DAC actors, for now the volume of assistance by sector and recipient remains 
unclear (Chapter 5). Until we have more information and comparable statistics, it is impossible 
to evaluate the effectiveness of this assistance.  
 
1.4 The Global Fund 
The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (Global Fund) is a financial 
instrument established in early 2002 (Sherry et al., 2009). Its formation was part of the 
“emergency response to accelerate the scale-up of control of the major communicable diseases, 
especially HIV/AIDS” in light of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (Biesma et al., 
2009). Although it is a relatively young organization, it has quickly adapted to practicing within 
global governance standards. It reports it disbursements to the OECD DAC and is a member of 
the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) (OECD, 2016g, IATI, 2016b). 
By the end of 2015 the Global Fund had saved an estimated 20 million lives (The Global Fund, 
2016e). It is the largest finance channel for malaria and tuberculosis, providing US$920 million 
and US$610 million, respectively, in 2014 (40 and 49 percent of total support, respectively) 
(IHME, 2016). It is the second largest channel for HIV/AIDS, behind the President’s 
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), providing US$1.7 billion in 2014 (16 percent of 
total support) (IHME, 2016). Along with funding the three diseases, it provides both disease-
specific and system-level health systems support (Warren et al., 2013). 
Since its inception, it has disbursed more than US$30.6 billion (The Global Fund, 2016a). In 
terms of overall contribution, the Global Fund was responsible for nine percent of funding for 
global health in 2015; it reached its maximum in 2012 and 2013 when it oversaw the 
disbursement of 12 percent of the total funds dedicated to DAH (IHME, 2016). 
Governments provide approximately 95 percent of Global Fund support; the private sector 
provides remaining 5 percent (The Global Fund, 2016o). For this reason, the Global Fund is 
considered a public-private partnership. Although the private sector does not provide a 
significant amount of finance they do contribute significantly to the agency’s governance. They 
are represented by two of 20 voting constituencies (Table 7).   
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Table 7. Voting constituencies of the Global Fund Board 
Implementer Bloc   Donor Bloc 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia  Canada and Switzerland 
Eastern Mediterranean  European Commission** 
Eastern and Southern Africa  France 
Latin American and the Caribbean  Germany 
Southeast Asia  Japan 
West and Central Africa  Point Seven*** 
Western Pacific Region  United Kingdom and Australia 
Communities*  United States 
Developed Countries NGOs  Prvate Foundations 
Developing Countries NGOs   Private Sector 
*NGOs representative of the communities living with the diseases; **Belgium, Italy, Portugal, Spain; ***Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden (The Global Fund, 2014) 
 
Earlier this year the Global Fund had its fifth replenishment where donors committed US$12.9 
billion for the next three years (The Global Fund, 2016c). It raised more over US$1 billion more 
than the previous replenishment (Figure 9). Many bilateral donors increased their pledges, 
private donors more than doubled their total contribution, and several low- and middle-income 
countries made pledges to show their commitment to the global fight against the three diseases 
(The Global Fund, 2016c). 
This most recent replenishment demonstrates continued support after a couple of tumultuous 
years and subsequent reform. In 2010 the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) conducted 
investigations into allegations of fraud, corruption, and misuse of funds in seven countries (The 
Global Fund - OIG, 2010). Shortly thereafter the Global Fund received its largest 
replenishment, to date, at US$11.7 billion (Figure 9).  
On 23 January 2011, the Associated Press published a story, “Fraud Plagues Global Health 
Fund” (Heilprin, 2011). More than 250 media outlets worldwide covered the story and within 
days Germany froze its contribution to the Global Fund (Rivers, 2011). Over the coming months 
the Global Fund underwent independent review, re-visited its 5-year strategy, and committed 
to urgent reform (The Global Fund, 2011c, The Global Fund, 2011b, The Global Fund, 2011a). 
Within one year, Gabriel Jaramillo, former Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Sovereign 
Bank, was appointed as General Manager to oversee the transformation plan (The Global Fund, 
2012b). 
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Figure 9. Global Fund replenishments 
(The Global Fund, 2005a, The Global Fund, 2005b, The Global Fund, 2007, The Global Fund, 2010c, The Global Fund, 2013a, The Global Fund, 2016p) 
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Reforms resulted in what became known as the New Funding Model (NFM). It has five key 
characteristics: flexible timeline, simplified grant application processes, shorter approval 
processes, enhanced engagement of all partners prior to grant submission, and improved 
predictability of funding (The Global Fund, 2016b). In short, the reform focuses on processes, 
not structure or paradigm (Chapter 6). 
The OIG systematically audited recipients and identified $118 million in losses as of 19 
September 2013 (Garmaise, 2013). It is important to note that these losses are only 0.5 percent 
of the $22.7 billion that the Global Fund had disbursed worldwide at the time (The Global Fund, 
2016d). Overall, the Global Fund has a particularly high level of financial accountability and is 
diligent in its response to these relatively small abuses (Figure 10). 
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F 
Figure 10. Quality of Global Fund assistance, 2014 
Zero represents the average score. Scores within the gray diamond are below the mean and scores outside it are above the 
mean. Scores outside the range -3 to 3 are rounded to those values for display (CGD, 2016). 
 
In the Center for Global Development’s evaluation of development assistance quality, the 
Global Fund scored better than average on 19 of the out of the 24 indicators that it was scored 
on (Figure 10).  Overall it scored above the mean (when compared to OECD DAC donors) in 
the dimensions Maximizing Efficiency, Reducing Burden, and Transparency and Learning. It 
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scored below the mean for Fostering Institutions (CGD, 2016). Out of 33 donor agencies, the 
Global Fund was ranked first in Maximizing Efficiency, fifth in Transparency and Learning, 13 
in Reducing Burden, and 27 for Fostering Institutions (CGD, 2016).  
The low score for Fostering Institutions was in part due to poor aid predictability, but this could 
improve with the changes associated with the New Funding Model (Garmaise, 2013). An 
additional weakness in the Fostering Institutions dimension is that much of Global Fund’s 
finance does not go through the public financial management systems and is therefore not 
reflected in recipients’ budgets (Birdsall and Kharas, 2014). Issues such as use of recipient 
country systems need to be tackled at the governance level. 
Identifying quality of assistance is particularly useful for an agency such as the Global Fund. 
They have proven themselves capable of reform which is unique for a large-scale organization 
(Hanrieder, 2016, Kelland, 2016). This direct comparison of the Global Fund and the bilateral 
agencies of its funders allows for a focused sharing of best practices among Board 
constituencies. Such discussions could also have a trickle-down effect for private foundations 
and corporations who are on the Board. Overall, the Global Fund is an example of a highly 
successful global health institution and emerging donor. 
 
1.5 Donor darlings and orphans 
This thesis focuses on the influence of emerging actors in health development in Chad, Ghana, 
Mozambique, and Tanzania- four countries that span the donor-darling / donor-orphan 
spectrum (Van de Maele et al., 2013). Chad is classified as a “donor orphan”; it is ranked in the 
bottom 10 in terms of commitments and disbursements of DAH based on the OECD’s DAC’s 
credit reporting system (CRS) (Table 9). Using the same indicators, Mozambique is classified 
as “donor darling” (Table 8). Likewise, Tanzania is classified as a darling using the Global 
Health Expenditure Database. Ghana falls between a darling and an orphan across all three 
classifications (Van de Maele et al., 2013).  
This phenomena reflects gaps in coordination amongst donors (MDG Gap Task Force, 2015). 
Coordination for health typically happens at the country-level for specific activities, but as the 
donor-darling / -orphan gaps illustrate, more can be done at the global level to ensure that 
resource allocation becomes more needs-based. 
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Table 8. Top 10 development assistance for health countries, by data source (2012) 
Expenditure (GHED)   Commitments (OECD DAC CRS)   Disbursements (OECD DAC CRS) 
Country US$*   Country US$*   Country US$* 
Namibia 353   Botswana 465   Botswana 389 
Botswana 303   Namibia 412   Namibia 321 
Zambia 167   Swaziland 263   Zambia 207 
Rwanda 130   Zambia 258   Swaziland 187 
Swaziland 119   Lesotho 231   Rwanda 172 
Malawi 116   Rwanda 218   Malawi 136 
Lesotho 84   Malawi 172   Mozambique 132 
United Republic of 
Tanzania 76   Mozambique 159   Lesotho 121 
Uganda 74   Liberia 155   Liberia 109 
Gambia 70   Uganda 125   Uganda 108 
*per capita US$ (Van de Maele et al., 2013) 
 
Table 9. Bottom 10 development assistance for health countries, by data source (2012) 
Expenditure (GHED)   Commitments (OECD DAC CRS)   Disbursements (OECD DAC CRS) 
Country US$*   Country US$*   Country US$* 
Mauritius 3   Mauritius 6   Mauritius 5 
Guinea 16   Sudan 27   Sudan 24 
Central African Republic 17   Guinea 32   Cameroon 29 
Sudan 23   Chad 33   Guinea 32 
Nigeria 23   Cameroon 36   Nigeria 32 
DRC 25   Madagascar 44   DRC 35 
Congo 27   Nigeria 45   Chad 39 
Madagascar 30   DRC 48   Togo 39 
Côte d'Ivoire 30   Central African Republic 48   Côte d'Ivoire 42 
Angola 31   Mauritania 48   Angola 45 
*per capita US$ (Van de Maele et al., 2013) 
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1.6 Rationale for thesis 
From 2003, sub-Saharan Africa consistently received the largest share of DAH. On average, it 
accounts for more than 24.5 percent of total international expenditure on health from 2000 to 
2012. The vast majority of its support comes from governments, multilateral agencies, and 
partnerships such as the Global Fund and the GAVI Alliance (IHME, 2015). It is difficult to 
tease out how much support comes from private sources as they enter recipient countries 
through other channels, ex. NGOs. The majority of money coming from private foundations 
and corporations is deemed unallocatable. The only private foundation that was tracked from 
source to recipient was the BMGF which allocated 25.3 percent of its funds to sub-Saharan 
Africa in 2012 (IHME, 2015). 
Shared roles and responsibilities blur the division between the private and public sectors’ aims 
and responsibilities (Buse and Walt, 2000). This raises concerns about legitimacy, 
accountability, and international cooperation (Hein and Kickbusch, 2010b) as well as concerns 
over potential conflicts of interest (Stuckler et al., 2011a), divergence from national strategies, 
and lack of harmonization among donors (Piva and Dodd, 2009). The influence of increasing 
plurality of the global health financing system on the coherence, efficiency, and effectiveness 
of health development programmes requires further investigation (McCoy, 2012). 
A growing proportion of development assistance for health comes from “unofficial” sources 
and therefore isn’t tracked or properly evaluated. Although many emerging donors have 
expressed support for international aid effectiveness principles, the influence of their support at 
country-level and there level of adherence to international guidelines has been unclear. 
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2. Aims and Objectives 
2.1 Aims 
This thesis aims to contribute to the literature on development assistance for health and the 
influence of emerging donors for health, specifically the Global Fund, philanthropic 
foundations, corporate social responsibility, and emerging economies. It provides a glimpse of 
in-country perceptions of the successes and challenges of working with these partners.  
The insights gained from this research can contribute a greater understanding of the priorities 
of stakeholders who work within recipient health systems as well as the culture of managing 
development assistance for health in-country. 
2.2 Objectives 
The overarching goal of this PhD thesis is to provide country-level insights of the nature and 
influence of emerging actors in the development assistance for health landscape. Each of the 
four case-study countries has a different existing relationship with providers of official 
development assistance to health. It was unknown if the trends are reflected in relationships 
with new donors or if donors who act outside of “official” development assistance channels 
establish their own unique norms. 
This thesis has three broad objectives: 
Objective 1 : To understand the nature of emerging donors’ development assistance for 
health in selected sub-Sahara African countries 
Specific objectives: 
• To illustrate the visibility of emerging economies and private donors acting in global 
health 
• To understand the range of activities supported by emerging donors 
• To uncover the type of assistance coming from emerging donors- financial or in-kind 
 
 
 
Objective 2 : To understand the influence of emerging donors’ development assistance 
for health in selected sub-Sahara African countries 
Specific objectives: 
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• How emerging donors influence country-level activity, in terms of: 
o achieving health outcomes 
o aid effectiveness 
o interactions among existing stakeholders 
o mechanisms for aid management 
• The successes and challenges of the Global Fund from the recipient’s perspective 
 
Objective 3 : To identify prospective roles and models of engagement with non-
traditional actors in development assistance for health 
Given the existing nature and influence of emerging donors in health, what do in-country 
stakeholders think are realistic expectations regarding role and responsibility of emerging 
donors for health should be? What are country-level stakeholder priorities for future 
engagement?   
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3. Summary Methods 
3.1 Study areas 
Chad, Ghana, Mozambique, and Tanzania are located in the Central, Western, Southern, and 
Eastern regions of sub-Saharan Africa, respectively (Figure 11).  
 
 
Figure 11. Map, case-study countries 
 
Tanzania is almost twice as populous as Ghana and Mozambique and has almost four times the 
population of Chad (Table 10). Its economy has remained relatively stable, in terms of GDP 
annual growth, since 2012 when it climbed steeply from an annual growth rate of 5.1. Likewise, 
Mozambique’s growth has remained steady around 6.3 since 2009. On the other hand, Chad’s 
economy has been volatile reaching a growth rate of 33.6 in 2004 and dropping to 0.6 in 2006. 
Most recently it has dropped from 6.9 in 2014 to 1.8. Ghana has been in steep decline since 
2011 from its high of 14.0 (The World Bank, 2016). 
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Three of the four countries- Chad, Mozambique, and Tanzania- are placed in the “low human 
development” category (UNDP, 2015). They rank 185, 180, and 151, respectively, out of 188 
countries. Chad and Mozambique scored lower than the composite for least-developed 
countries (0.502). Ghana is ranked at 140 and is categorized with “medium human 
development”.  Compared to the entire region, Ghana and Tanzania have surpassed the average 
national adult literacy rate, but Ghana is the only country of the four to approach the regional 
rates for secondary education. Chad, Ghana, and Tanzania are plagued by limited capacity 
which inevitably spills over into health system management and performance (Chapter 6). 
The four countries have relatively similar profiles in terms of government health expenditure 
but notable difference in total health expenditure due to the differences in level of external 
support (Table 11).  
Total health expenditure per capita is lower in all four case-study countries than the region as a 
whole. Government expenditure on health as a percent of total health expenditure is comparable 
across all four countries with all except Tanzania around ten percent more than the region. 
When it comes to how much of the total government budget is dedicated to health, Tanzania’s 
government dedicates the largest proportion of its purse (12.3 percent), Chad and 
Mozambique’s dedicate roughly the same proportion (9.0 and 8.8, respectively), and Ghana is 
far behind at 6.8 percent (WHO, 2016b). This indicator is an approximation of how a 
government prioritizes health among the sectors. Remarkably the governments of Chad and 
Ghana, who represent this sample’s lowest and highest human development scores, are 
responsible for roughly the same proportion of total health expenditure and Chad’s government 
dedicates more of its budget to health than Ghana’s. 
There are large disparities among the countries in terms official development assistance for 
health with divergence over time (Figure 12). Mozambique receives almost triple ODA for 
health per capita. Although these two have consistently represented the two extremes in our 
sample set since 2007, 2013 appears to have been a defining moment. Whereas Chad, Ghana, 
Tanzania, and the African region as a whole all saw a decrease in ODA for health per capita, 
Mozambique’s increased. Despite this increase, ODA for health as a percentage of total health 
expenditure in Mozambique continues to decrease (Figure 13) as a result of the government’s 
increased spending for health in recent years (data not shown). 
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Table 10. Case-study countries: selected comparative indicators  
  Chad Ghana Mozambique Tanzania 
African 
Region 
Population (millions*) 14.0 27.4 28.0 53.5 100.0 
Urban population (% of total) 23 54 32 28 … 
Gross national income per capita (PPP int. $)* 2,110 4,070 1,170 2,620 3,562 
GDP per capita (then-current US$)* 775.7 1,381.4 525.0 864.9 1,571.3 
GDP annual growth rate* 1.8 3.9 6.3 7.0 3.0 
% population that lives below international poverty line    
($1.25 per day) 36.5 29.0 60.7 43.5 … 
Adult literacy rate 37.3 71.5 50.6 67.8 60** 
% population with at least some secondary education, 
female (ages 25 and older) 1.7 45.2 1.4 5.6 52** 
% population with at least some secondary education, 
male (ages 25 and older) 9.9 64.7 6.2 9.5 69** 
Human Development Index 0.392 0.579 0.416 0.521 0.518 
 
(UNDP, 2015, The World Bank, 2016) *World Bank estimates for 2015; ** World Bank estimates for 2010 
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Table 11. Case-study countries: selected health financing indicators 
  Chad Ghana Mozambique Tanzania African Region 
Per capita total health expenditure (PPP int. $) 79 145 79 137 228 
Total health expenditure as % of GDP 3.6 3.6 7.0 5.6 5.5 
Government expenditure on health as % of total health expenditure 54.7 59.9 56.4 46.4 47.8 
Government expenditure on health as % of total government expenditure 9.0 6.8 8.8 12.3 10.0 
Official development assistance for health disbursements per capita* 4.2 6.5 12.1 6.9 5.6 
External resources for health as % of total health expenditure 19.4 15.4 48.7 35.9 9.6 
World Health Organization estimates for 2014 (WHO, 2016b) 
* World Bank Population estimates, 2015 (The World Bank, 2016) and OECD ODA CRS statistics (OECD, 2016g) 
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Figure 12. ODA for health per capita, disbursements 
Based on World Bank Population estimates, 2015 (The World Bank, 2016) and OECD ODA CRS statistics (OECD, 2016g) 
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Overall, Mozambique and Tanzania rely more heavily on external resources for health than 
Chad and Ghana (Figure 13). It is unclear why Tanzania’s degree of reliance on external finance 
for health varies so much from year to year while ODA for health per capita, government 
expenditure for health as proportion of total spending, and its economy are relatively stable. 
The composition and disbursement size of health development actors in the countries also vary 
(Table 12). 
As of 2010, Chad  had 20 sources of ODA for health (9 bilateral, 11 multilateral) and six of 
them disbursed less than US$1 million (WHO, 2012a). At the other extreme, Mozambique had 
31 sources (20 bilateral, 11 multilateral) and only six disbursed less than US$1 million (WHO, 
2012c). 
All of these elements culminate in varied and dynamic health financing landscapes at the 
country-level. These statistics only account for official development assistance and do not 
capture flows from philanthropic foundations, corporate social responsibility programs, or any 
of the emerging economies, including the BRICS. 
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Figure 13. External resources for health (percent of total expenditure) 
(WHO, 2016b)  
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Table 12. Top 5 sources of disbursements for health, case-study countries (2009-2010) 
Chad  Ghana  Mozambique  Tanzania 
Source %   Source %   Source %   Source % 
the Global Fund 37.8   the Global Fund 27.5   United States 43.4   United States 41.0 
UNFPA 12.6   United States 17.5   the Global Fund 10.0   the Global Fund 19.3 
UNICEF 9.1   United Kingdom 12.1   Ireland 5.6   IDA 9.3 
GAVI 7.7   Netherlands 10.9   United Kingdom 4.8   Germany 4.8 
EU Institutions 6.1   Denmark 10.1   Canada 4.7   Denmark 4.4 
(WHO, 2012a, WHO, 2012b, WHO, 2012c, WHO, 2012d) 
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3.2 Primary data collection 
Data was collected as part of a larger study on the influence of emerging donors in health 
development (SNIS, 2012). For the purpose of the larger study “emerging donors” includes 
philanthropic foundations, corporate social responsibility programmes, public-private 
partnerships, Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, and other emerging economies. Private 
sources of finance were defined as philanthropic foundations and corporate social responsibility 
programmes (CSR). Investigators conducted face-to-face semi-structured in-depth interviews 
with 88 key informants from the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Finance, health or development 
attachés of partner embassies in-country, selected UN agencies, local research institutions, the 
African Development Bank, and independent consultants. Interviews were held in the offices 
of key informants in N’Djamena, Chad; Accra, Ghana; Maputo, Mozambique; and Dar es 
Salaam, Tanzania. One in-depth interview was conducted by Skype. Interviews lasted 
approximately one hour but ranged from 45 minutes to three hours. Interviewers held an 
additional five brief discussions with relevant experts for country and/or development context 
(Table 10). In N’Djamena investigators were invited to, and attended, a meeting hosted by the 
Country Coordinating Mechanism (the partnership of local stakeholders responsible for Global 
Fund grant development, submission, and, upon approval, oversight). 
Investigators contacted prospective interviewees via email. We obtained email addresses 
through professional contacts and government websites. Emails contained a brief description 
of the research team, overall research questions and objectives, and methods. Respondents 
suggested additional interviewee(s) who were then contacted directly by the research team.  
Interviews in Ghana and Tanzania were conducted in English. In Chad, ten interviews were 
conducted in French and six in English. The meeting of the Country Coordinating Mechanism 
was held in French. One investigator is a Francophone and the other an Anglophone 
(accompanied by a local translator). In Mozambique discussions were held primarily in English 
with periodic clarifications in Portuguese as one investigator speaks Portuguese fluently. 
Investigators took detailed notes during the discussion. When more than one investigator was 
present for an interview, notes were compared after transcription. 
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Table 13. Interviewees by institution 
  Academic Institutions Consultants 
Coordination 
Bodies 
Government 
Officials 
Multilateral 
Institutions NGOs 
OECD 
partners Total 
Chad 0 4 2 4 9 1 4 24 
Ghana 1 1 2 4 6 3 0 17 
Mozambique 0 2 2 2 6 2 11 25 
Tanzania 3 2 0 5 7 0 10 27 
Total 4 9 6 15 28 6 25 93 
*includes face-to-face interviews, Skype call, and four respondents added in follow-up emails with MZ and TZ 
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Interviewers used a semi-structured interview guide (Annex 1). Discussions included questions 
about interviewees’ perspectives on overall changes in development assistance for health and 
resulting influences at country-level. Interviewers sought perceptions about who were the most 
influential private sources of finance and knowledge of actors’ activities in-country. 
Interviewers asked open-ended questions about private actors’ engagement with other donors, 
the recipient government, and their prospective roles in the country’s health development 
landscape. 
Key informants in Tanzania received follow-up emails eleven months post-interview to 
ascertain relevant changes in the donor landscape. Eleven interviewees responded and two 
referred the investigators to new respondents. Key informants in Mozambique received follow-
up emails nine months after the initial interview. Again, eleven responded and two referred the 
investigators to new respondents who provided input. 
3.3 Analysis 
The corresponding author combined interviewers' notes into one Microsoft Word document per 
interviewee and organized the material into fundamental themes- type of donor, aid 
management, health system, country context, etc. The corresponding author uploaded interview 
notes into MAXQDA 11 (UdoKuckartz; Berlin, Germany) and read each at least three times. 
Each successive reading was accompanied by descriptive, analytic, and thematic coding, 
respectively.  
Chapter 4 Stakeholder perceptions in sub-Sahara Africa of private assistance for health and 
principles of aid effectiveness - Thematic coding revealed that discussions fit within the Paris 
Declaration Framework, i.e. the five pillars of ownership, alignment, harmonization, managing 
for results, and mutual accountability.  
Chapter 5 Engaging with emerging economies for health development: a case-study of four sub-
Sahara African countries – Interviews were coded by donor country and sub-themes were 
identified. Thematic codes revealed common strengths and challenges of working with 
emerging economies. 
Chapter 6 The Global Fund’s paradigm of oversight, monitoring, and results in Mozambique – 
Coding revealed that discussions centered on the Global Fund paradigm (governance and 
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structures), its approach to monitoring results, and partnerships with other donors. A framework 
was created to cover these elements of the Global Fund - recipient relationship. 
Interview notes were indexed using the respective frameworks and included sub-themes as 
determined by the initial analytic coding (Gale et al., 2013).  
To maintain respondents’ anonymity, each interviewee was given a label: two letter country 
code, professional affiliation, and number (based on chronological order of interviews of people 
with same professional affiliation). For example, “TDConsultant2” the second consultant 
interviewed in Chad. 
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4.1 Abstract 
Development assistance for health (DAH) has increased substantially in the last 15 years, and 
the global health landscape continues to evolve into an increasingly complex network of actors 
and institutions. Overall, private capital flows are now the largest portion of finance from 
developed countries to developing countries, but it is unclear how much of this is DAH. The 
influence of increasing plurality of the global health financing system on the coherence, 
efficiency, and effectiveness of health development programmes requires further investigation. 
In this paper we report results of the influence of private donors on health development in Chad, 
Ghana, Mozambique, and Tanzania- four countries that span the donor-darling / donor-orphan 
spectrum. We conducted face-to-face semi-structured in-depth interviews with 93 key 
informants from government ministries, bilateral and multilateral agencies, local research 
institutions, and independent consultants. Thematic coding revealed that discussions on private 
donors fit within the Paris Declaration Framework, i.e. the five pillars of ownership, alignment, 
harmonization, managing for results, and mutual accountability. Small-scale engagement 
makes harmonization more difficult and more necessary, but private actors are absent from 
coordination groups at the country-level. Therefore development partners know little of how 
private actors are engaged in the health sector. Private finance for health is not necessarily 
aligned with country priorities or strengthening country health systems. This type of assistance 
is complementary to conventional bi- and multi-lateral assistance, but in order to limit further 
fragmentation, emerging donors should be informed of, and included in, development partner 
group discussions. 
 
Key words 
Development assistance for health ; philanthropy ; corporate social responsibility ; Paris 
Declaration ; aid effectiveness 
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4.2 Introduction 
 
Development assistance for health (DAH) has increased substantially in the last 15 years, and 
the global health landscape continues to evolve into an increasingly complex system of actors 
(Kickbusch and Szabo, 2014). For example, more than 100 well-endowed global health 
initiatives, such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, have been 
established (Samb et al., 2009) since 2000. Across all sectors, private capital flows have become 
the largest portion of financial flows from developed countries to developing countries 
(Adelman et al., 2011). It is unclear how much of this private investment from remittances, 
philanthropic groups, and other capital resource transfers is motivated by development 
concerns, and how much of that is DAH.  
Although global health initiatives have become the archetype for development assistance for 
health at country level, there is a notable growth in the number of major philanthropic 
foundations (with the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation as the predominant example). 
Furthermore, corporations have developed corporate responsibility programmes, and there are 
drug donation programmes, spontaneous individual contributions to humanitarian emergencies, 
and international aid campaigns (Stoianova, 2012). 
In 2005 more than 100 developed and developing countries agreed upon five principles of aid 
effectiveness in the Paris Declaration - ownership of development policies and strategies, 
alignment of aid with country priorities and systems, harmonization of donor practices, 
managing for results, and mutual accountability (OECD, 2005). In 2011, at the Fourth High 
Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, in Busan, South Korea, development partners agreed to 
update the five aid effectiveness principles. Analogs of the Paris Declaration pillars of 
ownership, managing for results, and mutual accountability were carried forward, but alignment 
and harmonization were replaced by “inclusive development partnerships”. The most 
noticeable deletion is language about alignment of resources with national strategies (Fourth 
High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, 2011).  
The 2014 Global Partnership on Effective Development Cooperation High-Level meeting in 
Mexico was the first high-level discussion on aid effectiveness that included private 
stakeholders (Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, 2014). In the report for the 
Third International Conference for Financing for Development in July 2015, participants 
acknowledged the contributions from philanthropists but called for increased transparency, 
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accountability, and alignment with country strategies and systems (OECD NetFWD, 2014). 
There was no mention of coordinating efforts with other actors. 
With the global financial crisis, many began to question the effects of a long-term recession on 
development and identified potential corrective actions (Over, 2009, Batniji and Woods, 2009, 
Garrett, 2009, USAID, 2009). Others insisted the global recession would be unlikely to affect 
bilateral levels of DAH (Stuckler et al., 2011c). Years later the discussion persists, while 
treatment programmes have been discontinued, and aid revenue decreased (Bennett, 2012, 
Gravier-Rymaszewska, 2012, IHME, 2011, Dieleman et al., 2016). Likely the overall ratio of 
private to public spending will continue changing at a noteworthy rate.  
In 2014, corporations provided $662 million (1.9%) for DAH. Other private sources amounted 
to $2.7 billion (7.4%) of DAH; this figure includes charitable giving and philanthropy excluding 
the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (IHME, 2015). 74.8% was provided to NGOs in 2014 
($2.5 billion); UN agencies and the Global Fund also received shares. The Bill and Melinda 
Gates Foundation (BMGF) is the largest single source of private finance for global health. In 
2014 alone, the BMGF accounted for 8.1% of total DAH and 46.6% of private funding flows 
for global health ($2.9 billion USD) (IHME, 2015). Overall, private philanthropy has grown 
more substantially than corporate donations over the last decade (IHME, 2015). Despite the 
inclusion of private actors in recent aid effectiveness discussions, few philanthropic actors 
appear to be aware of the principles first outlined in 2005 (OECD, 2005). BMGF is the only 
foundation that currently adheres to the principles outlined by the 2011 Busan Partnership for 
Effective Development Cooperation (UNDP, 2014). 
From 2003, sub-Saharan Africa consistently received the largest share of DAH. On average, it 
accounts for more than 24.5% of total international expenditure on health from 2000 to 2012. 
The vast majority of its support comes from governments, multilateral agencies, and 
partnerships such as the Global Fund and the GAVI Alliance (IHME, 2015). It is difficult to 
tease out how much support comes from private sources as they enter recipient countries 
through other channels, ex. NGOs. The majority of money coming from private foundations 
and corporations is deemed unallocatable. The only private foundation that was tracked from 
source to recipient was the BMGF which allocated 25.3% of its funds to sub-Saharan Africa in 
2012 (IHME, 2015). 
Shared roles and responsibilities blur the division between the private and public sectors’ aims 
and responsibilities (Buse and Walt, 2000). This raises concerns about legitimacy, 
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accountability, and international cooperation (Hein and Kickbusch, 2010b) as well as concerns 
over potential conflicts of interest (Stuckler et al., 2011a), divergence from national strategies, 
and lack of harmonization among donors (Piva and Dodd, 2009). The influence of increasing 
plurality of the global health financing system on the coherence, efficiency, and effectiveness 
of health development programmes requires further investigation (McCoy, 2012). In this paper 
we report results of the influence of private donors on health sector development in Chad, 
Ghana, Mozambique, and Tanzania- four countries that span the donor-darling / donor-orphan 
spectrum (Van de Maele et al., 2013). Chad is classified as a “donor orphan”; it is ranked in the 
bottom 10 countries in terms of commitments and disbursements of DAH based on the OECD’s 
Development Assistance Committee’s credit reporting system (DAC CRS). Using the same 
indicators, Mozambique is classified as “donor darling”. Likewise, Tanzania is classified as a 
darling using the Global Health Expenditure Database. Ghana falls between a darling and an 
orphan across all three classifications (Van de Maele et al., 2013).  
 
4.3 Methods 
Primary data collection 
Data was collected as part of a larger study on the influence of emerging donors in health 
development (SNIS, 2012). For the purpose of the larger study “emerging donors” includes 
philanthropic foundations, corporate social responsibility programmes, public-private 
partnerships, Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (the BRICS), and other emerging 
economies. Private sources of finance were defined as philanthropic foundations and corporate 
social responsibility programmes (CSR). Investigators conducted face-to-face semi-structured 
in-depth interviews with 88 key informants from the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Finance, 
health or development attachés of bi- and multilateral agencies, local research institutions, the 
African Development Bank, and independent consultants. Interviews were held in the offices 
of key informants in N’Djamena, Chad; Accra, Ghana; Maputo, Mozambique; and Dar es 
Salaam, Tanzania. One in-depth interview was conducted by telephone. Interviews lasted 
approximately one hour but ranged from 45 minutes to three hours. Interviewers held an 
additional five brief discussions with relevant experts for country and/or development context 
(Table 14). In N’Djamena investigators were invited to, and attended, a meeting hosted by the 
Washington, D.C.-based Grant Management Solutions (a USAID-funded technical body 
founded to support Global Fund principle recipients (GMS, 2016)). 
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Table 14. Interviewees by institution 
  Academic Institutions Consultants 
Coordination 
Bodies 
Government 
Officials 
Multilateral 
Institutions NGOs 
OECD 
partners Total 
Chad 0 4 2 4 9 1 4 24 
Ghana 1 1 2 4 6 3 0 17 
Mozambique 0 2 2 2 6 2 11 25 
Tanzania 3 2 0 5 7 0 10 27 
Total 4 9 6 15 28 6 25 93 
*includes face-to-face interviews, telephone call, and four respondents added in follow-up emails with MZ and TZ 
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We contacted prospective interviewees via email. We obtained email addresses through 
professional contacts and government websites. Emails contained a brief description of the 
research team, overall research questions and objectives, and methods. Respondents suggested 
additional interviewee(s) who were then contacted directly by the research team.  
Interviews in Ghana and Tanzania were conducted in English. In Chad, ten interviews were 
conducted in French and six in English. The meeting of the Country Coordinating Mechanism 
was held in French. One investigator is a Francophone and the other an Anglophone 
(accompanied by a local translator). In Mozambique discussions were held primarily in English 
with periodic clarifications in Portuguese as one investigator speaks Portuguese fluently. 
Investigators took detailed notes during the discussion. When more than one investigator was 
present for an interview, notes were compared after transcription. 
We used a semi-structured interview guide (see Annex 1). Discussions included questions about 
interviewees’ perspectives and experiences of overall changes in development assistance for 
health and resulting influences at country-level. Interviewers sought perceptions about who 
were the most influential private sources of finance and knowledge of actors’ activities in-
country. We asked open-ended questions about private actors’ engagement with other donors, 
the recipient government, and their prospective roles in the country’s health development 
landscape. 
Key informants in Tanzania received follow-up emails eleven months post-interview to 
ascertain further developments in the donor landscape. Eleven interviewees responded and two 
referred the investigators to new respondents. Key informants in Mozambique received follow-
up emails nine months after the initial interview. Again, eleven responded and two referred the 
investigators to new respondents who provided input. 
Analysis 
The corresponding author combined interviewers' notes into one Microsoft Word document per 
interviewee and organized the material into fundamental themes- type of donor, aid 
management, health system, country context, etc. These were uploaded into MAXQDA 11 
(UdoKuckartz; Berlin, Germany) and read each at least three times by the corresponding author. 
Each successive reading was accompanied by descriptive, analytic, and thematic coding, 
respectively. Thematic coding revealed that discussions fit within the original Paris Declaration 
Framework, i.e. the five pillars of ownership, alignment, harmonization, managing for results, 
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and mutual accountability. Interview notes were indexed using the framework and included 
sub-themes as determined by the initial analytic coding (Gale et al., 2013).  
To preserve respondents’ anonymity, each interviewee was given a label: two letter country 
code, professional affiliation, and number (based on chronological order of interviews of people 
with same professional affiliation). For example, “TDConsultant2” the second consultant 
interviewed in Chad. 
4.4 Results and Discussion 
Overview in case-study countries 
Despite the marked increase in private finance for health, discussions with health ministry 
officials and development partners at the country-level painted a different picture. Many 
interviewees concluded that although private actors work in these countries, their contributions 
are not visibly influential in the health sector. For example, government interviewees had heard 
of private financiers acting in Chad but had never seen any outcome of their activities 
(TDGovernment2). Respondents in all four countries perceive foundations and CSR 
programmes to have a narrow scope and provide one-off project assistance. In Chad and Ghana, 
interviewees commented that support from private actors has been increasing and that this trend 
will likely continue. One interviewee from Chad drew from his experience in other contexts 
and suggested that economic transitions present openings for unconventional financiers 
(TDConsultant1). This could also apply to Mozambique where foreign direct investment, 
government revenue, and lending, have all increased, changing the balance and influence of 
traditional donors.  
Private financiers are seen to be complementary sources of finance. Their contributions are 
welcome due to financial challenges, but they contribute to fragmentation and do not feed their 
experience back into their aid approaches. Overall, interviewees’ observations and concerns 
about the influence of private assistance were consistent with the themes outlined in the Paris 
Declaration, particularly alignment and harmonization of assistance. 
Alignment 
Alignment refers to coherence of support with recipient countries’ development strategies and 
policies, as well as strengthening country systems (OECD-DAC, 2009). Philanthropic 
foundations’ priorities and strategies differ from bilateral donors because they are determined 
more by internal factors than external factors. The interests of the benefactors, donors, or Board 
members dictate the priorities and therefore the themes of funding (Adelman et al., 2011). 
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Regardless of how the different types of organizations develop their strategies, respondents 
largely agreed that private sources of assistance are not adhering to the principles of alignment 
in their respective countries. Like the larger funders, these sources tend to want to impose their 
own agendas (TZAcademic1). 
Overall, interviewees agreed that resources coming from philanthropic sources are 
complementary to conventional development assistance, but replacement isn’t feasible due to 
the narrowly-focussed approach. Respondents in Tanzania highlighted the pros and cons of 
philanthropic foundations’ lack of alignment with national strategies. One interviewee implied 
that foundations’ agendas are ideological rather than needs-based, e.g. Kaiser Foundation 
(USA), …because of the sensitivity of donors, [some] private sources are reluctant to channel 
funds to the critical HIV-infected groups (TZMultilateral5). On the other hand, when the donor 
is more liberal than the government and doesn’t need to worry about political diplomacy, it can 
fill gaps. The Diana Foundation (UK-based) provides funding for HIV/AIDS to fill gaps left by 
government due to systemic stigma (e.g. criminalization of certain behaviors that result in 
increased risk for AIDS – sex workers, men-who-have-sex-with-men” (TZMultilateral5). 
Systems support was a prominent theme of discussions in Chad and Tanzania. In both countries 
there were discordant views on systems support from the BMGF. In Chad one respondent 
recounted that along with polio eradication, BMGF also strengthens routine immunization 
(TDConsultant1). TDConsultant2 stated that BMGF, understands there is need for a fully 
functioning health system. In contrast, a third respondent spontaneously implied that BMGF 
provides no system-level support, Gates should do minimum of training and capacity 
development. Without adequate health systems, even if funded by Gates, medication will not be 
used efficiently; there will be losses due to mismanagement (TDMultilateral9). In Tanzania the 
debate centered upon the Clinton Health Access Initiative which is under the umbrella of the 
Clinton Foundation. Its projects are included in the Health Sector Strategic Plan, and to that 
extent are approved by the government (TZMultilateral3). Likewise, they are involved in 
collaborations for the pay-for-performance scheme, innovative financing mechanisms, and 
systems strengthening (TZOECDPartner4). Another respondent addressed the same area of 
support but with a different opinion. They are very active in terms of money and technical input, 
but they are following their own agenda. They set up a pay-for-performance scheme over the 
past two years and trying to influence policy although the government is not ready to commit 
to a certain type of payment scheme (TZOECDPartner3). This intervention was a source of 
conflict within the development partners group for health (Chimhutu et al., 2015). 
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In Chad and Tanzania, it is difficult to know what causes this discordance. Is the disagreement 
because different respondents / organizations define systems strengthening differently? Also, 
was this topic discussed more frequently because there was a dominant actor in both countries- 
BMGF and Clinton Foundation, respectively? Neither Ghana nor Mozambique had a similarly 
visible source of private funding. Is the health system strengthening debate on development 
actors’ minds because private actors who are so visible are now being held to similar standards 
as conventional donors? In the case of the Clinton Foundation in Tanzania, this debate is 
particularly interesting as it works alongside the health ministry, and all of its projects are 
included the Health Sector Strategic Plan. So although they fully align on paper, there is 
disagreement about who exactly is dictating the strategy.  
In Chad, Mozambique, and Tanzania CSR contributions are small-scale projects with limited 
reach. Interviewees identified the extractive industries, namely oil and gas, as the most visible 
contributors through CSR. In general, these programmes are not focused on the long-term, are 
localized, and target personal interests. Due to lack of evaluation, it is difficult to gauge how 
much they provide in the short-term (MZGovernment1). As one respondent said, The private 
sector is better suited for one-off commitments rather than sustained contributions (MZNGO2). 
Ghana has a unique example of a CSR programme that has been incorporated into a national 
strategy. Presently, AngloGold Ashanti is a Principle Recipient of a Global Fund grant for a 
malaria control programme in 40 districts. It was replicated on AngloGold’s integrated malaria 
programme for employees in Obuasi town and villages of the Obuasi Municipal district. Some 
respondents were not particularly supportive of the programme - though they have experience 
and success in a small locality, they do not necessarily have the technical capacity to scale-up 
to national level. Overall, CSR programmes have contributed minimally. AngloGold Ashanti 
Malaria Control Ltd is an exceptional case, and its formation and level of involvement is due 
to Global Fund support (GHGovernment3). 
Although respondents gave mixed reviews about private actors working within the national 
strategy, they are some of the first of their kind and could provide models for the future. 
Realistically, donors will only provide coherent and cohesive support if governments are clear 
about what they want, spell out their policies, and forge meaningful strategies to act as a 
framework for all domestic and donor resources. Governments must also ensure compliance 
with their own strategies and hold private sector to the same alignment standards used for 
official development assistance for health. 
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Harmonization 
Harmonization, has three principles- coordinated donor actions, simplified procedures, and 
shared information to avoid duplication (4). The World Bank, for instance, emphasizes 
harmonization with key stakeholders in order to organize aid initiatives and finances for the 
health sector (Yiu and Saner, 2011). In-country coordinating bodies are a response to the Paris 
Declaration. They are comprised of bilateral and multilateral agencies that work with the host 
government and domestic non-governmental stakeholders for increased coordination and health 
development effectiveness.  
 In 2014, the OECD Global Network of Foundations Working for Development (netFWD) 
developed the “Guidelines for Effective Philanthropic Engagement” (OECD NetFWD, 2014). 
The three pillars- dialogue, data / knowledge sharing, and partnering- aim to foster “mutual 
recognition between philanthropic actors, governments and development agencies on the basis 
of their respective comparative advantages” (Samb et al., 2009). Essentially, this document 
reflects the recognition of the Paris Declaration’s harmonization pillar as the foundation of 
effective engagement. One could assume that all organizations associated with netFWD would 
abide by this pillar, if none other. Therefore it is surprising that the only foundation adhering to 
the 2011 Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation principles was BMGF 
(Adelman et al., 2011). Although the Busan Agreement does not explicitly address 
harmonization, foundations’ adherence would symbolize their commitment to internationally 
recognized principles. Currently many philanthropic foundations neglect systematic reporting 
of interactions with governmental institutions and other donors operating in-country (Nam et 
al., 2013). 
All four case-study countries have active country-level coordinating bodies. Interviews 
highlighted a distinct absence of private actors in these mechanisms.  
In Chad, new partners are expected to enter the health sector in the established partnership 
framework, but so far it is unclear with whom private actors engage. They lack structured 
policies and focus areas. TDGovernment4 stated that [t]here are difficulties in coordinating 
both conventional and unconventional donors, but it is essential for all to coordinate 
(TDGovernment4). The government convenes meetings once per month to promote dialog with 
donors. Private partners have not been included in coordination bodies led by conventional 
development partners, but  
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The partners group is very formalized and technically open to all, but to-date there 
is no clear criteria for representation. The group of development partners has acted 
somewhat exclusively by not extending the invitation to join to interested, potential 
partners. So the dialog has been stymied. Involvement of non-traditional partners 
is weak perhaps because they are not well-informed or perhaps because they are 
not pro-active (TDMultilateral1). 
In terms of CSR specifically, one respondent reported that the results of their efforts are 
unclear, there are no observers, and there is no cooperation (TDCoordination1).  
In Ghana, respondents were more likely to mention channels for private contributions such as 
the Global Fund or the One Million Community Health Workers Initiative1 rather than 
philanthropic actors. Such partnerships can obfuscate the contributions of different actors from 
the recipient’s perspective. There was a remarkable increase in resources coming from CSR 
programmes in 2012, but perhaps the data are being captured more effectively rather than an 
actual increase (GHGovernment4). Respondents discussed a diverse group of corporate actors 
in Ghana- banks, the Cocoa Board, mining companies, oil and gas companies, and 
telecommunications providers. Ghana’s lack of policy for integrating CSR funds has resulted 
in uncoordinated activities and, ultimately, waste. The Central Medical Stores currently has 
medicines that will not be distributed but must be disposed of. These medicines were likely 
purchased without regard to context or need (GHGovernment2). The Ministry of Health is 
working towards a policy for including the private sector because of these coordination 
challenges. 
One development partner in Tanzania argued that participation in coordination activities 
through the Development Partners Group is not always for the sake of coordination. Clinton is 
the only private foundation participating regularly, albeit opportunistically, in the sector-wide 
approach. They contribute to discussions only to push their agenda rather than moving forward 
together as a group (TZOECDPartner3). With regard to harmonization of actual funds, private 
actors do not provide finance to the sector-wide approach basket because of the lack of visibility 
and lack of “branding” (TZOECDPartner3). 
One interviewee in Mozambique best summarized coordination with corporations in the health 
sector. So far this type of support is uncoordinated, and there is no real model. It is actually 
Corporate Social (Ir)responsibility (MZMultilateral2). Respondents often spontaneously listed 
                                                 
1 http://1millionhealthworkers.org/ “The 1mCHW Campaign, which has a partnership base of over 150 organizations from United Nations 
agencies, civil society, the private sector, and academia, was launched in January 2013 at the World Economic Forum in Davos. Since its 
launch, the Campaign has been actively supporting African governments and partners who are dedicated to increasing the number and 
quality of lay health workers in the region.” 
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philanthropic donors, but not corporations, working in project implementation. This suggests 
that philanthropic donors are more likely to partner up- either out of necessity or by choice. 
This could result from the fact that they do not have institutional memory as donors 
(MZGovernment1). 
Respondents largely agreed that the small scale at which these donors operate makes it even 
more important for them to coordinate their efforts with established donors to maximize and 
leverage their assistance. This could be especially important for philanthropic donors who work 
in multiple locations. In theory, this makes philanthropic foundations perfect candidates for 
utilizing and supporting national systems (and therefore avoiding duplication). CSR 
programmes are quite localized, so perhaps they do not feel the need to use more country 
systems.  
Mutual accountability 
Models of ‘mutual accountability’ between donors and recipients inherently vary between 
countries as recipient mechanisms for aid delivery are fundamentally different. For example, 
respondents in Chad reported that no donor funds go through the government. In Tanzania 
official development assistance always goes through the Ministry of Finance. Ghana and 
Mozambique both have more mixed models; their governments do receive funds from donors, 
but these funds can enter at any level (central, regional/provincial, or district), and many actors 
act outside of government channels altogether (de Savigny et al., 2012). Therefore, although 
the underlying principles of mutual accountability should remain consistent across the 
countries, the means for achieving this goal will naturally vary. At the time of the interviews 
all four case-study countries lacked policies for integrating resources from private donors but 
recognized the need to formalize guidelines. Additionally countries experience a lack of mutual 
transparency, whether it was on the part of the government(s) or the private actors. This has 
direct implications for mutual accountability. 
In Chad, BMGF is the largest philanthropic donor and communicates with the Ministry of 
Health through either UNICEF, WHO, or the Chadian Comité de Coordination Inter-agences. 
The Ministry of Health is uninformed of BMGF activities in Chad, unless Bill Gates himself 
comes to Chad for a meeting (TDGovernment4). The Ministry of Health and development 
partners disagreed about who private actors were coordinating with. The ministry said that they 
had little to no contact with foundations and corporations. Interviewees from development 
agencies reported that, so far, these newer actors only coordinated with the ministry.  
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Despite private actors’ absence in coordination bodies, in Tanzania development partners 
seemed very aware of private actors and partnerships between organizations. Most would 
spontaneously offer a litany of health development projects, all organizations involved, and 
where they were located. All interviewees were involved and actively engaged in the 
Development Partners Group, and it was clear that there was continuous communication among 
the OECD Partners. Any lack of awareness of the development partners must stem from 
insufficient communication from the government. Tanzania’s operations are decentralized, but 
unlike Ghana health is governed at the national level, and all external actors must act under the 
auspices of the Ministry of Health (de Savigny et al., 2012). 
There is an overall sense of uncertainty of volume of funding from different sources 
outside the Development Partners Group for health. This is not communicated 
openly. Submitting reports to the Ministry of Finance is mandatory for conventional 
donors, but is voluntary for unconventional sources (TZOECDPartner5). 
TZOECDPartner1 shared that it is not uncommon to arrive at the launch of a project only to 
discover a previously unknown organization doing similar work in the same location- all 
sanctioned by the government. Additionally, the Ministry of Health reported that support from 
extractive industry goes directly to health facilities and hospitals. This indicates a different 
standard to which industry is held. All official development assistance for health is required to 
be channelled through the Ministry of Finance.  
In Mozambique, there is no reported coordination between corporations and the Ministry of 
Health, and it was suggested that they actually contribute to brain drain as they hire people from 
the ministry. These discussions rarely included direct commentary on who should be held 
accountable in preventing brain drain. Only one respondent was quick to state that it is the onus 
of the government to regulate the extractive industry (MZMultilateral2). The government has 
proposed innovative health financing strategy for 2019, but there is a gap in rhetoric versus 
reality for integrating private resources. Multiple interviewees converged on the idea that the 
best thing that the private sector could do, including the extractive industry, is pay taxes. The 
revenue generated through fair taxing would far outweigh any contribution they would make 
through a corporate social responsibility programme (MZOECDPartner7).   
One respondent, MZMultilateral6, highlighted another gap in progress towards satisfactory 
accountability of both donors and recipient governments- transparency. Until transparency 
extends to civil society, it will be difficult to gauge whether or not decision-makers on either 
side of a partnership are being held truly mutually accountable. 
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Managing for results 
Managing for results refers to a management strategy for increasing efficiency and effectiveness 
with an emphasis on shared values and leadership while promoting results-based decision-
making. It is an approach that includes strategic planning, monitoring and evaluating 
performance, reporting, and incorporating lessons learned for improvement (Buse and Walt, 
2000). Overall respondents discussed “managing for results” very minimally with regard to 
private donors, and when they did it was interwoven in discussions that centered more heavily 
upon other pillars.  
Discussions with TDMultilaterals 9 and 10 highlighted the role of alignment with country 
systems to increase results. Likewise, in Tanzania, TZMultilaterals 1 and 2 were under the 
impression that because private sources don’t have a local base, they are not feeding back their 
experience into their aid approaches. Other respondents in Tanzania suggested that a key to 
producing results had more to do with scale rather than alignment or evidence-based decision-
making. Private financing sources like Clinton Foundation and Gates’ Foundation support 
projects which can show results rather than larger programmes (TZMultilateral3). 
Overall, respondents’ comments in Chad and Mozambique reflect that the lack of 
harmonization with CSR programmes leaves respondents without much to say about whether 
and how they measure up to the managing for results pillar: 
It is difficult to predict how important corporate social responsibility programmes 
will be for health development over the coming years because the results of their 
efforts are unclear, there are no observers, and there is no cooperation 
(TDCoordination1).  
In general, these programmes are not focused on the long-term, they are very 
localized, and it is difficult to gauge how much they actually provide in the short-
term (MZGovernment1).  
As private actors’ lack of harmonization was the most pervasive theme, it is not surprising that 
respondents did not spontaneously discuss the emerging donors’ results or management thereof. 
Both conventional development partners and government officials were largely unaware of the 
nature of these actors’ engagement (as compared to awareness of conventional partners’ 
efforts), so it is unlikely that they should speak of organizational policies on results 
management. 
Ownership 
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The first pillar of the Paris Declaration, national ownership, refers to developing countries 
setting their own development strategies, improving their institutions, and tackling corruption 
(OECD-DAC, 2009). Respondents in all four case-study countries commented on their 
respective country’s lack of policy for including emerging donors, but the governments are 
actively discussing developing such policies and more inclusive health financing strategies. 
Interviewees often commented on perceived weaknesses in the health system but not 
specifically in the context of external private finance. Therefore these comments were deemed 
irrelevant in this analysis. The theme of country ownership was most often woven into 
interviewees’ opinions about the future of private finance for health in Ghana and Mozambique. 
Each of the case-study countries has a unique relationship with philanthropic foundations and 
corporations who support health development, but they also share experiences in terms of 
adherence to the Paris Declaration (Table 15). Respondents expressed similar concerns and 
hopes for future collaboration with private donors. 
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Table 15. Summary of private donors’ adherence to the five Paris Declaration pillars 
 Alignment Harmonization Mutual accountability Ownership Managing for results 
C
ha
d 
• discordant views on degree of systems support 
• CSR based on location of industry and personal 
interests 
• not focused on long-term; lacking evaluation 
• lack structured policies and 
focus areas 
• government largely uninformed of 
activities 
• opposing accounts of who donors are 
communicating with in-country 
 
• alignment required to increase 
results 
G
ha
na
 
• private company integrated into national 
strategy 
• overall CSR contributing minimally 
• working on policy for 
integrating CSR funds 
• difficulty tracking funds 
• lack of coordination results in 
waste 
• lack of policy affects decreases 
accountability 
• associated with discussions 
about private donors and 
effective engagement 
 
M
oz
am
bi
qu
e • CSR based on location of industry and personal 
interests 
•  not focused on long-term; lacking evaluation 
• foundations more likely to 
coordinate than corporations 
• disagreement about responsibility for brain-
drain 
•  lack of transparency 
• associated with discussions 
about private donors and 
effective engagement 
 
T
an
za
ni
a 
• foundations’ agendas are ideological 
•  fill gaps left by other donors 
•  discordant views on degree of systems support 
• CSR based on location of industry and personal 
interests 
• not focused on long-term; lacking evaluation 
• lack of awareness 
• using coordination efforts to 
push own agenda  
• government not clearly communicating with 
development partners about private donors' 
engagement 
•  government has different standards for 
private donors 
 
• private donors not using 
evidence-based decision-making 
• positive outcomes result of 
small-scale projects 
Sh
ar
ed
 a
m
on
gs
t a
ll 
fo
ur
 c
ou
nt
ri
es
 
• philanthropy complementary to conventional 
development assistance; replacement isn’t 
feasible due to the narrowly-focussed project 
approach 
•  follow own agenda 
•  there are good examples that could provide a 
model for future 
• all countries have established 
country-level coordinating 
bodies 
•  private donors are largely absent 
from coordination efforts 
•  small scale makes 
harmonization more difficult 
AND more necessary 
• models vary by country 
•  lacking transparency 
•  lacking policy 
• governments actively 
discuss developing policies 
to integrate private donors 
and more inclusive health 
financing strategies 
•  need for health systems 
strengthening 
• discussions tied in themes of 
other pillars for increasing 
results (specifically alignment 
and harmonization) 
• results unclear due to lack of 
coordination / communication 
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Prospective 
A few respondents, particularly in Ghana and Mozambique, spontaneously gave insights into 
how they predict private donors will engage in the coming years and, furthermore, how they 
should engage. These comments most often overlapped with the theme of country ownership. 
One comment made by a respondent in Chad hinted at why country ownership is integral to the 
future of private sector engagement in health. He witnessed in Southeast Asia that as the country 
transitioned economically, it was easier to get unconventional funding (TDConsultant1). This 
observation is consistent with perspectives in Ghana and Mozambique. 
In 2010 Ghana rebased its gross domestic product (GDP) calculations (Ghana Statistical 
Service, 2010) and transitioned overnight from a low-income economy to a lower-middle-
income economy (Jerven and Duncan, 2012). This has changed its relationship with donors. 
Most importantly, Ghana is excluded from concessional loans from the World Bank’s 
International Development Association, its predominant creditor for 30 years (Moss and 
Majerowicz, 2012). Although this change prevents it from receiving finance from poverty-
targeted aid programmes of bilateral donors, it does signal a need for increased access to private 
investment, international capital markets, and lending from the World Bank’s International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (Moss and Majerowicz, 2012). It may also open 
opportunities for emerging donors. 
Respondents shared that there is an expected increase in the volume of assistance coming from 
external private financiers (GHNGO1). For example, the Global Fund’s Country Coordinating 
Mechanism (the in-country multi-stakeholder group responsible for overseeing grant 
application and implementation) has a new role in securing private funding as part of the 
national resource mobilization strategy (GHCoordination2). EcoBank has committed $3 
million USD to West Africa with a deal that the Global Fund uses EcoBank as an intermediary 
(GHGovernment3).  
The majority of comments made about the future of the private sector in health were not about 
assistance but rather about foreign direct investment. Ghana is anticipating a partnership in 
pharmaceutical manufacturing, namely with investors from China and India. GHMultilateral4 
shared that the government provided a stimulus package to spur private or international 
investment for two to five new manufacturing plants. Three Indian companies have applied for 
a license. Additionally, there was a joint venture company between China and Ghana. This first 
China-Ghana pharmaceutical joint venture was inaugurated in 2005, with Danpong 
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Pharmaceuticals Ghana Ltd. as the Ghanaian partner. Eventually the Chinese partner pulled out, 
supposedly due to non-compliance with the joint venture contract. 
In Mozambique, as the consultant in Chad suggested, [f]oreign direct investment, government 
revenue, and lending have all increased which changes the balance and the influence of 
traditional donors (MZOECDPartner10). A number of interviewees (MZNGO2 and 
MZOECDPartners 7, 8, and 9) agreed that tax regulation is important for harnessing the wealth 
of the private sector. Additionally, MZOECDPartners 7, 8, and 9 suggested that there is room 
to pilot a Development Impact Bond. MZOECDPartner4 elaborated on the perceived benefits, 
It would result in a longer-term commitment, guaranteed results, and risk-sharing. It would 
require cooperation of government, NGOs, and private actors who have the flexibility to 
innovate and take higher risks. … Also, it is more an outcome-based approach rather than an 
output-based approach. 
A follow-up discussion with MZOECDPartners 7, 8, and 9 revealed that the Ministry of Health 
says that they are open to Development Impact Bonds  but view this approach as a purely donor-
funded endeavor. In order for it to work, the Ministry of Health must have a clearly defined role 
as overseer and service provider. They must define what services they would be willing to out-
source and set clear targets. Such a mechanism should be an integrated component of the 
national strategy. Ultimately, it is an approach to harmonization, but in theory, it addresses all 
five pillars of the Paris Declaration. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
This four-country study revealed that there is currently little coordination among private donors 
and conventional development partners. Development partners know little about how, 
specifically, private actors including philanthropic foundations are engaged in the health sector. 
Due to the scale of their engagement, private donors are only complementary to assistance 
coming from large bi- and multi-lateral agencies. They currently contribute to fragmentation 
due to their narrow focus. They are not necessarily aligned with country priorities or 
strengthening country health systems. These unconventional donors are not held to the same 
standards as conventional donors in terms of regulation, policies (e.g. in Tanzania submitting 
reports to the Ministry of Finance is mandatory for official development assistance, but is 
voluntary for unconventional sources). Corporate Social Responsibility aside, perhaps the 
greatest contribution that could come from the corporate sector is to pay fair tax, provided the 
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host country has an effective anti-corruption mechanism in place. Responsibility must be taken 
all along the value chain, and the governance of this extends beyond the health sector.  
Ten years later, health development stakeholders at country-level are still talking about Paris 
Declaration principles and are calling for emerging donors to adhere to the five pillars, in 
particular alignment, harmonization, and mutual accountability. Based on our interviews with 
key stakeholders, philanthropic foundations and corporations are not responding to these in-
country demands. Currently, in the four case-study countries, there are no policies, there is little 
information available, and, therefore, there is no means for accountability. This type of 
assistance is complementary to conventional bi- and multi-lateral assistance, but in order to 
prevent further fragmentation, emerging donors should be informed of, and included in, 
development partner group discussions. 
4.6 Key messages 
• Ten years after the Paris Declaration, country-level discussions still focus on 
alignment and harmonization of development assistance for health. 
 
• Due to the scale of their engagement, private donors remain complementary to 
assistance coming from large bi- and multi-lateral agencies. 
 
• Small-scale engagement makes harmonization more difficult AND more necessary, 
but private actors are absent in coordination groups at the country-level. 
 
• Private donors are not necessarily aligned with country priorities or strengthening 
country health systems and currently contribute to fragmentation due to their narrow 
focus. 
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5.1 Abstract 
Brazil, Russia, India, and China (the BRICS) have banded together as a bloc and launched joint 
initiatives for development. They have identified mutual interests, and they provide 
development assistance for health in their respective regions and abroad. As they do not 
currently report to international financial tracking data repositories, the volume, exact nature, 
and effectiveness of these emerging donors’ engagement with recipient countries remain 
unclear. In this paper we report results of the influence of emerging economies on health 
development in Chad, Ghana, Mozambique, and Tanzania- four countries that span the donor-
darling / donor-orphan spectrum. We conducted face-to-face semi-structured in-depth 
interviews with 93 key informants from government ministries, bilateral and multilateral 
agencies, local research institutions, and independent consultants. Interviewees identified 
health-specific engagement by the BRICS and other emerging economies. Thematic coding of 
interviews revealed common strengths and challenges of working with emerging economies. 
Overall, based on all of the interviews, BRICS do not contribute significantly to the public 
health sector. Interviewees see space for them in the landscape but acknowledge that myriad 
obstacles exist. They are not seen as a replacement, but rather as a supplement, for conventional 
aid. Emerging economies are not foreseen to provide assistance that resembles conventional 
aid; they are primarily focused on investment opportunities. Though they reportedly interact 
directly with the government, they are not participating in donor coordination bodies.  
 
Key words 
BRICS ; emerging economies ; development assistance for health ; coordination 
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5.2 Introduction 
In 2001 a Goldman Sachs economist coined the acronym BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and 
China) in his discussion on emerging market economies and the need to include them in global 
policymaking forums (O'Neill, 2001). South Africa was finally included in 2013 (The BRICS 
Post, 2013). Economists continue to argue the future of the BRICS (Washington, 2013, Avent, 
2013, Nwosu, 2015) while other emerging economies vie for a spot in an expanded acronym 
(Aneja, 2013) or even an acronym of their own (Northam, 2014, Next 11, 2016) as they surpass 
some of the BRICS countries in economic growth (The World Bank, 2016). What began as a 
catchy phrase in an investment bank’s research note has developed into a full-fledged institution 
complete with an arsenal of websites, think-tanks, and annual summits. 
In 2014 the BRICS announced the launch of the New Development Bank (NDB). It will have 
an initial capital pool of US$50 billion that will be equally divided; it will maintain a currency 
reserve of US$100 billion (Panda, 2014). Its headquarters will be in Shanghai, China, and the 
first president will be Indian. The bank has been established, in part, to challenge the Western 
order maintained by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (Panda, 2014). The 
NDB will focus on infrastructure projects in developing contexts (NDB BRICS, 2016). 
The 8th BRICS Summit in October 2016 was hosted in Goa, India (BRICS, 2016a). The Goa 
Declaration renewed its commitment to cooperate to achieve BRICS’ targets for HIV and 
tuberculosis, including research, development, and production of drugs and diagnostics 
(BRICS, 2016b). 
BRICS countries have individually provided foreign assistance since the 1950s (Mwase and 
Yang, 2012). Their contributions have increased rapidly in recent years- approximately 10 times 
faster than conventional donors- though the overall contributions are still relatively small in 
comparison to Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries 
(Birdsall, 2012a, Tytel et al., 2012). Scholars have identified a number of trends in BRICS’ 
development efforts such as applying principles of South-South Cooperation (G77, 2009a) 
focusing on partnership; avoiding policy conditionality in governance, economic policy, or 
institutional reform; structuring assistance to complement foreign direct investment; 
emphasizing individual project feasibility rather than long-term debt sustainability; and 
applying domestic development lessons (Mwase and Yang, 2012, Watson et al., 2013). The 
intention to develop their own agenda for development assistance is particularly interesting in 
light of the fact that their domestic health sector resource allocation appears to be still highly 
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influenced by current multilateral donors such as the World Bank and the Global Fund to Fight 
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (Sridhar and Gomez, 2011b). 
While the BRICS have declared that health collaboration is a priority, they haven’t yet begun 
working collectively to enhance the impact of their assistance programmes (Harmer and Buse, 
2014). The debate on the relevance of BRICS collective action is ongoing (McKee et al., 2014). 
Of the bloc, China has contributed the largest sum of foreign assistance to low-income countries 
approximating US$84 billion in 50 African countris, as of 2012 (Grépin et al., 2014). Overall, 
health has been a main focus of Brazil and Russia’s foreign assistance agendas, while it has 
been less emphasized in the agendas of China, India, and South Africa (Tytel et al., 2012). 
Although there are estimates on how much these countries dedicate to health, Russia is the only 
country that reports to the Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation – 
Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC) (OECD, 2016e). Researchers speculate 
why the BRICS do not openly share their development assistance data and suggest the need for 
a more inclusive, universally applicable reporting system (Fan et al., 2014). In the meantime, 
tracking emerging donors for health is unreliable and prevents an understanding of the volume 
and influence of a growing portion of development assistance for health. 
Aside from the BRICS, there are a number of non-DAC countries increasing their official 
development assistance. For example, the United Arab Emirates reached the highest gross 
national income (GNI) ratio of official development assistance (ODA) of any country at 1.17 
percent (MDG Monitor, 2016). Turkey doubled its aid across sectors between 2011 and 2012 
(Di Commo, 2014). In all, ODA from non-DAC providers is estimated to be between 13 and 
18 percent of total ODA (OECD, 2016e, OECD Development Co-operation Directorate, 2015). 
Twenty countries outside of the OECD-DAC do report to the OECD (OECD, 2016d). There is 
no data in the OECD DAC CRS showing health disbursements from Israel, Saudi Arabia, or 
Turkey to the four case-study countries (OECD, 2016g). On the other hand the United Arab 
Emirates is shown to have disbursed funds for health in Chad, Ghana, and Tanzania and Kuwait 
has disbursed funds to Ghana (OECD, 2016g). The relationships were not reflected in the 
interviews. The largest disbursement was US$658,000 from the United Arab Emirates to Ghana 
in 2011. 
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Colombia and Mexico are among six non-BRICS, non-DAC countries for which OECD 
produces development cooperation estimates (OECD, 2016g). The data is not disaggregated by 
recipient or sector. 
Currently some of these donors provide data through national reporting systems that are not 
formatted for cross-comparison with other donors, and for others only rough estimates are 
available (Steensen, 2014). Though in-country stakeholders are familiar with many non-BRICS 
non-DAC actors, for now the volume of assistance by sector and recipient remains unclear. 
Until we have more information and comparable statistics, it is impossible to evaluate the 
effectiveness of this assistance.  
There is a growing body of literature on BRICS engagement in international development and 
global health diplomacy (Florini et al., 2012, Kickbusch and Szabo, 2014, Kickbusch, 2014, 
Gautier et al., 2014). To-date there is very little understanding of their specific activities in-
country or perceptions of these countries as donors / partners (Harmer et al., 2013). In this paper 
we report results of the influence of emerging economies, with a particular focus on the 
individual BRICS, as donors for health development in Chad, Ghana, Mozambique, and 
Tanzania- four countries that span the donor-darling / donor-orphan spectrum (Van de Maele 
et al., 2013). Chad is classified as a “donor orphan”; it is ranked in the bottom 10 countries in 
terms of commitments and disbursements of DAH based on the OECD’s Development 
Assistance Committee’s credit reporting system (CRS). Using the same indicators, 
Mozambique is classified as “donor darling”. Likewise, Tanzania is classified as a darling using 
the Global Health Expenditure Database. Ghana falls between a darling and an orphan across 
all three classifications (Van de Maele et al., 2013). 
5.3 Methods 
Primary data collection 
Data was collected as part of a larger study on the influence of emerging donors in health 
development (SNIS, 2012). For the purpose of this study we focus on a subset of “emerging 
donors”, namely, Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (the BRICS), and other emerging 
economies. Investigators conducted face-to-face semi-structured in-depth interviews with 88 
key informants from the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Finance, health or development 
attachés bi- and multilateral agencies, local research institutions, the African Development 
Bank, and independent consultants. Interviewers held an additional five brief discussions with 
relevant experts for country and/or development context (Table 16). The first interviews in each 
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country were obtained through investigators’ professional contacts. We then used the 
‘snowball’ approach whereby each interviewee suggested colleagues in partner organizations 
and the government who had insight into our research interests. 
Interviews were held in the offices of key informants in N’Djamena, Chad; Accra, Ghana; 
Maputo, Mozambique; and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. One in-depth interview was conducted by 
telephone. Interviews lasted approximately one hour but ranged from 45 minutes to three hours. 
Interviewers held an additional five brief discussions with relevant experts for country and/or 
development context (Table 16). In N’Djamena investigators were invited to, and attended, a 
meeting hosted by the Washington, D.C.-based Grant Management Solutions (technical body 
founded and funded by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) to support 
Global Fund principle recipients) (GMS, 2016). 
We contacted prospective interviewees via email. We obtained email addresses through 
professional contacts and government websites. Emails contained a brief description of the 
research team, overall research questions and objectives, and methods. Respondents suggested 
additional interviewee(s) who were then contacted directly by the research team.  
Interviews in Ghana and Tanzania were conducted in English. In Chad, ten interviews were 
conducted in French and six in English. The meeting of the Country Coordinating Mechanism 
was held in French. One investigator is a Francophone and the other an Anglophone 
(accompanied by a local translator). In Mozambique discussions were held primarily in English 
with periodic clarifications in Portuguese as one investigator speaks Portuguese fluently. 
Investigators took detailed notes during the discussion. When more than one investigator was 
present for an interview, notes were compared after transcription. 
We used a semi-structured interview guide (see Annex 1). Discussions included questions about 
interviewees’ perspectives and experiences of overall changes in development assistance for 
health and resulting influences at country-level. Interviewers sought perceptions about who 
were the most influential private sources of finance and knowledge of actors’ activities in-
country. We asked open-ended questions about private actors’ engagement with other donors, 
the recipient government, and their prospective roles in the country’s health development 
landscape. 
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Table 16. Interviewees by institution 
  Academic Institutions Consultants 
Coordination 
Bodies 
Government 
Officials 
Multilateral 
Institutions NGOs 
OECD 
partners Total 
Chad 0 4 2 4 9 1 4 24 
Ghana 1 1 2 4 6 3 0 17 
Mozambique 0 2 2 2 6 2 11 25 
Tanzania 3 2 0 5 7 0 10 27 
Total 4 9 6 15 28 6 25 93 
*includes face-to-face interviews, telephone call, and four respondents added in follow-up emails with MZ and TZ 
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Key informants in Tanzania received follow-up emails eleven months post-interview to 
ascertain further developments in the donor landscape. Eleven interviewees responded and two 
referred the investigators to new respondents. Key informants in Mozambique received follow-
up emails nine months after the initial interview. Again, eleven responded and two referred the 
investigators to new respondents who provided input. 
Analysis 
The corresponding author combined interviewers' notes into one Microsoft Word document per 
interviewee and organized the material into fundamental themes- type of donor, aid 
management, health system, country context, etc. These were uploaded interview notes into 
MAXQDA 11 (UdoKuckartz; Berlin, Germany) and read each at least three times by the 
corresponding author. Each successive reading was accompanied by descriptive, analytic, and 
thematic coding, respectively. Interviews were coded by donor country and sub-themes were 
identified. Thematic codes revealed common strengths and challenges of working with 
emerging economies.  
To preserve respondents’ anonymity, each interviewee was given a label: two letter country 
code, professional affiliation, and number (based on chronological order of interviews of people 
with same professional affiliation). For example, “TDConsultant2” the second consultant 
interviewed in Chad.  
5.4 Results 
Overview of BRICS countries 
Of the 93 interviewees, many had not heard of any of the BRICS countries engaging in the 
health sector or could not comment on the nature of their engagement. They were careful to 
distinguish between BRICS investment in the economy and their support of health-specific 
activities. One interviewee with a donor organisation summarized his lack of knowledge in a 
way that reflected the general tone in the interviews, It is difficult to say if they aren’t present, 
or their contributions are small enough to go unnoticed, or whether they are providing 
resources off-radar and therefore difficult to track (TZOECDPartner2). Overall, respondents 
agree that BRICS countries do not yet contribute significantly to the health sector in any of the 
four recipient countries. 
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Respondents who were familiar with BRICS engagement in the health sector were able to 
provide insight into strengths and challenges of partnering with emerging economies. Table 17 
provides a comprehensive list of pros and cons as explicitly stated by respondents. 
 
Table 17. Strengths and challenges of engagement with emerging economies 
        
  Strengths Challenges   
  Direct interaction with Ministry of Health Distance is an obstacle   
  Efficient High transaction costs   
  Filling gaps left by conventional donors Lack of accountability   
  Identification with the donor eases cooperation Lack of data   
  More communication at higher levels Lack of transparency   
  More flexible at higher levels Language / communication issues   
  Quick response to requests and faster processing No ‘institutional memory’    
  Request and proposals less cumbersome No systemic approach   
   Not concerned with overall development   
   
Not coordinating through the established 
partner structures   
   Not harmonised   
   Potentially low quality investment   
   Side-step international business standards   
   Supply-side- and politically-driven   
   Tied to commercial interests   
   Time needed for contract negotiations   
   Unstructured policies and focus areas   
        
 
Respondents in all four case-study countries shared that emerging economies are interacting 
directly and exclusively with the Ministry of Health. This is particularly unique in Chad where 
traditional donors operate more as a network and interact with the government as a unit, 
oftentimes through the World Health Organization (WHO). This direct, exclusive interaction 
with the Ministry of Health has downstream effects on donor coordination within the recipient 
countries. In Mozambique, it means that the Ministry of Health finds cooperation with the 
BRICS much easier; they are more flexible and the process is expedited. For example, with 
China, it is very easy to submit requests and proposals, and the Ministry receives quick 
responses. With Brazil, there is more communication at higher levels and procedural flexibility. 
Perhaps the common Lusophone identity facilitates cooperation - the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs has excellent relations with its counterpart.  
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Many health development actors are not enthusiastic about this type of aid because it short-
circuits traditional channels. New partners are not coordinating through partner structures; they 
are working in parallel without necessarily knowing what is happening in the health sector.  
Coupled with the lack of coordination is a dearth of information; to-date South-South 
cooperation is not captured by national aid databases. 
Tanzania is currently working with selected emerging economies on a public-private 
partnership project proposal for health infrastructure and medical equipment. Most 
conventional donors have restriction in these areas, and Tanzanian officials recognise that 
medical supplies without proper diagnostics impair mortality rate reduction. Therefore the 
BRICS are perceived as important for filling gaps left by conventional partners. Many voiced 
that one issue with BRICS cooperation will be efficiency versus sustainability. Perhaps China 
can construct a hospital with greater speed, but it is yet unknown how long will it remain in 
good working condition.  
Though there are no insurmountable obstacles to South-South Cooperation there is no 
institutional memory like there is with long-standing partners (TZGovernment2). There will be 
different challenges in the relationships when compared to conventional donors; there are no 
systems in place, nor is there available data on working relationship, so there will perhaps be a 
lag in achieving results.  
Many of the downsides outlined by interviewees relate to the nature of BRICS engagement. 
Their vast resources are needed for quick investment, but time will tell the quality of the 
product. Many respondents in all four recipient countries acknowledged these relationships are 
investment-focused and BRICS partners are perceived as working towards economic 
cooperation, following their own commercial interests, rather than development. Aid tied to 
commercial interests, and driving social questions, is not a sustainable approach for the future. 
BRICS involvement will reflect political culture. If there isn’t a national drive for social 
responsibility in their own countries, they won’t do it abroad either. One interviewee in Ghana 
(GHMultilateral2) went so far as to say, BRICS pose the biggest threat because of their poor 
business practices; there seems to be an almost organisational culture of side-stepping 
international standards. His examples touched on the theme of accountability, and he repeated 
there is no way of tracing to prevent fraud. Even after listing the downsides, he believes that in 
five to ten years, the BRICS countries will be Ghana’s largest partners in industry. So far, 
structured policies and focus areas, including development effectiveness, are lacking for 
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unconventional donors. This highlights the importance of addressing partnership concerns 
upfront.  
Brazil 
Respondents in the four case-study countries gave an account of Brazilian engagement that 
aligned with literature. Brazilian health assistance targets Portuguese-speaking African 
countries, of which Mozambique is the largest beneficiary (Russo et al., 2013). There was no 
evidence of Brazilian activity in Chad or Ghana. Tanzania had minimal engagement with 
Brazil, and Mozambique had a project profile that resembled those outlined in key papers 
(Russo et al., 2013, Russo and Shankland, 2014).  
Brazil prefers technical assistance to conventional aid, and encourages direct interaction 
between Brazilian government officials and technicians and their partner-country counterparts. 
Trilateral agreements are a common element of Brazil’s development cooperation (Russo et al., 
2013); both Tanzania and Mozambique have trilateral agreements. In Mozambique, the US is 
the third / OECD partner while in Tanzania it is the European Union. Respondents did not know 
the details of the projects. Additionally, both countries benefit from Brazil’s so-called 
‘structural cooperation in health’, i.e. building local capacity for development (Almeida et al., 
2010). Both countries received physician training, and Mozambique also receives training for 
Masters degree in health systems.  
Brazil’s largest contribution, in the scope of this project, is the construction and outfitting of an 
anti-retroviral production facility. Brazil touts the ‘health industrial complex’ (Russo et al., 
2013, Gadelha, 2006) as an important feature of its assistance that will develop health systems 
and infrastructure to avoid donor dependency (Tytel et al., 2012). Unfortunately the respondent 
most informed on the partnership shared that there are 
…so many issues with coordination, technology transfer, staff training, patents, 
intellectual property, incompatibility between treatment protocols and regimes, and 
incompatibility with the technology that Brazil produces.  We don’t have the 
resources to make the factory work.  There is incompatibility between what the factory 
can produce and what is needed (MZGovernment1).   
This could stem from Brazilian civil servants’ lack of development-specific expertise (Russo et 
al., 2013). The focus on technical cooperation rather than assistance, per se, could result in 
inadequate evaluation and understanding of Mozambique’s capacity and context.  
While a couple of interviewees knew that Brazil supported the establishment of a 
pharmaceutical plant and physician training, a Mozambican government official was the 
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primary source of specific insights into Brazil’s activities (Table 18). MZGovernment1 outlined 
a relationship with Brazil that aligned almost exactly with descriptions in literature, but other 
stakeholders seemed to be largely uninformed. This could be because of Brazil’s emphasis on 
a true partnership with the recipient rather than being concerned about traditional donors and 
their coordination machinery. It might also stem from the fact that the emerging economies 
entered the high-level discussions on aid effectiveness with the signing of the Busan Partnership 
Agreement which lacks rhetoric on coordination amongst donors (Fourth High-Level Forum on 
Aid Effectiveness, 2011). Brazil is not documented to participate in other country-level health 
coordination fora (Russo et al., 2013). 
Russia 
The literature suggests that the majority of Russia’s bilateral assistance targets the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), is apparently steered by health security (Gómez, 
2009), and primarily focuses on disease surveillance systems (Zimmerman and Smith, 2011). 
Sometimes its assistance extends beyond the region. There are examples of trilateral assistance 
that includes malaria control and prevention programmes in sub-Saharan Africa and training in 
Africa, the Middle East, and former Soviet republics (Tytel et al., 2012). Literature on Russia’s 
influence on, and specific activities for, global health are scarce, and this was reflected in the 
dearth of information from in-country stakeholders. 
Russia was only reported to have a presence in Chad and Tanzania. For example, Physicians 
used to go to the Soviet Union for education (TDOECDPartner2) but do not anymore. No 
respondents in Chad provided concrete examples of Russian engagement. Russia has 
“diplomatic relationship” across all sectors. Russian projects are somewhat superficial and 
are clearly to increase visibility rather than to reach an objective (TDMultilateral1). In 
Tanzania, only one respondent mentioned engagement with Russia. Russia provides training at 
both the undergraduate and post-graduate levels.  It sends two to three consultants to one or 
two tertiary care hospitals when we lack the required speciality (TZConsultant2).  
With so little insight, the only conclusion to draw is that Russia is not very active in the health 
sectors of the four case-study countries, but this is not surprising given its bilateral assistance 
priorities. 
India 
Studies have shown that India uses a ‘recipient driven’ approach to development assistance for 
health, and it focuses on supporting local government and small non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), health infrastructure (Yang et al., 2014), technical assistance (Florini et 
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al., 2012), capacity building, and training (India-Africa Forum, 2015). India’s development 
assistance for health primarily goes to South Asian neighbors and Africa, but the nature of 
assistance might differ between the two regions due to foreign policy interests (Yang et al., 
2014). In sub-Saharan Africa, India has been an important source of cheap, generic 
pharmaceuticals (Hafner and Popp, 2011). In 2015, New Delhi hosted the Third India-Africa 
Forum Summit where India committed US$10 billion in lines of credit and grant assistance of 
US$600 million for development in Africa (India-Africa Forum, 2015). US$10 million of this 
is dedicated to the India-Africa Health Fund. At the fourth Africa-India Partnership Day of the 
African Development Bank Annual Meeting, the Finance Minister suggested that India’s 
successes in public-private partnerships in power and transport would translate well in the 
health sector (AfDB, 2016). 
In Chad, India is reportedly supporting a group of development projects under the title of “The 
Big Nine”, one of which is in the health sector (TDCoordination1), but we could not find any 
evidence of this in discussions with other respondents or in the literature.  
Multiple respondents in both Mozambique and Tanzania confirmed that Indian physicians 
conduct training and fill gaps themselves in the health sector. India also provides some medical 
personnel, with skills that are not available in Tanzania (TZMultilateral3 and 4). In 
Mozambique, 
India is very willing to help in many ways, such as: training of doctors, short-term 
and long-term, telemedicine, and usage of natural medicines. There are some 
language communication problems, and India provides no financial assistance, but 
rather assistance in kind. Fifty Indian doctors came, but it was difficult to retain them 
due to financial reasons. Some of them remained in Mozambique and opened a private 
practice (MZGovernment1). 
Similarly, India is best known in Tanzania for its elaborate referral system for tertiary care. 
Hundreds of patients per year are subsidized by the Tanzanian government and third parties 
(TZMultilateral3); fees for service are charged at local rates (TZGovernment1). This system is 
run in concert with telemedicine services, but as one respondent clarified, these are services for 
upper quintiles in Tanzania. Where is the support for those in poverty? (TZOECDPartner7). 
From these responses it is difficult to know whether Tanzania’s referral system with India is 
purely medical tourism with affluent Tanzanians receiving treatment. It is also unclear whether 
these services are subsidized by the Tanzanian government. 
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In terms of pharmaceuticals, India is reported to be the largest supplier of generic medicines in 
sub-Saharan Africa (Hafner and Popp, 2011). In Tanzania, multiple respondents shared that 
India is an important partner for procuring essential medicines. As with all of India’s support,  
it is unclear if any of it is in the form of assistance, or if it is all paid for by Tanzania 
(TZOECDPartner7 and 8). In Ghana, the relationship is clear. India is mainly engaged in 
manufacturing and supply of pharmaceuticals. Indian companies cover 80% of imports of 
medicines and equipment in Ghana [with 64% of the market-share] (GHMultilateral2). The 
India-Africa partnership for affordable medicines includes cheap, generic drugs as well as 
support for local manufacturing (UNAIDS, 2015), but it is still unclear whether these 
transactions are purely a response to an opening in the markets or if there are formalized 
agreements between the governments as part of foreign policy. India as a the largest source for 
medicines is also of particular interest in light of counterfeit manufacturing in India (Erhun et 
al., 2001, Harris, 2014). 
Overall, India’s activities in the case-study countries align with the literature, but for the most 
part, it is unclear how much of their engagement is sponsored by the Indian government, 
recipient government, or the patients themselves.  
 
China 
Though China has played a significant role in regional discussions on public health 
preparedness and disease surveillance, health is not a priority in its foreign assistance 
programmes overall. Its primary foci are health infrastructure, human resources capacity 
building, provision of international medical teams, reproductive health and family planning, 
and malaria control (Tytel et al., 2012). Health assistance is used as a diplomatic tool to bolster 
its image abroad as well as secure access to natural resources (Bliss et al., 2010, Huang, 2010).  
Bilateral channels are the primary means of Chinese foreign health assistance with Africa as 
the principle target. The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) serves to strengthen 
trade and development ties (FOCAC, 2016), and the framework includes malaria treatment and 
control programmes (Huang, 2010). Its projects are not currently integrated with other global 
malaria programmes; the Forum issues grants for antimalarials and support to malaria treatment 
facilities (Tytel et al., 2012). China has been sending medical teams abroad since the 1960s; 
these teams provide free medical care and train local medical staff in areas lacking access to 
health services (Huang, 2010, Government of China, 2006). In addition to on-site training 
programmes, China offers scholarships to health care personnel from low-income countries to 
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receive training in China. China is well-known for its role in infrastructure development, and 
this extends to the health sector. It has funded the construction of hospitals, clinics, and 
pharmaceutical manufacturing facilities, primarily in Africa (Bräutigam et al., 2011). It also 
provide funds for health commodities and medical equipment. 
China has financed the construction of health infrastructure in all four case-study countries. To 
date, the facilities were reported to be in good working order, but some respondents expressed 
a lingering inner-conflict about the quality of Chinese investment. One issue with BRICS 
cooperation will be efficiency versus sustainability. An example is the speed with which China 
can construct a hospital, but how long will it remain in good working condition. BUT China’s 
vast resources are needed (MZMultilateral1). 
Mozambique and Tanzania both have long-standing relationships with China. Development 
partners in Mozambique were most concerned with sustainability because [China is] not really 
concerned with overall Mozambican development (MZOECDPartner4). While a government 
official viewed China’s expediency and short-term focus in another light. 
It is very easy to submit requests and proposals, and we get quick responses.  …  The 
short-term approach with China works well, because sometimes we need to forget the 
rules to get things done. Otherwise people will die. The assistance of the Chinese 
comes quickly, particularly when it is not financial but actually in terms of goods 
(MZGovernment1). 
This response mirror’s other countries experience of Chinese development assistance as being 
‘recipient driven’ (Yang et al., 2014), but this is in stark contrast to the accounts in Tanzania. 
China provides loans not grants, and it sets the agenda. Conditions are economic conditions 
rather than governance and human rights conditions (TZOECDPartner3). And in another 
discussion, [the d]egree of fragmentation in South-South Cooperation depends on the agenda 
of the donor.  For example, the Chinese intend to establish their own investment 
(TZOECDPartner4, 5, 6). It is difficult to know if this difference in response is a product of 
different countries’ relationships with China or if it is a difference in perspective (recipient 
government versus development partner). As it is, it can only serve to highlight lingering 
concerns about agenda-setting and the question about who the true recipient is- the government 
or the citizens it represents. 
China explicitly said that it is not interested in joining partner-led coordination.  It is only 
interested in coordinating with the government (TZOECDPartner4, 5, 6). Although China is 
not unique in its absence from country-level coordination efforts, an incident in Tanzania 
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illustrates stakeholders’ concerns about emerging donors’ lack of coordination. The Chinese 
Premier came and signed 17 contracts with the Tanzanian government but the details of the 
content and nature were never disclosed.  There was a large public outcry, but no subsequent 
response (TZOECDPartner7 and 8). Some see this trend as a concern for overall governance 
beyond development assistance for health. 
In Ghana, China was the most visible BRICS country, but again it was in terms of investment 
and economic engagement rather than assistance; it has provided Ghana with US$3 billion 
across all sectors (GHMultilateral6). In the health sector, China provides loans for the 
construction of hospitals and clinics (GHMultilateral2 and 6). It is best known in the health 
sector for the provision of health commodities, and one anecdote in particular sheds light on 
why respondents lack confidence in Chinese business practices. 
130 million counterfeit condoms were imported from China as part of a Global Fund 
grant. … The origins of only 17% could be traced.  They were shipped out of seven 
different Chinese ports. Nine separate shipments, totalling approximately 20 million 
condoms, made it through the Ghana Health Service, the Central Medical Stores and 
all the way down to the consumer. The orders arrived in Ghana in 2012 but were not 
identified as counterfeit until 2013 (GHMultilateral2).  
The respondent went on to say that this also illustrates the inadequacy of post-procurement 
tracking in Ghana. This systemic weakness is of even greater concern to GHMultilateral2 as 
s/he believes that in five to ten years, the BRICS countries will be Ghana’s largest partners in 
industry. BRICS pose the biggest threats because of their poor business practices.  There is no 
tracing to prevent fraud. Companies are also ignorant of international standards.  
(GHMultilateral2).  
This lack of transparency and accountability as experienced in Ghana and Tanzania make it 
difficult to monitor the influence and effectiveness of China as a partner.  
South Africa 
Due to the high burden of HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis and the resultant strain on the domestic 
health system, South Africa must focus primarily on domestic priorities. Though South Africa 
receives more funds than it donates, it does contribute to foreign assistance for health through 
multilateral agencies, bilateral partnerships, and South-South cooperation. Its assistance is 
delivered mainly in the form of grants and technical support to other African countries. South 
Africa hosts a number of important research institutes and is a regional centre for research and 
development of medicines and vaccines for various infectious diseases. Generic drugs, 
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including first-line antiretrovirals (ARVs), are produced domestically (Tytel et al., 2012). 
Currently it does not play an influential role in the health sector in the four case-study countries. 
In Chad, respondents acknowledge that South Africa is important in the mobilization of the 
diaspora (TDMultilateral1) and is strengthening its economic ties with Chad through 
partnerships [as reflected by the increased number of flights] (TDMultilateral1). But there has 
been no concrete evidence to suggest that South Africa will engage with the health sector.  
Though South Africa is currently Mozambique’s number one training partner for Mozambique 
(MZOECDpartner1), both Mozambique and Tanzania predicted that cooperation with South 
Africa will diminish in the coming years because it is now cheaper to send patients to India 
(MZGovernment1, TZMultilateral3 and 4).  
Respondents in Mozambique and Tanzania suggested that South Africa’s low visibility is 
because it is more involved in the private sector. In Tanzania, this highlighted the role of 
ideology in assistance. South Africa’s presence in Tanzania’s health sector is very weak due to 
the different system typologies. Tanzania is predominantly focused on strengthening the public 
sector whereas South Africa emphasizes the private sector (TZConsultant2). In general, 
interviewees were unfamiliar with activities in the private sector, so while this could not be 
confirmed, it is an interesting hypothesis about the how partnerships are forged in South-South 
cooperation. 
Overall, the BRICS countries appear to be more engaged with the OECD’s donor darlings, and 
each of the BRICS largely followed their set norms in development assistance for health (Table 
18). 
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Table 18. BRICS support in case-study countries 
 Chad Ghana Mozambique Tanzania 
Brazil   • anti-retrovirals factory incl. technology (MZMultilateral3, 
MZGovernment1, MZOECDPartner1, MZMultilateral2, 
MZOECDPartner10). 
• investment in National Institutes of Health 
(MZGovernmennt1) 
• Milk Bank in Maputo (MZGovernment1).  
• MSc in Health Systems - Brazilian professors and 
accreditation of diplomas (partnership with FIOCRUZ; 
MZGovernment1).   
• training and technology for dentistry (MZGovernment1).   
• trilateral agreements with US (MZOECDPartner1, 7, 8, and 
9).  
• physician training (MZOECDPartner1). 
• physician training 
(TZOECDPartner4, 5, 6) 
• generic products 
(TZMultilateral6 and 7) 
• unspecified trilateral agreement 
with EU (TZAcademic2) 
Russia • “diplomatic relationship” 
across all sectors - projects 
superficial and clearly to 
increase visibility rather than 
to reach objective 
(TDMultilateral1) 
  • training -  undergraduate and 
post-graduate (TZConsultant2) 
• 2-3 consultants to 1-2 tertiary 
care hospitals when lack 
required speciality 
(TZConsultant2) 
India • nine projects called the “Big 
9”, including health sector 
(TDCoordination1). 
 • physicians (MZMultilateral2, MZGovernment1) 
• training, telemedicine, natural medicines (MZGovernment1) 
• referrals, training, low-cost 
equipment, generic products 
(TZMultilateral6 and 7) 
China • mostly involved in economic 
activities, but overall is an 
important partner for Chad.   
• construction of some clinics 
and secondary care hospital in 
N’Djamena (TDMultilateral1, 
TDOECDPartner3 & 4, 
TDMultilateral3 and 4) 
• China is building 
hospitals in Ghana and 
provides training too.  
However, it is very 
“cautious”.  It is 
difficult to obtain land 
for private investment 
(GHMultilateral2). 
• antimalarials (MZMultilateral5, MZGovernment1) 
• physicians (MZMultilateral2, MZGovernment1) 
• medical equipment, accommodation for physicians near 
Maputo Central Hospital (MZGovernment1). 
• medical teams (TZConsultant2, 
TZOECDPartner2, 
TZGovernment5,TZGovernment
1, TZMultilateral6 and 7, 
TZMultilateral3 and 4) 
• supplies/equipment 
(TZConsultant2, 
TZGovernment1) 
• subsidized medical training in 
China (TZConsultant2, 
TZOECDPartner7 and 8) 
South Africa   • South Africa is involved, as part of a regional system, in the 
procurement of medicines.  It supports enterprises through 
public-private partnerships (MZOECDPartner5). 
• We have a bilateral cooperation agreement for tertiary 
referral with South Africa in the context of SADC 
(MZGovernment1). 
• Subsidize training 
(TZMultilateral3 and 4) 
• Equipment (TZMultilateral1 and 
2) 
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Non-BRICS emerging economies 
Although respondents reported having very little exposure to BRICS in the health sector, they 
often spontaneously mentioned other so-called emerging economies. After this happened in a 
few interviews, we altered our questions to include “BRICS and other emerging economies”. 
Each case-study country had a distinct set of emerging economies that contribute, or have made 
pledges, to the health sector (Figure 14) (Annex 2 for details of engagement).  
 
 
 
Figure 14. Non-BRICS emerging economies engaged with case-study countries 
IDB : Islamic Development Bank ; *Japan has been a member of the OECD DAC since 1961 (OECD, 2016a) ; **South 
Korea has been a member of the OECD DAC since 2010 (OECD, 2016b) 
 
Currently there is no data on these non-BRICS emerging economies’ health-specific 
development assistance, and these countries have not had high profile participation in 
international discussions. Recent annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth has slowed for 
the BRICS countries, decreasing their distinction from other emerging economies (Figure 15). 
At the country-level, these non-BRICS emerging economies also lack visibility, in part due to 
their absence from coordination groups. This is not unique to these four recipients or their 
respective donors (Kragelund, 2008). 
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Figure 15. GDP growth (annual, %), emerging economies active in case-study countries 
World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files (The World Bank, 2016) 
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When asked about the engagement of the BRICS and emerging donors in the health sector, a 
number of interviewees in Ghana and Tanzania included Japan and South Korea. Respondents 
in Mozambique mentioned South Korea. This is surprising in that Japan has been a member of 
the OECD DAC since 1961 (OECD, 2016a). South Korea has been a member of the OECD 
DAC since 2010 (OECD, 2016b). Japan’s development assistance for health in Tanzania has 
been steady at approximately US$3-4 million per year. Its support for Ghana it increased 
dramatically from US$3.2 million in 2010 to US$7.7 million in 2011 and again to US$18.8 
million in 2012 (OECD, 2016g). 
Development assistance for health from South Korea has been growing in all four countries, 
but Mozambique and Tanzania have seen the most dramatic increases. Mozambique received 
US$17 thousand in 2012 and US$16.3 million in 2013. Likewise Tanzania received US$2.7 
million in 2012 and US$16.3 million in 2013. Ghana’s growth in support has been much slower 
and in 2013 still only received US$2.5 million (OECD, 2016g). 
These dramatic increases in development assistance for health coincided with the interviews 
and could explain, in part, why these long-time donors were grouped with emerging donors. 
One respondent in Ghana provided a hypothesis as to why Japan and South Korea were 
increasing their assistance. 
Currently the predominant bilateral players in health are [the United Kingdom], 
the [European Union], the Netherlands, Germany, Japan, and South Korea.  South 
Korea even employs health advisors in their embassies. I predict that Japan, and 
possibly South Korea, will replace conventional donors especially in light of their 
political concern of the increasing presence of China in sub-Saharan Africa 
(GHMultilateral2). 
This is a remarkable hypothesis about the influence of shifting geopolitical interests that merits 
further exploration. 
 
5.5 Conclusions 
Overall, based on all of the interviews, BRICS do not contribute significantly to the public 
health sector. Interviewees see space for them in the landscape but acknowledge that myriad 
obstacles exist. They are not seen as a replacement, but rather as a supplement, for conventional 
aid. They are not foreseen to provide assistance that resembles conventional aid; they are 
primarily focused on investment opportunities.  
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Though the BRICS have a more public profile in international development than other emerging 
economies, there are many other emerging economies acting in-country. These donors also have 
limited visibility within the network of development partners, and presumably the strengths and 
challenges ascribed to working partnering with the BRICS extend to these other emerging 
economies. 
These actors all reportedly interact directly with the government, but they are not participating 
in donor coordination bodies. In order to prevent further fragmentation, emerging donors should 
be informed of, and included in, development partner group discussions.  
 
5.6 Take-home messages 
• The BRICS countries are not the only emerging economies acting in the health sector 
of sub-Sahara African countries. 
 
• Emerging economies are not seen as a replacement, but rather as a supplement, for 
conventional aid. They are primarily focused on investment opportunities. 
 
• Due to emerging economies lack of coordination, health development partners in-
country are not well-informed of health-specific engagement. 
 
• Some government officials welcome this unconventional engagement while 
development partners can be sceptical of the sustainability and long-term social welfare. 
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6.1 Abstract 
The Global Fund is one of the largest actors in global health. In 2015 the Global Fund was 
credited with disbursing close to ten percent of all development assistance for health. In 2011 
it began a reform process in response to internal reviews following allegations of recipients’ 
misuse of funds. Reforms have focused on grant application processes thus far while the core 
structures and paradigm have remained intact. We report results of discussions with key 
stakeholders on the Global Fund, its paradigm of oversight, monitoring, and results in 
Mozambique. We conducted 38 semi-structured in-depth interviews in Maputo, Mozambique 
and members of the Global Fund Board and Secretariat in Switzerland. In-country stakeholders 
were representatives from Global Fund country structures (eg. Principle Recipient), the 
Ministry of Health, health or development attachés bilateral and multilateral agencies, 
consultants, and the NGO coordinating body. Thematic coding revealed concerns about the 
combination of weak country oversight with stringent and cumbersome requirements for 
monitoring and evaluation linked to performance-based financing. Analysis revealed that 
despite the changes associated with the New Funding Model, respondents in both Maputo and 
Geneva firmly believe challenges remain in Global Fund’s structure and paradigm. The lack of 
a country office has many negative downstream effects including reliance on in-country 
partners and ineffective coordination. Due to weak managerial and absorptive capacity, more 
oversight is required than is afforded by country team visits. In-country partners provide much 
needed support for Global Fund recipients, but roles, responsibilities, and accountability must 
be clearly defined for a successful long-term partnership. Furthermore, decision-makers in 
Geneva recognize in-country coordination as vital to successful implementation, and partners 
welcome increased Global Fund engagement. To date, there are no institutional requirements 
for formalized coordination, and the Global Fund has no consistent representation in 
Mozambique’s in-country coordination groups. The Global Fund should adapt grant 
implementation and monitoring procedures to the specific local realities that would be 
illuminated by more formalized coordination.  
 
Key words 
Global Fund ; Mozambique ; financial management ; performance-based finance ; 
coordination ; country oversight ; reform ; New Funding Model 
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6.2 Introduction 
The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (Global Fund) is a financial 
instrument established in early 2002 (Sherry et al., 2009). Its formation was part of the 
“emergency response to accelerate the scale-up of control of the major communicable diseases, 
especially HIV/AIDS” in light of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (Biesma et al., 
2009). Governments provide approximately 95% of Global Fund support; the private sector 
provides the rest (The Global Fund, 2016o). Since its inception, it has disbursed more than 
US$30.6 billion (The Global Fund, 2016a). In 2015, the Global Fund was the world’s largest 
channel of finance for malaria and tuberculosis (40% and 49% of total support, respectively), 
and the second largest channel for HIV/AIDS (16% of total support). In terms of overall 
contribution, the Global Fund was responsible for nine percent of funding for global health in 
2015; it reached its maximum in 2012 and 2013 when it oversaw the disbursement of 12% of 
the total funds dedicated to development assistance for health (IHME, 2016). 
The Global Fund has seven core structures, the: Board, Office of the Inspector General, 
Technical Review Panel, Principle Recipient, Country Coordinating Mechanism, Staff / 
Secretariat, and Local Fund Agent (The Global Fund, 2016n). The Global Fund Board is the 
overall governing body responsible for defining policies, objectives, and strategies. It includes 
representatives from both donor and recipient countries, non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), the private sector, and affected communities (The Global Fund, 2014). The Office of 
the Inspector General (OIG) is an independent body that oversees investment effectiveness 
including risks associated with misused funds. The Technical Review Panel (TRP) is an 
independent team of health and development experts that evaluates proposals submitted to the 
Global Fund  (The Global Fund, 2016l). 
The Principle Recipient (PR) is responsible for grant implementation and can either be part of 
the public sector, e.g. a ministry, an NGO, or even a private company. The PR is under the 
direct supervision of the Country Coordinating Mechanism (CCM). The CCM is reflective of 
the Global Fund’s dedication to local ownership and decision-making. It writes the original 
grant proposal, nominates implementers, and governs grant implementation. The CCM is a 
partnership of country stakeholders including the private sector, academic institutions, 
multilateral and bilateral development partners, civil society, and key affected populations (The 
Global Fund, 2016l).     
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The Global Fund Secretariat is responsible for the daily operations, primarily grant 
management. The Secretariat engages with Principal Recipients through country teams. The 
Global Fund does not have offices in recipient countries. Instead it uses Local Fund Agents 
(LFAs) to oversee grant management (The Global Fund, 2016l).  
In October 2010 the Global Fund received its largest replenishment, to date, at US$11.7 billion 
despite allegations of illicit use of funds in Zambia, the Philippines, and Mauritania and 
subsequent freezing of their cash disbursements (The Global Fund, 2010a, The Global Fund, 
2010b, The Global Fund, 2009b, The Global Fund, 2009a). At the 22nd Board Meeting, the OIG 
released its Progress Report for March through October 2010. It outlined its findings from 
investigations of allegations of fraud, corruption, and misuse of funds in seven countries (The 
Global Fund - OIG, 2010). On 23 January 2011, the Associated Press published a story, “Fraud 
Plagues Global Health Fund” (Heilprin, 2011). More than 250 media outlets worldwide covered 
the story and within days Germany froze its contribution to the Global Fund (Rivers, 2011). 
Over the coming months the Global Fund underwent independent review, re-visited its 5-year 
strategy, and committed to urgent reform (The Global Fund, 2011c, The Global Fund, 2011b, 
The Global Fund, 2011a). Within one year, its Executive Director, Michel Kazatchkine, 
announced that he would step down, cutting his tenure two years short (The Global Fund, 
2011c, The Global Fund, 2012a). Gabriel Jaramillo, former Chairman and Chief Executive 
Officer of Sovereign Bank, was appointed as General Manager to oversee the transformation 
plan (The Global Fund, 2012b). Mr. Jaramillo lacked technical expertise in health development, 
but he specialized in managing change in complex financial institutions during his 36 years of 
experience in banking in Latin and South America and the US (Harvard T.H. Chan School of 
Public Health, 2014). 
The OIG systematically audited recipients and identified US$118 million in losses as of 19 
September 2013 (Garmaise, 2013). It is important to note that these losses are only 0.5% of the 
US$22.7 billion that the Global Fund had disbursed worldwide at the time (The Global Fund, 
2016d). Overall, the Global Fund has a particularly high level of financial accountability, 
compared with other global health agencies, and is diligent in its response to these relatively 
small abuses. 
The New Funding Model 
Reforms resulted in what became known as the New Funding Model (NFM). It has five key 
characteristics: flexible timeline, simplified grant application processes, shorter approval 
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processes, enhanced engagement of all partners prior to grant submission, and improved 
predictability of funding (The Global Fund, 2016b). In short, the reform focuses on processes, 
not structure or paradigm. 
Initially the Global Fund application process was in distinct rounds announced by a call for 
proposals approximately three months before a submission deadline. In the NFM, funding 
cycles are flexible and countries can submit a so-called concept note any time during windows. 
This allows countries to align the grant timeline with national fiscal years and strategies. 
Countries are eligible to apply for a pre-assigned amount per disease, called “the envelope”. 
Envelopes are determined by countries’ burden of disease and ability to finance. This approach 
is meant to enhance predictability of funding (The Global Fund, 2016b). 
CCMs seek technical assistance to write grants for the three diseases (and health systems 
strengthening (HSS) which can either stand alone or be incorporated into a disease-oriented 
grant). Upon submission, grants are screened for eligibility by the Secretariat and then passed 
along to the TRP which recommends technically sound proposals for funding. The Board gives 
official approval of chosen grants. The grants undergo classifications and budget cuts by the 
Board before being returned to the TRP for negotiations, further reductions of the budgets 
through efficiency gains, and division between multiple PRs (and the subsequent necessary 
modifications to the budget). Then PRs and the Global Fund sign the final grant agreement The 
most notable change in the NFM is that from the beginning, country teams are engaged in 
country-level dialog on concept note development (Figure 16).
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Figure 16. Comparison of the Rounds-based funding process and the New Funding Model 
(The Global Fund, 2013b) 
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The Global Fund in Mozambique 
As of 2016, Mozambique has been awarded 17 grants. The Global Fund signed, committed, 
and disbursed a total of more than US$972 million, US$802 million, and US$620 million, 
respectively, to Mozambique in its fight against the three diseases. (Please note that the 
discrepancy between values of signed, committed, and disbursed is due to active grants.) The 
average portfolio is US$466 million making Mozambique the 12th highest recipient of Global 
Fund support (The Global Fund, 2016o). 
Of Mozambique’s 17 grants, 12 have been awarded to the Ministry of Health, representing 86% 
of funds disbursed to Mozambique. From 2004 and 2008 the Global Fund disbursed 
US$135.8m into a health financing basket, known as PROSAUDE (The Global Fund - OIG, 
2012).  
In early grants, scorecards issued at the end of Phase I often reported “weak financial 
management practices and capabilities within the MOH resulting in weak financial 
accountability for resources used” along with difficulties tracking funds PROSAUDE (The 
Global Fund, 2016g, The Global Fund, 2016h, The Global Fund, 2016i, The Global Fund, 
2016j, The Global Fund, 2016k). In 2011, in response to calls for increased accountability, the 
OIG began an audit of Global Fund grants to Mozambique’s Ministry of Health for years 2008, 
2009, and 2010 (The Global Fund - OIG, 2012). Five months into the audit they concluded a 
total of US$3,318,395 was inadequately accounted for. The OIG recommended that the 
Ministry of Health repay the PROSAUDE. Overall, they concluded that there were not 
“adequate controls … in place to manage the key risks impacting the Global Fund supported 
programs” (The Global Fund - OIG, 2012).  
This study was conducted to understand how the Global Fund was experienced by key 
stakeholders in Maputo, Mozambique and how recent reforms were experienced by key 
stakeholders in Mozambique as well as by Global Fund stakeholders in Geneva, Switzerland. 
In late 2013 members of the research team conducted interviews with 38 representatives from 
these two groups. 
6.3 Methods 
Primary data collection 
Data was collected as part of a larger study on the influence of emerging donors in health 
development (SNIS, 2012). For the purpose of the larger study “emerging donors” includes 
public-private partnerships, philanthropic foundations, corporate social responsibility 
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programmes, Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (the BRICS), and other emerging 
economies. The investigators conducted 37 face-to-face and one phone-based semi-structured 
in-depth interviews with stakeholders in Maputo, Mozambique and members of the Global 
Fund Board and Secretariat in Switzerland. In-country stakeholders were representatives from 
Global Fund country structures (eg. Principle Recipient), the Ministry of Health, health or 
development attachés of partner embassies in-country, selected UN agencies, consultants, and 
the NGO coordinating body (Table 19). Interviews were held in the offices of key informants 
in Switzerland and Maputo, Mozambique. Interviews lasted approximately one hour but ranged 
from 45 minutes to three hours.   
Table 19. Interviewees by representation 
Representation Number of Interviewees 
Nomenclature in 
paper 
Global Fund Board 5 GFBoard# 
Global Fund Secretariat 5 GFSecretariat# 
Global Fund Country Structure* 4 GFCountryStructure# 
Academia 1 Academia# 
Consultant Firm 2 Consultant# 
Non-governmental organization 3 NGO# 
Multilateral Agency 6 Multilateral# 
OECD Partner 10 OECDPartner# 
Coordination Body 2 Coordination# 
Total 38   
*includes Local Fund Agents, Country Coordinating Mechanism, Principal Recipients, and Sub-Recipients; members of the 
CCM may be a representative of a multilateral agency or OECD Partner (Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development). 
# refers to interviewees in chronological order 
 
Investigators contacted prospective interviewees via email. We obtained email addresses 
through professional contacts and official websites. Emails contained a brief description of the 
research team, overall research questions and objectives, and methods. Respondents suggested 
additional interviewee(s) who were then contacted directly by the research team.  
Interviewers used a semi-structured interview guide (see Annex 1). Discussions included 
questions about interviewees’ perspectives on overall changes in development assistance for 
health and resulting influences at country-level. Interviewees were also asked to share their 
opinions about who they perceived to be the most influential private sources of finance 
including the Global Fund. Many of interviewers’ questions were in the context of the Global 
Fund as an international non-governmental organization as opposed to an intergovernmental 
organization or a purely bilateral donor. We asked open-ended questions about Global Fund 
engagement with the government and other donors. Interviewers allowed respondents to lead 
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discussion for the most part and followed up with more detailed questions for clarification. 
Interviewers also asked questions based on insights provided in earlier interviews. 
The majority of interviews conducted in Switzerland followed a similar structure to those in 
Mozambique. Five interviews were conducted much later, in mid-2015, after an initial content 
analysis, and focused on the Global Fund and the New Funding Model, specifically 
(Academic1, NGO1, GFCountryStructure1, GFBoard4 and 5, and GFSecretariat5). 
In Mozambique 23 interviews were conducted. The discussions were primarily in English with 
periodic clarifications in Portuguese as one investigator speaks Portuguese fluently. In 
Switzerland, 11 interviews were conducted with 13 interviewees. All discussions were in 
English. One phone-based interview was conducted in English, and a second member of the in-
country NGO coordination body provided input via email in response to later follow-up. 
Key informants in Mozambique received follow-up questions nine months after the initial 
interview. Of the 24 interviewees, eleven responded and two referred the investigators to new 
respondents who provided input. 
 
Analysis 
The corresponding author combined interviewers' notes into one Microsoft Word document per 
interviewee and organized the material into fundamental themes- type of donor, aid 
management, health system, country context, etc. The corresponding author uploaded interview 
notes into MAXQDA 11 (UdoKuckartz; Berlin, Germany) and read each at least three times. 
Each successive reading was accompanied by descriptive, analytic, and thematic coding, 
respectively, to assemble discussion points on the Global Fund paradigm and country-level 
engagement. The interview notes were indexed using the framework and included sub-themes 
as determined by the initial analytic coding (Gale et al., 2013).  
To maintain respondents’ anonymity, each interviewee was given a label with the following 
nomenclature: two letter country code, professional affiliation, and number (based on 
chronological order of interviews of people with same professional affiliation). For example, 
“OECDPartner2” for the second OECD Partner interviewed.  
 
6.4 Results and Discussion 
History of the Global Fund in Mozambique 
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Mozambique first received Global Fund support in Round 2 (year 2004) for all three diseases. 
The Global Fund signed Mozambique’s first Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for the 
sector-wide approach, the PROSAUDE. It channelled resources through the basket until the 
audit of Round 7. Due to problems with reporting and tracing expenditure, the Global Fund 
paused funding for Round 8 (year 2008). Meanwhile the second PROSAUDE MoU was 
released; the Global Fund did not sign.  
The Round 8 grant expired while awaiting results of the OIG’s Round 7 audit. Continued 
support during the audit would have required a parallel system for operation. Interviewees gave 
different accounts of the audit. Those who work closely with the Global Fund described it very 
matter-of-factly. To paraphrase:  It was initially claimed that US$14 million was unaccounted 
for, but after one year, the audit deemed US$1 million missing. This is not surprising given the 
nature of pooled funding. Eventually the government repaid the US$1 million (OECDPartner1). 
But one interviewee from a bilateral agency was more cutting in response,  
In standard auditing protocol, the organization would be given three months to 
provide proper evidence for spending. The Global Fund gave three months, three 
times. … This is not good practice. The Global Fund hid behind its procedures. They 
did not grant access to their draft reports even though they audited bilateral funding 
by nature of auditing pooled funding. This is not a healthy approach. They are not 
improving health or a health sector when covering up results this way 
(OECDPartner10). 
Three years after the audit, the Round 8 HSS grant was re-constituted in June 2012. The 
Ministry of Health is the principle recipient, and the grant focuses on risk mitigation and 
reporting as per the OIG’s report. Despite the Global Fund reforms in application processes, 
[the grant proposal] went through the old bureaucratic processes (OECDPartner1).  
In Mozambique the audit, requirements for financial management, and performance-based 
approach, have inspired questions about Global Fund’s paradigm given the contexts in which 
it works. One quote in particular encapsulates many of the concerns addressed piece-meal in 
other interviews. 
The Global Fund has two choices: either continue to not have people on the ground 
or relax their requirements for monitoring and evaluation. As it stands there is no one 
on the ground, they maintain their high expectations, and have other partners doing 
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their monitoring for them (OECDPartner2). 
Respondents in both Mozambique and Switzerland voiced concerns about the combination of 
weak country presence/oversight/guidance with stringent and cumbersome requirements for 
monitoring and evaluation (M&E) linked to performance-based financing. They felt this 
combination forces buttressing by partners. Respondents in Geneva also expressed concern that 
perceived weaknesses of partners add risk in this paradigm. 
The Global Fund paradigm 
The Global Fund highly values recipient ownership in program development, implementation, 
and evaluation (Atun and Kazatchkine, 2009). The PR leads grant application, administers 
funds, develops their targets for performance-based funding, and tracks results (The Global 
Fund, 2016f). Due to this emphasis on country ownership, the Global Fund operates without 
country offices (The Global Fund, 2016m). Communication with the Global Fund is entirely 
dependent on country teams. Often the PR seeks technical assistance, particularly for grant 
application and evaluating performance (The Global Fund, 2016s). Additionally recipients are 
typically supported, to some degree, by development partners on the ground (The Global Fund, 
2016r). Bilateral agencies working in the country provide support, some more than others, 
because they also have vested interest in Global Fund’s success as they are donors to the Global 
Fund. 
Each country in the larger four-country study on emerging donors for health had a different 
experience and relationship with the Global Fund, but the general tone of response in 
Mozambique was that of a question- does the current approach of the Global Fund fit with 
country-level needs? Most interviewees were active before, during, and after the audit and were 
left with concerns about the future of the Global Fund in Mozambique as it undergoes its first 
phase of reform. Global Fund wants to follow only its own rules, and here it is not working 
(Multilateral3). Perhaps the Global Fund’s inflexibility to recipient needs is because it tends to 
be obsessed with financial technicalities (Multilateral2). 
The Global Fund is a financier, rather than an implementing/development agency. Along with 
other global health initiatives created in the early 2000s, it was designed to overcome market 
and public failures in international public health, as well as disperse the power of the UN and 
its agencies (Buse and Walt, 2000). It was meant to offer streamlined, less bureaucratic, 
processes. Respondents in Mozambique suggested that the Global Fund currently functions 
somewhere between its predecessors and the vision of its creators. 
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The Global Fund has straddled between a managerial and a bureaucratic model in 
Mozambique. They try to apply performance-based financing, but their grant 
management processes have been highly bureaucratic. They function as a 
bureaucracy, but they’d like to have performance-based targets (OECDPartner1). 
The cost of the bureaucracy extends beyond cumbersome administrative processes … [s]o much 
money spent on managing and getting through the bureaucratic requirements of the Global 
Fund (OECDPartner1). 
Despite respondents’ concerns, they were hopeful about prospective changes with the New 
Funding Model, and more importantly about the capacity of the Global Fund to reform at all. 
The Global Fund’s New Funding Model addresses inefficiency concerns, and the recent 
changes in the Global Fund have shown how international organizations are capable of re-
inventing themselves (GFCountryStructure2). 
The Global Fund’s reform is unique for a large-scale organization (Hanrieder, 2016, Kelland, 
2016), and respondents seemed to be providing constructive criticism with the hope that 
feedback would result in further reform of the Global Fund. 
Performance-based funding 
Results-based financing is an attempt to link financial input to health-related outcomes. 
Development partners compare the results of the funded project or program to pre-determined 
targets for a set of indicators. Although this approach is not new, there is a broader range of 
actors using a wider range of results-based models. If implemented properly, results-based 
finance can: align donor and recipient objectives, improve data reliability, give recipients a 
stake in the outcome of their efforts, and give recipients greater discretion and authority to carry 
out their tasks (Savedoff, 2010). On the other hand there are concerns about the effectiveness 
of these tools for health development (Oxman and Fretheim, 2009) and the feasibility of 
measuring outcomes of complex, system-level interventions (Meessen et al., 2011, de Savigny 
and Adam, 2009). To date, studies have focused on approaches that focus on paying for the 
results achieved by individuals or institutions (for example, health facilities or central medical 
stores). There has only been one study on results-based approaches to grant management (Fan 
et al., 2013). 
Performance-based finance (PBF) is one of the guiding principles of the Global Fund; continued 
support for recipients depends on proven results. Their strategy to “actively manage grants 
based on impact, value for money and risk” includes increased emphasis on impact of funding, 
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investment in data systems, requirement of increased financial management transparency, 
coordination with recipients and other donors, and avoidance of duplicated or inconsistent 
demands on recipients (The Global Fund, 2012c). 
GFSecretariat2 shared that the organization uses a more progressive model of PBF than a 
strictly results-based approach. Currently the approach centers upon progress and improved 
performance of national programs. They focus on country ownership of results and corrective 
actions. The Global Fund wants to understand why a country is not performing, not just where 
the money is going. Part of this decision-making is to get countries themselves to do their own 
performance reviews. So part of it is not just the mechanical rating, it’s that they actually do 
review their results against their targets, and they explain the deviations and they come to an 
overall rating (GFSecretariat2). 
While this approach is arguably more holistic, it has been reasoned that the subjective elements 
of their evaluation decrease incentives to improve performance (Fan et al., 2013). This 
conclusion was supported by a development partner in Mozambique. The recipients’ criterion 
for success is disbursement rather than results (OECDPartner10).  
The Global Fund approach was described as a streamlined skeleton which countries built upon 
to create their own performance evaluation. …we had several hundred indicators and we’ve 
reduced it down to a top set of 10, which are highly weighted, but then a country can use further 
indicators. They have to set targets, and then it’s really how many of those targets are reached 
(GFSecretariat2). But concerns at the country-level focus on burdens placed on data collection 
systems. There is an enormous amount of paperwork to fill out … All data that is not aggregated 
in the routine national health information system must be gathered in the programme 
(GFCountryStructure4). Multilateral3 shared that Mozambique has performed well and 
accomplished targets despite the obstacles posed by Global Fund requirements. They have 
achieved results although [i]t is difficult to comply with the requirements (in terms of prescribed 
health indicators) ... Reporting has not aligned with the health information systems. There has 
been a duplication of efforts from the ground all the way to central level. 
Overall, there appears to be a strong association in the minds of respondents in Mozambique 
between performance-based funding, financial tracking, and the audit. This results in distaste 
for the approach. There have been a lot of discussions about Global Fund’s inflexibility and 
unrealistic demands of a developing country. ‘You are asking for oranges, but we only have 
bananas’ (OECDPartner1). Some respondents were more hopeful that distance from the audit 
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will change the relationship with the Global Fund. The Global Fund has a horrendous story 
with performance-based financing. There have been improvements in the past two years 
(OECDPartner2). Both of these quotes illustrate a disconnect between the perception of PBF at 
headquarter-level and at the country-level. In Geneva they believe this approach will ultimately 
help countries identify obstacles to meeting national goals and incentivize problem-solving. In 
Mozambique this approach feels based on implausible expectations and a resulting frustration.  
Mozambique does not necessarily have the financial management capacity required to satisfy 
Global Fund demands, and this directly affects return-on-investment measurements. 
Additionally, addressing the obstacles identified in the performance evaluation would require 
systems support.  
They give more money than such a weak system can properly absorb.  So overall they 
might be doing more harm than good. Giving such a large sum of money without the 
proper checks and balances leads to corruption and growing inequality 
(OECDPartner10). 
Mozambique is not alone in this. Low absorption capacity has been blamed for the failure of 
many development assistance projects in African countries. Donor agencies complain that 
insufficient physical infrastructure and technical expertise at the local level generate high 
transaction costs and, thus, inefficiency in project implementation. Distribution and 
institutional channels in Mozambique are weak and thus the US government takes a hegemonic 
approach (GFCountryStructure2). Although many projects now include training modules to 
train technical experts and some funds for infrastructure needs, the managerial needs of aid 
administration and implementation are often overlooked. This leads, among others, to slow 
delivery of assistance and reporting problems (Austin, 1990, Easterly, 2013, Coase, 1937, 
Simon, 1947). 
The Global Fund has targeted funding for health systems strengthening to build capacity among 
ministry officials for strategic planning and reporting tasks. Whether these efforts will succeed 
in creating the necessary institutional capacity to administer large-scale projects, remains an 
open question. Their approach to health systems strengthening in lower-middle income 
economies has focused results coupled with a very weak country presence (OECDPartner10). 
Multilateral3 commented that this problem may be overcome in the capital, Maputo, as it has 
been in other parts of the world, but that given Mozambique’s size and national reality, the issue 
needs to be addressed at provincial level.  
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Based on the interviews in Mozambique, it is difficult to know if the intention of the Global 
Fund’s PBF has been communicated on the ground, or if it’s been overshadowed by the 
administrative burden placed on the principle recipient. A Geneva-based interviewee made a 
small comment that implies, to date, headquarters has recognized the need for change. [We need 
to] push down the performance-based funding so that it’s not just done in a committee room in 
Geneva, but there are these program reviews that are done within countries, … we need to 
invest much more that there’s a process in-country, and performance-based at the country level 
(GFSecretariat2). Until countries takes full ownership of this process and are empowered by 
the intended purpose of performance-based financing, PBF will likely continue to be perceived 
as an administrative burden and identified as a siloed donor demand. 
Country oversight 
The Global Fund does not have country offices. Instead they rely on country teams that are 
based in Geneva, travel to the country, and are led by a Fund Portfolio Manager. The team is 
comprised of programme officers, and legal, procurement, finance, and M&E staff (Garmaise, 
2010). Team members are responsible for multiple countries. The number of countries varies 
by role, for example, the Fund Portfolio Manager is responsible for one or two countries 
whereas the Procurement and Supply Management Officers are responsible for up to five 
countries (GFCountryStructure1). Previously country teams typically visited Mozambique once 
annually, but with the changes under the New Funding Model, teams visit countries multiple 
times per year (Multilateral4; OECDPartner2). This increase in frequency has yielded mixed 
reviews. Many respondents saw it as an improvement because the country teams are becoming 
more familiar with the realities on the ground and are available for guidance. One respondent 
contradicted this feedback. Countries also complain that country teams come too often. There 
is not enough time to make progress between visits, they are constantly working for the next 
visit, and this increases the time stress (GFSecretariat5). Overall, the major concerns voiced by 
respondents were that country teams are over-worked and are therefore sometimes unsuccessful 
as the channel for communication, too much depends on an individual (the Fund Portfolio 
Manager), and the country teams are out of touch with the realities on the ground. 
Aside from technical support for proposal development and grant implementation, country 
teams act as the primary channel of communication with Global Fund headquarters. The Global 
Fund does not put things on their website to communicate widely with stakeholders, including 
at the country level.  They rely on Fund Portfolio Managers and people on the country team 
(NGO1). Interviewees in-country and in Geneva expressed concern about the reliance on 
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country teams. The availability of expertise within the team is country-dependent.  … Personnel 
are over-worked and over-extended and as a result it is not uncommon for them to take extended 
leave. This has caused detrimental gaps in communication (GFCountryStructure1).  
The Global Fund has recognized some of the issues associated with the burden placed on 
country teams and has begun to bring in technical expertise to help (GFSecretariat5).  
Overall, interviewees in Mozambique and Geneva agreed there are problems associated with 
the current paradigm of country oversight. The Global Fund has weak country presence.  Much 
more oversight is required; they must do more than disburse funds (OECDPartner10). 
Something that is missing in the Global Fund’s current approach is close contact with the 
realities on the ground.  There is also a high level of internal movement that affects continuity 
(GFBoard4). GFBoard4 commented, [e]mployees need a strong financial background rather 
than focusing on a background in development or field experience. This was linked to the 
discussion about the Global Fund’s quickness to remind that “we are a funder, not a 
development agency.” This contributes to the perception the Multilateral2 voiced, Global Fund 
tends to be obsessed with financial technicalities. 
As referenced earlier, one respondent believes that Mozambique’s problems with grant 
implementation are a result of the lack of oversight combined with the expectations associated 
with performance-based financing. The Global Fund must either relax their M&E requirements 
or place staff in-country. As it stands they have other partners doing the monitoring required to 
meet their high expectations (OECDPartner2). 
One Board Member emphasized the importance of increasing coordination with other 
development partners in-country to address shortcomings of the country team. The Global Fund 
is currently doing stakeholder mapping at the country level so that the network of partners is 
clear. For now, at least, country teams are staffed with very bright people that regularly visit 
the country (GFBoard5). GFBoard2 suggested that some of these concerns could be addressed 
with clearer expectations for a Fund Portfolio Manager and more effective coordination among 
constituents. Essentially, there needs to be changes in the hiring of Fund Portfolio Managers 
combined with diffused powers in oversight of grant implementation. 
In-country coordination 
Coordination among donors is central to the harmonization pillar of the Paris Declaration as 
one of three principles to avoid duplication (OECD, 2005). As a result many countries have 
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coordinating bodies comprised of bilateral and multilateral agencies that work with the host 
government and domestic non-governmental stakeholders for increased coordination and health 
development effectiveness. Mozambique has a Health Partners Group that meets monthly and 
brings together all health sector supporters, including representatives of civil society. In 2008 
Mozambique signed an International Health Partnership (IHP+) compact (IHP+, 2008). It is a 
commitment among partners to harmonize and align their support with nationally defined 
priorities (to the extent that their procedures allow). A Global Fund Board Member identified 
IHP+ as the most important opening that we have right now (GFBoard3) for increased 
coordination and collaboration with other development partners. 
Many more coordinating bodies have been created in Mozambique as a result of absorption 
challenges. These include the G19 (a group of bilateral donors who provide sector-wide support 
and coordinate among themselves), the National AIDS Council (Conselho Nacional Contra o 
SIDA), NAIMA+ (NGOs coordinating body), etc. As one donor representative put it, [the 
coordinating bodies] in Mozambique they are a nickel a dozen! This is due to a very weak civil 
society. If you get an organogram of the Ministry of Health, you will see so many directors and 
sub-directors, but not many technicians (GFCountryStructure2). 
This has led to conventional donors and local officials spending exorbitant time on 
coordination, rather than on implementation issues. Coordination among different ‘market 
players’ involves notably high transaction costs (Coase, 1937). Yet, integration into a single 
organization with unified goals involves either high bureaucracy costs (Williamson, 1975) or 
requires very strong leadership (Selznick, 1949).  
The Global Fund reportedly uses effective coordination as a criterion for grant approval. The 
success of the application for Phase II of Round 9’s grants for HIV/AIDS and malaria was 
contingent upon the coordination among partners. So, effective coordination among partners 
is recognized as a potential weakness in Mozambique (Coordination1). However, as there is no 
country presence, the Global Fund itself doesn’t participate in coordination bodies. Engagement 
with the Health Partners Group would greatly enhance the Global Fund’s understanding of 
country-level activities as this coordination body is a clearing house of what each partner is 
doing (OECDPartner3). 
All respondents who represent the Global Fund agreed that coordination at the country-level is 
vital for successful implementation. A member of the Secretariat commented on coordination 
as if it is integral to the nature of the Global Fund’s engagement. We are a contribution model 
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and impact only really occurs when you've got other donors in the national program also 
contributing (GFSecretariat2). The picture painted by most country-level respondents was very 
different. Only one participant suggested that s/he was satisfied with the Global Fund’s 
influence on country-level coordination. Programmatically they brought a new approach. They 
forced partners to coordinate more (Multilateral2). Decision-makers at the Global Fund did 
voice the need for improvement. Few specifically mentioned country-level coordinating bodies, 
but they recognized that the only way to avoid duplication is through coordinating with other 
actors. There’s definitely more to be done. Fortunately, it’s moving in the right direction. It’s 
crazy to think you can do appropriate due diligence of a proposal for funding to the Global 
Fund if you don’t understand what other people are already funding (GFBoard2). 
The Health Partners Group reaches out to the Global Fund (Multilateral2, Multilateral4). There 
is an attempt to communicate openly and freely with the Geneva headquarters.  The Global 
Fund portfolio manager is included on the Health Partners Group listserv, so there is a 
somewhat formalized channel (OECDPartner2). But Global Fund representatives do not seek 
contact with the Health Partners Group when they are in the country (OECDPartner3). As there 
is no presence on the ground, coordination with donors is completely dependent on the interest 
and initiative of the Fund Portfolio Manager (GFBoard4). Overall respondents expressed 
frustration about the Global Fund’s lack of coordination; this was a near-universal theme at the 
country-level. This was mirrored by GFCountryStructure1’s reflection that the main criticism 
during the rounds-based model- the lack of coordination with in-country partners.   
At times commentary about country-level coordination bled into discussions on the Global 
Fund’s partnership paradigm. 
Bilateral donors do have individual coordination, and interaction, with the country-
level Global Fund bodies. For example, in Tanzania, the Global Fund initially 
interacted exclusively with PEPFAR [the US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS 
Relief]. Global Fund provided the money and the resources and PEPFAR was 
essentially overseeing implementation (GFBoard4). 
The Global Fund’s challenges with coordination are not unique among implementing agencies 
in any field of development nor is Mozambique’s ineffective coordination unique among 
recipient countries (manuscript in preparation). Rather these challenges are symptomatic of a 
widespread trend in development assistance in most sectors (Mwisongo and Nabyonga-Orem, 
2016, Lawson, 2013).  
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The Global Fund strongly emphasizes partnerships with technical and development partners for 
governance and in-country efforts. Partners offer technical expertise, support resource 
mobilization and advocacy efforts, provide or support country coordination, assist with 
stakeholder engagement, and provide M&E for Global Fund-supported programs (The Global 
Fund, 2016r). The assistance provided by partners varies by country, but these partnerships are 
one more mechanism that the Global Fund uses to support grant recipients without a country 
office. 
Partnerships 
The two largest donors to the Global Fund, the United States and France, both contribute five 
percent of their pledges to technical assistance (TA) (The Global Fund, 2016o). The five percent 
is channelled through their bilateral development agencies or their respective technical bodies 
founded to support Global Fund principle recipients- Grant Management Solutions and 
Initiative 5% (GMS, 2016, Initiative 5%, 2016). Additionally, the Global Fund works closely 
with partners to facilitate technical cooperation for countries at any stage in the grant process. 
Countries can request support for CCM functioning; strengthening the involvement of key 
populations; health systems strengthening; operational support; community, rights, and gender 
considerations; and grant management (The Global Fund, 2016s). In short, partnerships 
perform the functions that would otherwise be carried out by technical officers housed in 
country offices. 
Information, personnel, finance, equipment, and supplies are all forms of TA for which 
applicants are eligible (Averett and Rivers, 2004). The latest published list of providers of 
technical assistance was in 2004 (Averett and Rivers, 2004). At the time there were 170 Global 
Fund-related technical assistance providers (135 organizations and 35 technically-qualified 
individuals). At the time of writing, the Global Fund website listed six organizations that offer 
TA. Aside from requests for technical cooperation on community, rights, and gender issues, the 
Global Fund encourages direct contact with TA providers (The Global Fund, 2016s). The 
consultants hired to advise countries on strategies for their concept note development are paid 
by the partners. … There is a lot of money flowing for Global Fund engagement that is not 
accounted for. … These activities are coordinated at the country level, at the Development 
Partners Group (GFBoard4). 
The technical support provided by partners is an integral component of the principle recipients’ 
success and, therefore, the Global Fund’s success. The amount of support buttressing the Global 
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Fund’s activities depends on the country (GFCountryStructure1). In Mozambique, [w]e still 
have to rely on external consultants to develop our proposals (Multilateral2). Discussions in 
Geneva revealed that there is tension among stakeholders regarding reliance on technical 
partners and how these relationships are financed. On the one hand, if the Global Fund is not 
going to develop its own technical capacity, it has to be able to rely on useful, helpful, 
actionable guidance from the partners and I think that has been a real problem (GFBoard2). 
Furthermore, 
The big problem has been basically from the creation of the Fund that technical 
partners are very important; they are the ones who are present on the ground … And 
many of the countries depend on the technical assistance and the guidance from these 
technical partners. … It works already quite well in some countries and less well in 
others. And the challenge is to get more consistent, let’s say, quality of technical 
assistance provided by these partners (GFSecretariat1). 
Interviews in Mozambique revealed that partners do more than provide TA, they also step in to 
fill gaps. When there are delays / gaps with the Global Fund, other donors step in for support. 
The other donors’ responses are not formally decided or premeditated (OECDPartner6). The 
US government is the largest donor in the health sector; they provide more development 
assistance for health than all other donors combined (GFCountryStructure2). They often fill 
gaps in Global Fund support due to the fact that they are both Mozambique’s and the Global 
Fund’s largest investor.  
The US government is very invested in Mozambique’s success with the Global Fund 
… The US government is the most involved of all the Global Fund donors both 
financially but also in terms of coordination at the project-level.  All of Global Fund’s 
activities on the ground in Mozambique are coordinated with PEPFAR and the 
President’s Malaria Initiative [PMI] (OECDPartner6). 
In Mozambique the US government even has a Global Fund Liaison on the payroll. This 
position was created to increase coordination of Global Fund with PEPFAR and [PMI]  The 
position is pay-rolled by USAID, PEPFAR, or US Centers for Disease Control [CDC] 
depending on the country (OECDPartner1). Respondents expressed confidence in the liaison 
and saw the position as the best window into Global Fund support. Without the oversight 
usually afforded by a donor, the liaison provides the best channel of communication between 
the Global Fund and some of the partners working in-country. It is an improvised mechanism 
of in-country coordination. One interviewee contrasted it with the intended mechanism of 
coordination. The Global Fund liaison is more effective than the Country Coordinating 
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Mechanism because the members of the [CCM] are not actually paid; if the [CCM] were to 
become institutionalized, it would result in a parallel system (Multilateral5).  
It was unclear if this position is financed with the US Government’s budget line for five percent 
of its commitment to the Global Fund through technical assistance. By all accounts, the US is 
the bilateral partner with whom the principle recipients and Global Fund stakeholders most 
often coordinate and communicate with. For example, The Portfolio Managers communicate 
directly with [PMI] whereas the Global Fund liaison communicates with the Country 
Coordinating Mechanism (OECDPartner6). 
This degree of support from the US government has been invaluable in Mozambique. They are 
able to identify gaps early on and provide additional support as needed. The National HIV/AIDS 
Acceleration Plan [financed by the Global Fund] … is projected to have a massive gap in 
commodities procurement, which the US government will ultimately need to fill 
(OECDPartner6). But interviewees also shared concerns of when the agenda of the US 
government and the other donors do not align.  
US Congress sets specific targets … that make it imperative for US development 
activities to follow their own goals. Otherwise Congress will cut funding. … US 
funding has far more constraints and accountability rules, so that little of it goes 
directly to the Mozambican government. PEPFAR has a more efficient 
implementation machine, but –indeed—perhaps the long-term coordination suffers 
(GFCountryStructure2). 
This response was independently supported by other interviewees (OECDPartners 2 and 3) who 
touched upon donor relations in Mozambique and the disagreement among the G19 about 
expectations to hold.  
US government recognizes that Mozambique has weak systems and provides support 
for the system so as not to set them up to fail but expects them to be a genuine partner 
and makes changes based on lessons learned.  The Global Fund expects the Ministry 
of Health to apply for funds and then take a “do-it-yourself” approach to systems 
strengthening, but this fails because they need support (OECDPartner2). 
Some partners question the boundary between the US government and the Global Fund. In 
Mozambique criticizing the Global Fund is criticizing US government assistance 
(OECDPartner10). Based on discussions with Board Members in Geneva about partners 
providing TA on the ground, this concern extends up to the highest levels and is perhaps not 
unique to Mozambique. Sometimes, it's not only a question of wanting something, it's (a 
question of) what does USA believe in? (GFBoard1). The US government, in particular, holds 
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a lot of power in Global Fund's activities in-country, so their own approach, mandate, and 
philosophy are highly relevant in how the Global Fund operates in Mozambique. 
A member of the Secretariat inadvertently reinforced the prospect that there is enmeshment of 
Global Fund and US government agendas at the highest level. When asked if Global Fund’s 
donors are coordinating to maximize their contributions the interviewee only discussed 
coordination with the US government (USG). The Global Fund has formed a partnership with 
PEPFAR to avoid duplication.  …  The USG focuses on service delivery and community-level 
interventions, and the Global Fund works at the national level (GFSecretariat5). It is unclear 
from GFSecretariat5’s response at what level the US government is supposed to share 
knowledge, and with whom exactly. 
The degree of external support required for the Global Fund’s success has raised a debate on 
accountability. To whom are the providers of TA held accountable?… the most difficult part of 
the Global Fund model is the partnership model. It depends on the support of partners and yet 
it doesn’t have any say over the partners. … I think we need to figure out what that relationship 
should be (GFBoard2). 
In Mozambique this blurry line extends to the Ministry of Health. The US government pays for 
the Global Fund Unit in the Ministry of Health (OECDPartner6). It’s in the Department of 
Planning and Coordination and is responsible for coordinating Global Fund projects.  
From 2002 to 2007 the Ministry of Health had a coordinator and a financial assessor 
who acted as focal points for the Global Fund [presumably paid for from Global Fund 
grants]. From 2007 to 2008 the positions were paid for by the Ministry of Health. 
Eventually an auditor asked the US government to pay for the entire Unit. … The 
Country Coordinating Mechanism was not included in the formation of the Global 
Fund Unit [Memorandum of Understanding].  (GFCountryStructure4). 
In terms of coordination, the US government is the only bilateral donor that [the Global Fund 
Unit] has contact with (GFCountryStructure4). 
A new channel was created to manage Global Fund money in 2010/11 in response to the Global 
Fund's withdrawl from the health financing basket. Rather than going directly from the Ministry 
of Finance to the Ministry of Health, money goes through the Global Fund Unit. The 
combination of burdensome requirements and weak oversight has resulted in the need for an 
entire unit within the Ministry of Health. Mozambique is an example of a country undergoing 
internal reform of reporting systems to adapt to Global Fund requirements (GFBoard4). The 
fact that it is paid for by the US government means that it is accountable to  the US government 
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and not the Mozambican government.  
The Global Fund’s lack of country presence results in inadequate coordination with in-country 
partners. It also necessitates support from technical partners, for example, the WHO, to address 
stringent performance-based funding reporting requirements. Additionally they require 
buttressing by bilateral donors who provide finance to the Global Fund and the countries in 
which it operates, for example, the US government (Table 20).
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Table 20.Summary of country-level perceptions of the Global Fund’s paradigm 
Aspect of paradigm Perceived country-level result Respondent(s) 
Performance-based financing • recipients' focus on disbursement rather than results OECDPartner10 
 • burdensome administrative requirements GFCountryStructure4 
 
• duplication of reporting efforts from the ground all the 
way to central level  Multilateral3 
   
Emphasis on financial 
technicalities 
• staff with financial rather than development background 
who lack country experience GFBoard4 
   
Lack of country office • other partners doing monitoring for the Global Fund OECDPartner2 
 
• Global Fund is not engaged in country-level 
coordination Coordination1, OECDPartner3 
 • forces partners to coordinate among themselves more Multilateral2 
 • frequent deadlines and time stress GFSecretariat5 
 
• over-worked staff, communication challenges, out-of-
touch with realities on the ground GFSecretariat5 
 
• dependent on expertise and interest of single person 
(Fund Portfolio Manager) GFBoard4, GFCountryStructure1, GF Secretariat5 
   
Partnerships • reliance on external consultants to develop proposals Multilateral2 
 
• early identification of gaps and provision of additional 
support OECDPartner6 
 • undefined roles and concerns about accountability GFBoard2, GFCountryStructure4 
 
• potential for agenda alignment with single partner and 
less coordinated/multilateral approach 
GFBoard1, GFCountryStructure2, GFSecretariat5, 
OECDPartners2, 3, and 10 
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Ability to reform 
Overall, there were mixed reviews on what the New Funding Model has, or will, actually 
change on the ground, but multiple interviewees referred to the Global Fund’s ability to reform 
as one of the defining characteristics of the organization. It was a prominent, recurring theme 
in interviews. 
“Global Fund has proved in 10 years to have the ability to renew itself” 
(Multilateral4).   
 
“The Global Fund’s New Funding Model addresses inefficiency concerns, and the 
recent changes in the Global Fund have shown how international organizations are 
capable of re-inventing themselves” (GFCountryStructure2). 
 
“Overall, the Global Fund is learning from its mistakes. … the Global Fund, 
completed its reformation in one year. It is a ‘learning organization’; it is 
navigating through a field of opposing forces, and is highly committed to its 
mission” (GFBoard4). 
 
Although many of the reforms have not yet addressed concerns about the Global Fund’s overall 
model, interviewees seemed to be looking beyond this initial transformation. They spoke of 
prospective changes and solutions. The final remarks of two respondents who shared an 
interview were reminiscent of the tone and attitude of many respondents during discussions on 
the Global Fund. They clarified that although their responses were critical of the Global Fund, 
they admire the Fund’s work (GFBoard4 and GFBoard5). This sentiment is linked to the 
organization’s ability to reform- respondents can use opportunities such as interviews to share 
lessons learned about perceived strengths and weaknesses of the Global Fund with the hope 
that they are included in the next wave of changes. 
 
“I think there is commitment from the Secretariat as well certainly from our 
constituency and others to improve the Funding Model. As Mark Dybul is the first to 
say, ‘we haven’t got it all right’, this will be an iterative process to continuously 
improve how the new funding model works” (GFBoard2). 
 
As one respondent pointed out, the continued success of the Global Fund in Mozambique is 
important because the Global Fund is a means of getting around the government; the 
government does not necessarily reflect societal demands (OECDPartner3). 
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6.5 Conclusion 
In Mozambique the Global Fund is viewed as an institution that is uniquely capable of reform. 
Despite the changes with application processes that are associated with the New Funding 
Model, respondents in both Geneva and Maputo firmly believed that challenges remain in the 
inherent structure and paradigm of the Global Fund. The lack of a country office has many 
negative downstream effects including reliance on partners in-country. Due to weak managerial 
and absorptive capacity, more oversight is required than is afforded by country team visits. In-
country partners provide much needed support for Global Fund recipients, but roles, 
responsibilities, and accountability must be clearly defined for a successful long-term 
partnership paradigm. Furthermore, decision-makers in Geneva recognize in-country 
coordination as vital to successful implementation, and other actors in-country would welcome 
Global Fund engagement. To date, there are no institutional requirements for formalized 
coordination, and at the time of the interviews the Global Fund has no consistent representation 
in any in-country coordination groups. 
Although the Global Fund’s decision against having local offices may be justified, the various 
downstream difficulties suggest that the Global Fund should adopt a more conscientious 
approach by adapting grant implementation and monitoring procedures to the specific local 
realities. It should establish procedures that allow room for flexibility while remaining 
harmonized with headquarter demands. This shifts the onus to headquarters to assess whether 
what a country reports meets the requirement. The Global Fund could couple these changes 
with a policy for formalized coordination in-country. 
 
6.6 Take-home messages 
● The lack of a country office has many negative downstream effects including over-
reliance on partners in-country. 
● Although partnerships provide much needed support for Global Fund recipients, roles, 
responsibilities, and accountability must be clearly defined for a successful long-term 
partnership. 
● The Global Fund emphasizes coordination at the higher levels of the organization, but 
country teams’ engagement with other actors in-country is dependent on the Fund 
Portfolio Manager. 
● The Global Fund’s ability to reform is seen as unique, and respondents see its approach 
as continually evolving. 
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7. Discussion 
7.1 Synthesis 
This thesis serves to illuminate the nature and influence of development assistance for health 
from three types of emerging donors in sub-Saharan Africa – private donors, emerging 
economies, and global health initiatives. To date, philanthropic foundations, corporations, and 
emerging economies remain complementary to bi- and multilateral agencies for DAH. On the 
other hand, the Global Fund is one of the most important actors in the fight against AIDS, 
tuberculosis, and malaria. Despite the range of influence amongst these emerging donors, they 
are all absent from case-study country-level coordination groups. 
The Global Fund has become one of the most important sources of development assistance for 
health in 14 years in terms of both volume and success. It has undergone reform in recent years 
(The Global Fund, 2013b) but country-level stakeholders identified challenges that persist. The 
lack of a country office has many negative downstream effects including over-reliance on 
partners in-country. Although partnerships provide much needed support for Global Fund 
recipients, roles, responsibilities, and accountability must be clearly defined for a successful 
long-term partnership. Respondents were eagerness to discuss Global Fund challenges 
stemmed, in part, from their perception that the Global Fund has the unique ability to reform. 
The recent changes give hope that future iterations of reform could include changes to the 
structure and governance of the Global Fund.  
The Global Fund is an example of an emerging donor that has successfully integrated into high-
level governance structures. It participates in international efforts to standardize financial 
tracking by reporting to the OECD and International Aid Transparency Initiative (OECD, 
2016g, IATI, 2016b) and is considered to provide high quality assistance (CGD, 2016). 
Discussions about philanthropic foundations and CSR programs focused on alignment and 
harmonization. These are principles that were included in the first declaration on aid 
effectiveness but were de-emphasized in later iterations (OECD, 2005, Fourth High-Level 
Forum on Aid Effectiveness, 2011). Emerging donors were not included in high level 
discussions until recently which potentially explains their seeming unfamiliarity. As a result 
private donors are not necessarily aligned with country priorities or strengthening country 
health systems and currently contribute to fragmentation due to their narrow focus. 
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Respondents in the case-study countries highlighted that the BRICS countries are not the only 
emerging economies active in the health sector. Due to the lack of coordination of these newer 
actors, development partners were largely unaware of specific engagements or influences. The 
scale of their engagement remains unclear. Overall, the BRICS are still perceived to be focused 
on investment opportunities rather than development priorities. Some governmental officials 
welcome the support of the emerging economies as it can be quicker and fill gaps, but many 
development partners are sceptical of the sustainability of their support and long-term 
implications for social welfare. Interviewees identified many challenges in working with 
emerging economies, but many agree that their resources are needed to meet development 
goals. 
Private donors and emerging economies are not held to the same standards as conventional 
donors in terms of regulation, policies (e.g. submitting reports to the Ministry of Finance is 
mandatory for conventional donors, but is voluntary for unconventional sources in Tanzania). 
This culture of more relaxed standards begs for more stringent transparency measures. 
Transparency of emerging donors’ financial flows is not only important for understanding the 
volume of assistance these actors provide, but also to mitigate potential corruption. Recent 
reports have shown that illicit capital flows, including trade mispricing, have left Africa a net 
creditor (Kar and Cartwright-Smith, 2013). There are many country-level concerns that are 
associated with illicit flows- dependence on natural resource extraction, tax incentives not 
appropriately ascribed, lack of transparency, political corruption, and capacity to name a few 
(Hamdock et al., 2015). Multinational corporations and the BRICS bloc, which is Africa’s 
largest trade partner and biggest new group of investors, are in the perfect position to spearhead 
transparency and accountability efforts to reduce the draining of capital from Africa. 
By 2011, more than US$1 trillion was leaving developing nations annually, with over 83 
percent attributed to deceitful trade invoicing (Kar and Spanjers, 2015). To put this in 
perspective, in 2012, “for every dollar of ODA that entered the developing world in 2012, ten 
dollars flowed out illicitly” (Kar and Spanjers, 2015). Between 2004 and 2013 in sub-Saharan 
Africa alone an estimated US$675 billion was lost (Kar and Spanjers, 2015). Though this only 
represents 8.6 percent of the total, when illicit flows are scaled as a percentage of GDP, sub-
Saharan Africa is the region most affected with illicit flows averaging 6.1 percent of the regions’ 
GDP (Kar and Spanjers, 2015). These illicit flows are especially important in light of the fact 
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that countries are expected to mobilize more domestic revenue for health to supplement 
declining ODA. 
OECD bilateral agencies provide support to transparency initiatives, civil society efforts, tax 
fora, and multilateral initiatives (OECD, 2014b). But this responsibility extends beyond 
providers of official assistance, specifically to corporations themselves and emerging 
economies who are important trade partners for many developing countries. The first step is 
enhanced transparency. 
Additionally, official development assistance for health has shown some volatility in recent 
years, and emerging donors may find themselves playing a larger role than they had originally 
intended. The development community has adapted to the global financial crises, but soon it 
may be faced with shortages due to political crises in OECD countries. Brexit, the recent US 
presidential election, and predictions about upcoming French and German elections all 
highlight a widespread nationalist trend that among other consequences, could directly affect 
bilateral assistance programs. This places even more importance on developing best practices 
and increasing inclusivity in aid effectiveness fora. 
Recent political changes in the United Kingdom and the United States also foreshadow potential 
threats to global development progress. Both countries experiences illustrate the worrying trend 
of increased nationalism. In mid-2016 the United Kingdom voted to withdraw from the EU in 
what is known as Brexit. Since then there have been speculations about what this will mean for 
development priorities and EU development assistance (Watkins, 2016, Green, 2016). Of 
particular concern is the prediction that it will abandon its commitment to 0.7 percent of its GNI 
on development assistance (Barder, 2016).  Likewise, the 2016 US Presidential election has 
raised concerns about the incoming administrations priorities including development. So far, 
reports are focused on domestic concerns, but experts will likely share their predictions in the 
months ahead. One bright spot in the scenario is that in both cases, polls show that young voters 
were against these nationalist trends (BBC, 2016, Mosendz, 2016).  
7.2 Overall significance of research 
The guiding principle of the Swiss Tropical and Public Health Institute is to work in 
interdisciplinary partnership to respond to local, national and international public health 
priorities. It aims to identify solutions through innovation (discovery through promotion and 
testing of hypotheses), validation (evidence promoting what works) and application 
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(strengthening individual and public health actions, systems and policies). Therefore it is 
essential to map the findings of this thesis against these aims. 
Table 21. Research findings within the Swiss TPH research pillars 
Chapter Innovation Validation Application 
4 
Capturing country-level 
perspectives on 
engagement with 
philanthropic 
foundations and 
corporate social 
responsibility programs 
Researchers must find 
another entry point to 
quantify contributions 
effectively 
Dialog on aid 
effectiveness must be 
more inclusive, and the 
principles must be more 
comprehensive 
5 
Capturing country-level 
perspectives on 
emerging economies in 
development 
cooperation 
Researchers must find 
another entry point to 
quantify contributions 
effectively 
Dialog on aid 
effectiveness must be 
more inclusive, and the 
principles must be more 
comprehensive 
6 
  The Global Fund should 
heed country-level 
concerns about 
operational and 
governance challenges 
 
We found that studies on emerging donors of development assistance for health need to find a 
different entry point to quantify and qualify contributions. Interviews and document review are 
insufficient. Funds from philanthropic foundations often enter recipient countries through non-
governmental organizations obfuscating their contributions. There is a lack of disaggregated 
data on websites and annual reports. Additionally many private financiers are part of complex 
networks of other donors, recipient organizations, and implementing bodies; this prevents 
monitors from teasing apart flows without proper network analyses. 
This study highlighted existing gaps in donor-donor coordination and recipient-donor 
coordination, despite the proliferation of coordinating bodies. There also appears to be a lack 
of understanding about emerging donors overall influence on communities’ health through 
investments affecting the social determinants of health. The themes of this project could be 
further pursued through interviewing and exploring selected relevant emerging donors- both 
BRICS and non-BRICS countries, philanthropic foundations, and corporations with active 
corporate social responsibility programmes in each of the case-study countries. 
The Global Fund is entering a new phase. It received its fifth replenishment and is seeking a 
new Executive Director for 2017. The findings of this thesis provide insight on existing country-
level challenges. 
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Overall, our findings are useful for highlighting the challenges associated with investigating the 
nature of development assistance.  
7.3 Limitations 
There are a number of limitations to consider with this dissertation. We expected to unearth 
quantitative data on financial flows for the four case-study countries to supplement the wealth 
of qualitative data gathered in interviews. No interviewees, including those from the Ministries 
of Health, could, or would, provide exact figures. Chad’s Ministry of Finance was the only 
governing body that provided budgetary data; unfortunately, no donor funds go through the 
public sector, so it was not useful in our study. This unexpected result illuminates the lack of 
transparency, or country-level awareness, of newer sources of external finance.  
We also expected conventional development partners to be more aware of the presence and 
activities of emerging donors. It is difficult to gauge whether or not this is a pitfall in current 
donor coordination efforts (both amongst themselves but also with the recipient governments) 
or because the emerging donors provide more support for social determinants of health rather 
than development assistance directly for health, etc. As we were interested in the perception of 
emerging actors’ influence, we did not engage directly with representatives from philanthropic, 
corporate social responsibility, or the emerging economies. If time had allowed, it would have 
interesting to follow-up with the donors themselves as a supplement. Data was collected as part 
of a larger study on the influence of emerging donors in health development (SNIS, 2012). It 
was a two-pronged look at the influence of emerging actors in health assistance: ground-level 
experiences and global governance. Therefore one team of interviewers conducted interviews 
at Geneva-based institutions and were able to capture perspectives from the Global Fund that 
were relevant in this study on country-level perspectives. 
There were also limitations to the interviews themselves. There was one interview lead in the 
case-study countries and one interview lead in Geneva. A different co-interviewer accompanied 
the lead in each case-study country. (Likewise this same team of four rotated for the Geneva-
based interviews, based on availability.) The team is composed of four development 
professionals with different backgrounds (trade, etc). The interview guide (see Annex 1. Semi-
structured interview guide (for health ministry officials) provided structure and topics that 
needed to be covered, but the interviews were conducted with different lenses and steered by 
different interests. Additionally, the interviewees at times appeared to use the interviews as a 
chance to vent their frustrations on the state of development assistance for health in-country. 
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This frustration might have restricted the range of the perspective communicated to 
interviewers. 
Last but not least, are the limitations of conducting research and reporting results on the rapidly 
changing landscape of development assistance for health. This research was conducted during 
the transition from the Millennium Development Goals to the Sustainable Development Goals, 
in the aftermath of the largest global recession in recent history, and during volatile political 
climates in donor and recipient nations. The nature and influence of development assistance for 
health is itself guided by these rapidly changing spheres of power. The snapshot captured in 
2013-2014 could be dramatically different from a snapshot captured at the time of publication 
in 2016. 
 
7.4 Recommendations and Future Research 
Practical and policy recommendations 
• National Health Accounts are an internationally accepted framework to track 
expenditure on health to guide policy-making (WHO, 2016c). They primarily focus on 
financial flows for health services and break down domestic sources into public and 
private and also include development assistance for health. Unfortunately, many 
countries do not yet produce NHAs and those that do only publish every three to five 
years (when a country publishes them at all). In terms of development assistance for 
health, the data presented is aggregated and is not broken down by donor, nor do they 
include external sources of private finance or the emerging economies. NHAs should 
be modified to include emerging sources of finance and should be updated on a more 
regular basis to be a more useful tool of who is contributing to health in any given 
country.  
 
• In an ideal world, emerging donors would publish their aid data with the International 
Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI), a voluntary, multi-stakeholder initiative that aims 
to increase aid effectiveness through increasing aid transparency (IATI, 2016a). 
Government donors, private organisations, and NGOs are called to report their aid data 
in a standardised framework. There are currently 496 publishers on IATI. Of these, 21 
are foundations (up from seven in 2015), 30 are classified as “private sector” (up from 
12 in 2015), three are public private partnerships (up from two in 2015; the Global Fund 
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is classified as a multilateral organisation), and none are emerging economy bilateral 
donors.   
Unfortunately only 17 of 34 OECD countries report to IATI, so putting 
international pressure on emerging donors will be ineffective if conventional donors are 
not complying. At the very least emerging donors should be encouraged to report against 
global standards like the OECD-DAC. Additionally, the OECD-DAC databases would 
be more useful for understanding aid flows, if donors were required to submit data with 
a lower level of aggregation.   
As of yet there are no real incentives for donors to increase their transparency or 
accountability. Perhaps the most effective approach would be for the international 
development community to design a standardised rubric to be included in routine 
auditing of bilateral donors- a separate section dedicated to aid effectiveness. In light of 
ongoing economic volatility, it is also in the best interest of donor governments and tax-
payers to ensure that their aid agencies avoid internal duplication and non-evidence-
based programming. 
 
While there are a number of actions that the BRICS can take individually- such as establishing 
formal, centralized institutions for their foreign assistance programs- there are initiatives they 
could approach collectively to have an enormous impact on the global health landscape. 
• Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa represent five of the six WHO regions- 
Region of the Americas, European Region, South-East Asia Region, Western Pacific 
Region, and African Region; respectively. This positions each country to serve as a hub 
for a number of key health activities. 
Regional Health Observatories would facilitate evidence-based decision-making 
through the compilation and management of regional health statistics, coordination of 
regularly updated health system profiles, and tailor-made national and regional policy 
briefs. While smaller, scattered public health observatories exist, the European Region 
currently hosts the only WHO regional health observatory (WHO, 2016a). Such a 
network in each region would facilitate strong partnerships between governments, 
academic institutions, and international institutions for generating appropriate strategies 
for health investment. Reports provide detailed assessments of pre-defined health 
indicators and outcomes while measuring health sector performance and evaluating 
health programs. Observatories allow for streamlined data management; if indicators 
are standardized and rationalized, they could provide a framework for alignment with 
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donors to minimize duplication of effort in reporting routine data, including burden of 
disease. These observatories should also be responsible for organizing national health 
accounts, hosting health and demographic surveillance systems, serving as sentinel sites 
for outbreak surveillance, and promoting the collection of vital statistics and cause of 
death data. The already entrenched BRICS network would provide a platform for trans-
regional communication on lessons learned. 
 
• Brazil, Russia, and China are three of the world’s largest players in the extractive 
industry, both domestically and abroad. They are in the position to revolutionize the 
regulation of the industry. Due to the magnitude and pervasiveness of the extractive 
industry, it is important that institutionalization of health impact assessment (HIA) 
becomes more universal (Lee et al., 2013) and ensure that the corporate social 
responsibility arm of the industry coordinates with the national health system. Brazil 
has formalized HIA, but the BRICS need to more fully integrate and formalize impact 
assessment as a part of their foreign assistance agenda (Winkler et al., 2013). The data 
gathered during the health impact assessment should naturally be submitted to the 
national data repository. Corporate social responsibility programs associated with the 
extractive industry often times set up parallel health systems for their employees. While 
it is commendable that the employees have access to quality services, if approached 
differently, the same resources could be used to strengthen the local system to leave a 
more sustained legacy of good health in the community.  
 
• The Global Fund should adopt a more conscientious approach by adapting grant 
implementation and monitoring procedures to the specific local realities. It should 
establish procedures that allow room for flexibility while remaining harmonized with 
headquarter demands. This shifts the onus to headquarters to assess whether what a 
country reports meets the requirement.  
 
• The Global Fund should create a policy for formalized coordination in-country. Initially 
the Country Coordinating Mechanism (CCM) was established, in part, to act in this 
capacity. Our research corroborates Global Fund OIG findings that this mandate has not 
been satisfied (The Global Fund - OIG, 2016). E.g. 58% of the CCMs had not shared 
oversight reports with country stakeholders and The Global Fund Secretariat in the 
previous six months. As the Global Fund extends its reforms beyond the application 
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processes, it could create a policy, with accountability measures, that specifies a position 
within the CCM that is responsible for attending health partners group meetings, 
providing a comprehensive and exhaustive update of current Global Fund grants and 
upcoming applications to the health partners group, and communicating the agenda and 
outcomes of each health partners group meeting to the rest of the CCM and the country 
team. 
 
Further research 
• Emerging donor engagement from their perspective. Our study was interested in 
understanding how new partners are engaged with recipients from the country-level 
perspective. This study highlighted gaps in donor-donor coordination and recipient-
donor coordination and potentially gaps in understanding about emerging donors overall 
influence on communities’ health through investments affecting the social determinants 
of health. The themes of this project could be further pursued through interviewing and 
exploring selected relevant emerging donors- both BRICS and non-BRICS countries, 
philanthropic foundations, and corporations with active corporate social responsibility 
programmes in each of the case-study countries. 
 
• Network analysis / partner mapping. Recipient countries have increasingly 
complicated partnership landscapes. In Mozambique, there are 38 members in 
NAIMA+, the NGO coordination body. Between these 38 members there are more than 
90 unique sources of funding and more than 190 unique operating partners. It is 
impossible to understand such complex interactions of donors, recipients, and 
operational partners without a proper network analysis to understand where money 
goes.  
 
• Agenda-setting with new donors. How are agendas set between recipient governments 
and emerging donors? Conventional donors have long-standing relationships with the 
countries in which they operate and therefore have “institutional memory” for agenda-
setting. How are new partnerships formed and finalised? How are agendas and priorities 
set? Who approaches whom for investment? 
 
• Policy analysis of changes associated with bilateral aid agencies’ shift to Ministries 
of Trade. The international community expressed concern about Canada and 
A. Warren PhD Dissertation                                                             DAH: Stakeholder perspectives on emerging donors in sub-Saharan Africa 
 
134 
 
Australia’s recent re-structuring of their Department/Ministry of Foreign Affairs. CIDA 
and AusAID were reorganised and housed within their countries’ Ministry of Trade. 
Concerns focus on how this will affect central-level resource allocation and to what 
extent priority setting for development assistance will be overtly linked to trade 
interests. Norway, the Netherlands, and Denmark have all alternated between having 
independent aid agencies and aid agencies housed within the Ministries of Trade. What 
actually changes besides politics and internal re-structuring? Were these organisational 
changes accompanied by significant changes in development policy? 
 
• Capture resources for health development research. Health development research 
often includes capacity building through training. Additionally it introduces new 
equipment and information and communication technology, it sponsors treatment 
administration, provides health commodities (e.g. ARVs, antimalarials, insecticide 
treated bednets), and introduces financing mechanisms such as vouchers. Others 
introduce complex, system-level interventions that provide support across the six health 
system building blocks (governance, finance, human resources, information, medicines 
and technologies, and service delivery). These investments should be tracked and 
considered amongst the financial flows for health. 
 
 
 
  
A. Warren PhD Dissertation                                                             DAH: Stakeholder perspectives on emerging donors in sub-Saharan Africa 
 
135 
 
8. References 
 
Addison, T., Mavrotas, G. & Mcgillivray, M. 2005. Aid, Debt Relief and New Sources of 
Finance for Meeting the Millennium Development Goals. Development Aid: A Fresh 
Look. Helsinki, Finland: United Nations University- World Institute for Development 
Economics Research. 
Adelman, C., Norris, J., Spantchak, Y. & Marano, K. 2011. The Indey of Global Philanthropy 
and Remittances. Washington, D.C.: Hudson Institute Center for Global Prosperity. 
Afdb. 2016. Africa-India Partnership Day: India dishes out US $ 10 bn for Africa's 
healthcare and other sectors [Online]. Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire: African Development 
Bank Group (AfDB). Available: http://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-
events/article/africa-india-partnership-day-india-dishes-out-us-10-bn-for-africas-
healthcare-and-other-sectors-15733/ [Accessed 15 November 2016]. 
Aiddata. 2016. Tracking Chinese Development Finance [Online]. Williamsburg, VA: 
AidData. Available: http://china.aiddata.org/ [Accessed 12 November 2016]. 
Allen, M. 2005. The Macroeconomics of Managing Increased Aid Inflows: Experiences of 
Low-Income Countries and Policy Implications. New York, NY: International 
Monetary Fund. 
Almeida, C., Pires De Campos, R., Buss, P., Ferreira, J. R. & Fonseca, L. E. 2010. Brazil's 
conception of South-South "stuctural cooperation" in health. Revista Electrônica de 
Comunicação, Informação & Inovação em Saúde (RECIIS), 4, 23-32. 
Amorim, C., Douste-Blazy, P., Wirayuda, H., Store, J. G., Gadio, C. T., Dlamini-Zuma, N. & 
Pibulsonggram, N. 2007. Oslo Ministerial Declaration - global health: a pressing 
foreign policy issue of our time. Lancet, 369, 1373-1378. 
Aneja, A. 2013. Egypt's Morsy pitches for 'E-BRICS'. The Hindu. 
Anglogold Ashanti. 2013. Creating a sustainable solution for malaria in Continental Africa 
Region [Online]. Johannesburg, South Africa: AngloGold Ashanti. Available: 
http://www.anglogoldashanti.com/en/Media/Our-Stories/Pages/Creating-a-
sustainable-solution-for-malaria-in-Continental-Africa-Region.aspx [Accessed 25 
November 2015]. 
Armijo, L. E. 2007. The BRICs Countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) as Analytical 
Category: mirage or insight? Asian Perspective, 31, 7-42. 
Atun, R. & Kazatchkine, M. 2009. Promoting country ownership and stewardship of health 
programs: The Global Fund experience. J Acquir Immune Defic Syndr, 52 Suppl 1, 
S67-8. 
Au. 2016. Pan African e-Network (PAeN) for Tele-medicine and Tele-education [Online]. 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: African Union (AU). Available: 
http://pages.au.int/infosoc/pages/pan-african-e-network-paen-tele-medicine-and-tele-
education [Accessed 12 November 2016]. 
Austin, J. E. 1990. Managing in Developing Countries: Strategic Analysis and Operating 
Techniques, New York, NY, The Free Press: a division of Macmillan. 
Avent, R. 2013. Welcome to the post-BRIC world [Online]. London, UK: The Economist. 
Available: http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2013/05/global-economy 
[Accessed 10 November 2016]. 
Averett, S. & Rivers, B. 2004. The Aidspan Guide to Obtaining Global Fund-Related 
Technical Assistance. In: GLOBAL FUND OBSERVER (ed.). Nairobi, Kenya: 
Aidspan. 
Barder, O. 2016. Brexit: Threats and Opportunities for Global Development [Online]. 
Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Development (CGD). Available: 
http://www.cgdev.org/blog/brexit-threats-and-opportunities-global-development 
[Accessed 22 November 2016]. 
A. Warren PhD Dissertation                                                             DAH: Stakeholder perspectives on emerging donors in sub-Saharan Africa 
 
136 
 
Batniji, R. & Woods, N. 2009. Averting a Crisis in Global Health: 3 Actions for the G20. 
Oxford, U.K.: University of Oxford. 
Bbc. 2016. EU referendum: The result in maps and charts [Online]. London, U.K.: BBC 
News. Available: http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-36616028 [Accessed 22 
November 2016]. 
Bennett, S. 2012. Financial Crisis May Kill in Congo as Global Health Aid Stalls [Online]. 
New York, NY: Bloomberg Businessweek. Available: 
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-01-18/financial-crisis-may-kill-in-congo-
as-global-health-aid-stalls.html [Accessed 30 September 2015]. 
Biesma, R., Brugha, R., Harmer, A., Walsh, A., Spicer, N. & Walt, G. 2009. The effects of 
global health initiatives on country health systems: a review of the evidence from 
HIV/AIDS control. Health Policy and Planning, 24, 239-252. 
Birdsall, N. 2012a. The Global Financial Crisis: The Beginning of the End of the 
"Development" Agenda? Washington, DC: Center for Global Development. 
Birdsall, N. 2012b. The Global Financial Crisis: The Beginning of the End of the 
"Development" Agenda? Policy Papers. Washington, D.C.: Center for Global 
Development. 
Birdsall, N. & Kharas, H. 2014. The Quality of Official Development Assistance (QuODA). 
In: DEVELOPMENT, C. F. G. (ed.) 3rd ed. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings 
Institution. 
Bliss, K. E., Boynton, X. L., Cha, V., Chand, S., Conley, H. A., Cooke, J. G., Delmas, F., 
Dukkipati, U., Freeman, C. W. & Twigg, J. 2010. Key Players in Global Health: How 
Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa are Influencing the Game. Washington, 
D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). 
Bräutigam, D., Youfa, L., Huang, Y., Xulong, C., Shinn, D. H. & Anshan, L. 2011. China's 
Emerging Global Health and Foreign Aid Engagement in Africa. Washington, D.C.: 
Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS). 
Brics-Tern. 2016. BRICS Trade & Economics Research Network (BRICS-TERN) [Online]. 
Jaipur, India: CUTS International. Available: http://cuts-international.org/brics-tern/ 
[Accessed 3 June 2013]. 
Brics. 2016a. BRICS, India : 2016 - Building Responsive, Inclusive & Inclusive Solutions 
[Online]. Goa, India: BRICS, India. Available: 
http://brics2016.gov.in/content/innerpage/8th-summit.php [Accessed 11 November 
2016]. 
Brics 2016b. Goa Declaration. 8th BRICS Summit. Goa, India. 
Buse, K. & Walt, G. 2000. Global public-private partnerships: Part I--A new development in 
health? Bull World Health Organ, 78, 549-61. 
Cebri 2010. Brazil World Bank - Sharing a quiet social revolution. In: COOPERATION, T. 
T. O. S.-S. (ed.). Centro Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (CEBRI). 
Cgd. 2016. Quality of Official Development Assistance (QuODA) [Online]. Wshington, D.C.: 
Center for Global Development (CGD). Available: 
http://www.cgdev.org/page/quality-oda-quoda?callout=4-5 [Accessed 7 November 
2016]. 
Cha, A. E. 2016. Mark Zuckerberg and Priscilla Chan's $3 billion effort aims to rid world of 
major diseases by the end of the century. The Washington Post, 21 September. 
Chimhutu, V., Tjomsland, M., Songstad, N. G., Mrisho, M. & Moland, K. M. 2015. 
Introducing payment for performance in the health sector of Tanzania- the policy 
process. Globalization and Health, 11. 
Coase, R. H. 1937. The Nature of the Firm. Economica, New Series, 4, 386-405. 
Coffey, B. 2015. Pledge Aside, Dead Billionaires Don't Have to Give Away Half Their 
Fortune. Bloomberg News. New York, NY. 
A. Warren PhD Dissertation                                                             DAH: Stakeholder perspectives on emerging donors in sub-Saharan Africa 
 
137 
 
De Renzio, P. 2011. Buying Better Governance: The Political Economy of Budget Reforms in 
Aid-Dependent Countries. In: PROGRAMME, G. E. G. (ed.). Oxford, U.K.: 
University of Oxford. 
De Savigny, D. & Adam, T. 2009. Systmes Thinking for health systems strengthening. 
Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Organization. 
De Savigny, D., Webster, J., Akua Agyepong, I., Mwita, A., Bart-Plange, C., Baffoe-Wilmot, 
A., Koenker, H., Kramer, K., Brown, N. & Lengeler, C. 2012. Introducing vouchers 
for malaria prevention in Ghana and Tanzania: context and adoption of innovation in 
health systems. Health Policy and Planning, 27, iv32-iv43. 
Desbordes, R. & Azémar, C. 2008. Public Governance, Health and Foreign Direct Investment 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. University of Strathclyde; University of Glasgow. 
Di Commo, M. 2014. Turkey's aid doubled in 2012 [Online]. London, UK: Development 
Initiatives. Available: http://devinit.org/?dialogFeatures=protocol=http#!/post/turkeys-
aid-doubled-2012 [Accessed 11 November 2016]. 
Dieleman, J. L., Schneider, M. T., Haakenstad, A., Singh, L., Sadat, N., Birger, M., Reynolds, 
A., Templin, T., Hamavid, H., Chapin, A. & Murray, C. J. 2016. Development 
assistance for health: past trends, associations, and the future of international financial 
flows for health. The Lancet, 387, 2536-2544. 
Dolan, K. A. 2015. Mark Zuckerberg Explains Why the Chan Zuckerberg Initiative Isn't a 
Charitable Foundation. Forbes. Jersey City, NJ. 
Dominican Today. 2007. Brazil to help Dominican Republic set up human milk bank 
[Online]. Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic: International Milk Banking Initiative 
(IMBI). Available: 
http://www.dominicantoday.com/dr/people/2007/2/10/22330/Brazil-to-help-
Dominican-Republic-set-up-human-milk-bank [Accessed 3 June 2013]. 
Droppert, H. & Bennett, S. 2015. Corporate social responsibility in global health: an 
exploratory study of multinational pharmaceutical firms. Globalization and Health, 
11. 
Easterly, W. 2013. The Tyranny of Experts: Economists, Dictators and the Forgotten Rights 
of the Poor, New York, NY, Basic Books. 
Erhun, W. O., Babalola, O. O. & Erhun, M. O. 2001. Drug Regulation and Control in Nigeria: 
The Challenge of Counterfeit Drugs. Journal of Health & Population in Developing 
Countries, 4, 23-34. 
Fan, V. Y., Duran, D., Silverman, R. & Glassman, A. 2013. Performance-based financing at 
the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria: an analysis of grant ratings 
and funding, 2003-12. Lancet Glob Health, 1, e161-8. 
Fan, V. Y., Grépin, K. A., Shen, G. C. & Chen, L. 2014. Tracking the flow of health aid from 
BRICS countries. Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 92, 457-458. 
Farag, M., Nandakumar, A. K., Wallack, S. S., Gaumer, G. & Hodgkin, D. 2009. Does 
funding from donors displace government spending for health in developing 
countries? Health Aff (Millwood), 28, 1045-55. 
Fidler, D. P. 2009. After the Revolution: Global Health Politics in a Time of Economic Crisis 
and Threatening Future Trends. Global Health Governance, 2. 
Financial Times. 2016. Definition of corporate social responsibility (CSR) [Online]. London, 
U.K.: Financial Times. Available: http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=corporate-social-
responsibility--(CSR) [Accessed 21 November 2016]. 
Florini, A., Nachiappan, K., Pang, T. & Pilcavage, C. 2012. Global Health Governance: 
Analysing China, India and Japan as Global Health Aid Donors. Global Policy, 3, 
336-347. 
A. Warren PhD Dissertation                                                             DAH: Stakeholder perspectives on emerging donors in sub-Saharan Africa 
 
138 
 
Focac. 2016. Forum on China-Africa Cooperation [Online]. Beijing, China: Forum on China-
Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). Available: http://www.focac.org/eng/ [Accessed 3 June 
2013]. 
Forbes Corporate Communications. 2016. Forbes' 30th Annual World's Billionaires Issue 
[Online]. Jersey City, New Jersey. Available: 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/forbespr/2016/03/01/forbes-30th-annual-worlds-
billionaires-issue/#3f682c871a8c [Accessed 7 November 2016]. 
Foundation Center. 2016. Foundation Center [Online]. New York, NY: Foundation Center. 
Available: http://foundationcenter.org/ [Accessed 8 November 2016]. 
Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness 2011. Busan Partnership for Effective 
Development Cooperation. 
Frier, S. 2015. Mark Zuckerberg Philanthropy Pledge Sets New Giving Standard [Online]. 
New York, NY: Bloomberg. Available: 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-12-01/zuckerberg-to-give-99-of-
facebook-stock-away-during-lifetime [Accessed 7 November 2016]. 
G77. 2009a. G77 Ministerial Declaration [Online]. Available: 
http://www.g77.org/doc/Declaration2015.htm [Accessed 3 June 2013]. 
G77. 2009b. Ministerial Declaration adopted by the 33rd Annual Meeting of Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs of the Group of 77 [Online]. Geneva, Switzerland: The Group of 77 
(G-77). Available: http://www.g77.org/doc/Declaration2009.htm [Accessed 3 June 
2013]. 
Gadelha, C. a. G. 2006. Development, health industrial complex and industrial policy. Revista 
Saúde Pública, 40, 11-23. 
Gale, N. K., Heath, G., Cameron, E., Rashid, S. & Redwood, S. 2013. Using the framework 
method for the analysis of qualitative data in multi-disciplinary health research. BMC 
Med Res Methodol, 13, 117. 
Garmaise, D. 2010. New "Country Team Approach" Adopted for Managing Grants. In: 
GLOBAL FUND OBSERVER (ed.). Nairobi, Kenya: Aidspan. 
Garmaise, D. 2013. Global Fund Releases Report on Losses and Recoveries. In: GLOBAL 
FUND OBSERVER (ed.). Nairobi, Kenya: Aidspan. 
Garrett, L. 2009. The Future of Foreign Assistance Amid Global Economic and Financial 
Crisis [Online]. Available: CFR.org [Accessed 20 June 2012]. 
Gautier, L., Harmer, A., Tediosi, F. & Missoni, E. 2014. Reforming the World Health 
Organization: what influence do the BRICS wield? Contemporary Politics, 20, 163-
181. 
Ghana Statistical Service 2010. News Brief: New Series of the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) Estimates. Statistical Newsletter. Accra, Ghana: Ghana Statistical Service. 
Gms. 2016. Grant Management Solutions [Online]. Washington, D.C.: Grant Management 
Solutions (GMS). Available: http://www.gmsproject.org/gmswebsite/ [Accessed 10 
November 2016]. 
Gomez, E. J. 2012. Understanding Brazilian Global Health Diplomacy: Social Health 
Movements, Institutional Infiltration, and the Geopolitics of Accessing HIV/AIDS 
Medication. Global Health Governance, 6. 
Gómez, E. J. 2009. The Politics of Receptivity and Resistance: How Brazil, India, China, and 
Russia Strategically use the International health Community in Response to 
HIV/AIDS: A Theory. Global Health Governance, III. 
Government of Brazil 2011. Health Cooperation: Brazilian International Health Activities 
Bulletin. In: DEPARTMENT, I. H. M. A. (ed.). Brasília, Brazil: Government of 
Brazil, Ministry of Health. 
Government of China. 2006. The State Council of the People's Republic of China [Online]. 
Available: http://english.gov.cn/ [Accessed 3 June 2013]. 
A. Warren PhD Dissertation                                                             DAH: Stakeholder perspectives on emerging donors in sub-Saharan Africa 
 
139 
 
Government of India. 2011. India vaccine market reaches $900 million [Online]. New Delhi, 
India: Government of India. Available: 
http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=77172 [Accessed 3 June 2016]. 
Government of Russia 2007. Russia's Participation in International Development Assistance: 
Concept. Moscow, Russia: Government of Russia, Ministry of Finance. 
Gravier-Rymaszewska, J. 2012. How Aid Supply Responds to Economic Crisis. Helsinki, 
Finland: United Nations University, World Institute for Development Economics 
(UNU-WIDER). 
Green, D. 2016. What's the likely impact of Brexit on development, aid and Oxfam? Any 
opportunities amid the gloom? [Online]. Oxford, U.K.: Oxfam. Available: 
https://oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/whats-the-likely-impact-of-brexit-on-development-aid-
and-oxfam-any-opportunities-amid-the-gloom/ [Accessed 22 November 2016]. 
Grépin, K. A., Fan, V. Y., Shen, G. C. & Chen, L. 2014. China's role as a global health donor 
in Africa: what can we learn from studying under reported resources flows? 
Globalization and Health, 10. 
Hafner, T. & Popp, D. 2011. China and India as suppliers of affordable medicines to 
developing countries. NBER Working Paper Series. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau 
of Economic Research. 
Hamdock, A., Adejumobi, S., Dipeolu, A., Elhiraika, A., Gumbi, M., Karingi, S., Kouassi, R., 
Tolan, H., Ibrahim, G., Aden-Osman, S., Mukungu, A., Mevel, S., Davis, W., 
Kaninda, J. & Johnson, O. 2015. Report of the High Level Panel on Illicit Financial 
Flows from Africa. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: United Nations Economic Commission for 
Africa (UNECA). 
Hanrieder, T. 2016. The Reform Reformation: International Organizations and the Challenge 
of Change. Council on Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-
04-08/reform-reformation. 
Harmer, A. & Buse, K. 2014. The BRICS - a paradigm shift in global health? Contemporary 
Politics, 20, 127-145. 
Harmer, A., Xiao, Y., Missoni, E. & Tediosi, F. 2013. 'BRICS without straw'? A sytematic 
literature review of newly emerging economies' influence in global health. 
Globalization and Health, 9. 
Harris, G. 2014. Medicines Made in India Set Off Safety Worries [Online]. New York, NY: 
The New York Times. Available: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/15/world/asia/medicines-made-in-india-set-off-
safety-worries.html [Accessed 22 November 2016]. 
Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health. 2014. Gabriel Jaramillo, former General 
Manager of The Global Fund [Online]. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University. 
Available: https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/voices/events/jaramillo/ [Accessed 15 
September 2016]. 
Heilprin, J. 2011. Fraud plagues global health fund. The Guardian, 23 January. 
Hein, W. & Kickbusch, I. 2010a. Global Health, Aid Effectiveness and the Changing Role of 
the WHO. Hamburg, Germany: German Institute for Global and Area Studies. 
Hein, W. & Kickbusch, I. 2010b. Global Health, Aid Effectiveness and the Changing Role of 
the WHO. Hamburg, Germany: German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA). 
Huang, Y. 2010. Pursuing Health as Foreign Policy: The Case of China. Indiana Journal of 
Global Legal Studies, 17, 105-146. 
Iati. 2016a. IATI makes information about aid spending easier to access, use and understand 
[Online]. New York, NY: United Nations Development Fund (UNDP). Available: 
http://www.aidtransparency.net/ [Accessed 1 Spetmeber 2015]. 
Iati. 2016b. Publishers [Online]. New York, NY: United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP). Available: https://iatiregistry.org/publisher [Accessed 21 November 2016]. 
A. Warren PhD Dissertation                                                             DAH: Stakeholder perspectives on emerging donors in sub-Saharan Africa 
 
140 
 
Ibsa. 2016a. Health - Introduction [Online]. New Delhi, India: Government of India, Ministry 
of External Affairs. Available: http://ibsa.nic.in/intro_health.htm [Accessed 15 
November 2016]. 
Ibsa. 2016b. IBSA : India, Brazil, South Africa [Online]. New Delhi, India: Government of 
India, Ministry of External Affairs. Available: http://ibsa.nic.in/index.html [Accessed 
3 June 2013]. 
Ihme 2011. Financing Global Health 2011: Continued Growth as MDG Deadline Approaches. 
Seattle, WA: Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME), University of 
Washington. 
Ihme 2015. Financing Global Health 2014: Shifts in Funding as the MDG Era Closes. Seattle, 
WA: Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME). 
Ihme. 2016. Viz Hub: Financing Global Health [Online]. Seattle, WA: Institute for Health 
Metrics and Evaluation (IHME). Available: http://vizhub.healthdata.org/fgh/ 
[Accessed 8 November 2016]. 
Ihp+ 2008. Mozambique Compact. In: DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH SYSTEMS 
GOVERNANCE AND FINANCING (ed.). Geneva, Switzerland: International Health 
Partnership, World Health Organization. 
Imf. 2016. World Economic Outlook Database [Online]. Washington, D.C.: International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). Available: 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/01/weodata/index.aspx [Accessed 5 
November 2016]. 
Inderfurth, K. F. & Khambatta, P. 2011. A US - India Innovation Partnership. Washington, 
D.C.: Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS). 
India-Africa Forum 2015. Reinvigorate Partnership - Shared Vision. India-Africa Forum 
Summit III. New Delhi, India: Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. 
Initiative 5%. 2016. Initiative 5% SIDA, Tuberculose, Plaudisme [Online]. Paris, France: 
Experitse France. Available: http://www.initiative5pour100.fr/en/frances-
commitment/france-and-the-global-fund/ [Accessed 27 July 2015]. 
Jerven, M. & Duncan, M. E. 2012. Revising GDP estimates in Sub-Saharan Africa: Lessons 
from Ghana. The African Statistical Journal, 15, 13-22. 
Jobelius, M. 2013. New Powers for Global Change? Challenges for International 
Development Cooperation - The Case of India. Berlin, Germany: Friedrich Ebert 
Stiftung. 
Kar, D. & Cartwright-Smith, D. 2013. Illicit Financial Flows from Africa: Hidden Resource 
for Development. In: GFI (ed.). Washington, D.C.: Global Financial Integrity (GHI). 
Kar, D. & Spanjers, J. 2015. Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: 2004-2013. 
Washington, D.C.: Global Financial Integrity (GFI). 
Kelland, K. 2016. The World Health Organization’s critical challenge: healing itself. Reuters 
Investigates. http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/health-who-future/. 
Kickbusch, I. 2014. BRICS' contributions to the global health agenda. Bulletin of the World 
Health Organization, 92, 463-464. 
Kickbusch, I. & Szabo, M. M. 2014. A new governance space for health. Glob Health Action, 
7, 23507. 
Kragelund, P. 2008. The Return of Non-DAC Donors to Africa: New Prospects for African 
Development? Development Policy Review, 26, 555-584. 
Labonté, R., Mohindra, K. & Schrecker, T. 2011. The Growing Impact of Globalization for 
Health and Public Health Practice. Annual Reviews of Public Health, 32, 263-283. 
Lanz, M. 2012. Selbst die Entwicklungshilfe hat eine Wachstumsbranche. Neue Züricher 
Zeitung, 5 April. 
Lawson, M. L. 2013. Foreign Aid: International Donor Coordination of Development 
Assistance. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service. 
A. Warren PhD Dissertation                                                             DAH: Stakeholder perspectives on emerging donors in sub-Saharan Africa 
 
141 
 
Leach-Kemon, K., Chou, D. P., Schneider, M. T., Tardif, A., Dieleman, J. L., Brooks, B. P., 
Hanlon, M. & Murray, C. J. 2012. The global financial crisis has led to a slowdown in 
growth of funding to improve health in many developing countries. Health Aff 
(Millwood), 31, 228-35. 
Leão, M. & Maluf, R. S. 2013. Effective public policies and active citizenship: Brazil's 
experience of building a Food and Nutrition Security System. Oxford, U.K.: Oxfam. 
Lee, J. H., Röbbel, N. & Dora, C. 2013. Cross-Country Analysis of the Institutionalization of 
Health Impact Assessment. In: WHO (ed.) Social Determinants of Health. Geneva, 
Switzerland: World Health Organization (WHO). 
Lee, K. & Smith, R. 2011. What is 'Global Health Diplomacy'?: A Conceptual Review. 
Global Health Governance, 5. 
Maciocco, G. & Stefanini, A. 2008. From Alma-Ata to the Global Fund: the history of 
international health policy. Revista Brasileira de Saúde Materno Infantil, 7, 479-486. 
Maia, J., Bastista, F., Sato, E., Gala, P., Cintra, M., Grimaldi, D., Souza, A., Rybkin, A. & 
Al., E. 2012. The BRICS Report: A Study of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South 
Africa with special focus on synergies and complementarities. In: PRESS, O. U. (ed.). 
New Delhi, India. 
Mankoff, J. 2009. Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics, Lanham, 
MD, Rowman & Littlefield. 
Martin, G., Grant, A. & D'agostino, M. 2012. Global health funding and economic 
development. Globalization and Health, 8. 
Mccoy, D. 2012. Aidspan Review of a Study by Y. Akachi and R. Atun on the Effect of 
Investment in Malaria Control on Child Mortality. Global Fund Observer. Nairobi, 
Kenya: Aidspan. 
Mccoy, D., Chand, S. & Sridhar, D. 2009. Global health funding: how much, where it comes 
from and where it goes. Health Policy and Planning, 24, 407-417. 
Mckee, M., Marten, R., Balabanova, D., Watt, N., Huang, Y., Finch, A. P., Fan, V. Y., Van 
Damme, W., Tediosi, F. & Missoni, E. 2014. BRICS' role in global health and the 
promotion of universal health coverage: the debate continues. Bulletin of the World 
Health Organization, 92, 452-453. 
Mckitterick, W. 2012. DAC Data Doesn't Tell All [Online]. Washington, DC: Center for 
Global Development. Available: http://www.cgdev.org/blog/dac-data-
doesn%E2%80%99t-tell-all [Accessed 11 November 2016]. 
Mdg Gap Task Force 2015. Taking Stock of the Global Partnership for Development. In: 
(UN/DESA), T. D. O. E. A. S. A. O. T. U. N. S. (ed.) MDG Gap Task Force Report 
2015. Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations. 
Mdg Monitor. 2016. MDG 8: Develop a global partnership for development [Online]. 
Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations Development Fund (UNDP). Available: 
http://www.mdgmonitor.org/mdg-8-develop-a-global-partnership-for-development/ 
[Accessed 5 November 2016]. 
Meessen, B., Soucat, A. & Sekabaraga, C. 2011. Performance-based financing: just a donor 
fad or a catalyst towards comprehensive health-care reform? Bull World Health 
Organ, 89, 153-6. 
Miller, P. & Al., E. 2011. The Index of Global Philanthropy and Remittances. Washington, 
D.C.: Hudson Institute Center for Global Prosperity. 
Missika, B. & Romon, E. 2014. Foundations as development partners. In: OECD (ed.) 
Development Co-operation Report 2014: Mobilising Resources for Sustainable 
Development. Paris, France: OECD. 
Mosendz, P. 2016. What This Election Taught Us About Millennial Voters [Online]. New 
York, NY: Bloomberg News. Available: 
A. Warren PhD Dissertation                                                             DAH: Stakeholder perspectives on emerging donors in sub-Saharan Africa 
 
142 
 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-11-09/what-this-election-taught-us-
about-millennial-voters [Accessed 22 November 2016]. 
Moss, T. & Majerowicz, S. 2012. No Longer Poor: Ghana's New Income Status and 
Implications of Graduation from IDA. Washington, D.C.: Center for Global 
Development. 
Mwase, N. & Yang, Y. 2012. BRICS' Philosophies for Development Financing and Their 
Implications for LICs. New York, NY: International Monetary Fund. 
Mwisongo, A. & Nabyonga-Orem, J. 2016. Global health initiatives in Africa - governance, 
priorities, harmonisation and alignment. BMC Health Serv Res, 16 Suppl 4, 212. 
Nam, S., Obeng Ampofo, F., Shields, L., Sosa Altamirano, E. & Toure, M. S. 2013. 
Enhancing Learning in Monitoring and Evaluation: Six Cases from Philanthropic 
Organizations Working in the Health Sector. Geneva, Switzerland: Centre for Socio-
Eco-nomic Development. 
Ndb Brics. 2016. New Development Bank BRICS [Online]. Shanghai, China: New 
Development Bank - Brazil, Rusia, India, China, South Africa (NDB BRICS). 
Available: https://www.ndbbrics.org/ [Accessed 10 November 2016]. 
Next 11. 2016. Next 11 - Emerging Markets [Online]. Dubai, UAE: Next 11. Available: 
http://next11.se/next-11-emerging-markets/ [Accessed 15 November 2016]. 
Northam, J. 2014. The Global Economy: A World of Acronyms [Online]. Washington, D.C.: 
National Public Radio (NPR). Available: 
http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2014/05/13/311852601/the-global-economy-
will-mint-countries-be-the-new-brics [Accessed 15 November 2016]. 
Nwosu, C. 2015. What Happened to the BRICS? [Online]. Washington, D.C.: Institute for 
Policy Studies. Available: http://fpif.org/what-happened-to-the-brics/ [Accessed 15 
November 2016]. 
O'neill, J. 2001. Building Better Global Economic BRICs. Global Economics Papers. New 
York, NY: Goldman, Sachs & Co. 
Oecd-Dac 2009. Measuring Aid to Health. Pairs, France: Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development - Development Assistance Committee. 
Oecd 2005. Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. Paris, France: Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD). 
Oecd 2014a. How does the United States compare? OECD Health Statistics 2014. Paris, 
France: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 
Oecd 2014b. Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: Measuring OECD 
Responses. Paris, France: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD). 
Oecd. 2016a. DAC member profile : Japan [Online]. Paris, France: Organization of Economic 
and Development Cooperation (OECD). Available: 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/japan.htm [Accessed 9 November 2016]. 
Oecd. 2016b. DAC member profile : Korea [Online]. Paris, France: Organization for 
Economic and Development Cooperation (OECD).  [Accessed 9 November 2016]. 
Oecd. 2016c. DAC members [Online]. Paris, France: Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD). Available: http://www.oecd.org/dac/dacmembers.htm 
[Accessed 7 November 2016]. 
Oecd. 2016d. Development finance of countries beyond the DAC [Online]. Paris, France: 
Organization for Economic Cooperation for Development (OECD). Available: 
http://www.oecd.org/development/stats/non-dac-reporting.htm [Accessed 9 November 
2016]. 
Oecd. 2016e. Development finance of countries beyond the DAC [Online]. Paris, France: 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Available: 
A. Warren PhD Dissertation                                                             DAH: Stakeholder perspectives on emerging donors in sub-Saharan Africa 
 
143 
 
http://www.oecd.org/development/stats/non-dac-reporting.htm [Accessed 11 
November 2016]. 
Oecd. 2016f. Global Network of Foundations Working for Development [Online]. Paris, 
France: Organization of Economic Cooperation for Development (OECD). Available: 
http://www.oecd.org/site/netfwd/ [Accessed 16 October 2016]. 
Oecd. 2016g. OECD.Stat : Creditor Reporting System (CRS) [Online]. Paris, France: 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. Available: 
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx [Accessed 11 November 2016]. 
Oecd. 2016h. Official development assistance - definition and coverage [Online]. Paris, 
France: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 
Available: 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/officialdevelopmentassistancedefinitionandcoverage.ht
m [Accessed 4 November 2016]. 
Oecd Development Co-Operation Directorate 2015. Develepment Co-operation by Countries 
Beyond the DAC. Paris, France: Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD). 
Oecd Netfwd 2014. Guidelines for Effective Philanthropic Engagement. In: GLOBAL 
NETWORK OF FOUNDATIONS WORKING FOR DEVELOPMENT (NETFWD) 
(ed.). Paris, France: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD). 
Oritz, F. 2011. Brazil: Providing Alternatives for Small-Scale Tobacco Farmers. Inter Press 
Service News Agency, 23 December. 
Over, M. 2009. How Will the Financial Crisis Affect Aid to the Health Sector? [Online]. 
Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Development. Available: 
http://blogs.cgdev.org/globalhealth/2009/06/how-will-the-financial-crisis-affect-aid-
to-the-health-sector.php [Accessed 30 September 2016]. 
Oxman, A. D. & Fretheim, A. 2009. Can paying for results help to achieve the Millennium 
Development Goals? Overview of the effectiveness of results-based financing. J Evid 
Based Med, 2, 70-83. 
Paen Project. 2016. Pan-African e-Network Project [Online]. New Delhi, India: TCIL. 
Available: http://www.panafricanenetwork.com/ [Accessed 12 November 2016]. 
Panda, A. 2014. BRICS Announce New Development Bank. The Diplomat. Tokyo, Japan. 
Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation 2014. First High-Level Meeting of the 
Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation: Building Towards an 
Inclusive Post-2015 Development Agenda. Mexico City, Mexico: Government of 
Mexico, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Path. 2016. Human milk banks may help save vulnerable babies [Online]. Seattle, 
Washington: PATH. Available: http://www.path.org/projects/milk-banks.php 
[Accessed 3 June 2013]. 
Pimenta, C., Terto Jr., V., Kamel, L., Maksud, I. & Raxach, J. C. 2006. Access to AIDS 
treatment in Bolivia and Paraguay: international cooperation and social mobilization. 
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Associacão Brasileira Interdisciplinar de AIDS. 
Piva, P. & Dodd, R. 2009. Where did all the aid go? An in-depth analysis of increased health 
aid flows over the past 10 years. Bull World Health Organ, 87, 930-9. 
Ponder, E. & Moree, M. 2012. Developing New Drugs and Vaccines for Neglected Diseases 
of the Poor: The Product Developer Landscape. San Francisco, U.S.A.: Bio Ventures 
for Global Health. 
Prizzon, A. & Greenhill, R. 2012. 'The Aid Effectiveness Agenda: The benefits of going 
ahead' - A commentary on the final report. In: (EDCSP), E. D. C. S. P. (ed.). Overseas 
Development Institute. 
A. Warren PhD Dissertation                                                             DAH: Stakeholder perspectives on emerging donors in sub-Saharan Africa 
 
144 
 
Ravishankar, N., Gubbins, P., Cooley, R. J., Leach-Kemon, K., Michaud, C. M., Jamison, D. 
T. & Murray, C. J. 2009. Financing of global health: tracking development assistance 
for health from 1990-2007. Lancet, 373, 2113-2124. 
Rivers, B. 2011. Corruption by Global Fund Grant Implementers. Global Fund Observer 139. 
Nairobi, Kenya: Aidspan. 
Russo, G., Cabral, L. & Ferrinho, P. 2013. Brazil-Africa technical cooperation in health: 
what's its relevance to the post-Busan debate on 'aid effectiveness'? Global Health, 9, 
2. 
Russo, G. & De Oliveira, L. 2016. South-South Collaboration in Pharmaceuticals: 
Manufacturing Anti-retroviral Medicines in Mozambique. In: MACKINTOSH, M., 
BANDA, G., TIBANDEBAGE, P. & WAMAR, W. (eds.) Making Medicines in 
Africa: The Political Economy of Industrializing for Local Health. New York, NY: 
Palgrave MacMillan. 
Russo, G. & Shankland, A. 2014. Brazil's engagement in health co-operation: what can it 
contribute to the global health debate? Health Policy and Planning, 29, 266-270. 
Sachs, J. 2001. Macroeconomics and Health - Investing in Health for Economic 
Development: Report of the Commission on Macroeconomics and Health. Geneva, 
Switzerland: World Health Organization. 
Samb, B., Evans, T., Dybul, M., Atun, R., Moatti, J. P., Nishtar, S., Wright, A., Celletti, F., 
Hsu, J., Kim, J. Y., Brugha, R., Russell, A. & Etienne, C. 2009. An assessment of 
interactions between global health initiatives and country health systems. Lancet, 373, 
2137-69. 
Sanofi. 2016. Innovation: Developing the first candidate dengue vaccine [Online]. Paris, 
France: Sanofi. Available: 
http://en.sanofi.com/csr/patient/progress/innovation/innovation.aspx [Accessed 17 
November 2016]. 
Saraiva, M. G. 2010. Brazilian foreign policy towards South America during the Lula 
administration: caught between South America and Mercosur. Revista Brasileira de 
Política Internacional, 53, 151-168. 
Savedoff, W. D. 2010. Basic Economics of Results-Based Financing in Health. Bath, Maine: 
Social Insight. 
Selznick, P. 1949. TVA and the Grass Roots: A Study in the Sociology of Formal 
Organization, Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA, University of California Press. 
Shah, S. 2001. How Private Companies are Transforming the Global Agenda: A New Era for 
the World Health Organization. Foreign Affairs. 
Sherry, J., Mookherji, S., Ryan, L., Bezanson, K., Boerma, T., Greenwell, F., Hyslop, A., 
Leban, K., Tanaka, S., Vaessen, M. & Walker, N. 2009. The Five-Year Evaluation of 
the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria: Synthesis of Study Areas 
1, 2, and 3. Calverton, MD; USA: Macro International. 
Simon, H. A. 1947. Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in 
Administrative Organizations, New York, NY, The MacMillan Company. 
Singer, N. & Isaac, M. 2015. Mark Zuckerberg's Philanthropy Uses L.L.C. for More Control. 
The New York Times, 2 December. 
Singh, S. & Dube, M. 2012. BRICS and the World Order: A Beginner's Guide. Jaipur, India: 
CUTS Center for International Trade, Economics & Environment. 
Snis. 2012. Trends and Influence of Private Finance on Global Health Initiatives and 
Development Goals in Resource-constrained Countries [Online]. Geneva, 
Switzerland: Swiss Network for International Studies (SNIS). Available: 
http://www.snis.ch/project_trends-and-influence-private-finance-global-health-
initiatives-and-development-goals [Accessed 10 October 2016]. 
Sridhar, D. 2009. Global Health - Who Can Lead? The World Today, 65, 26-26. 
A. Warren PhD Dissertation                                                             DAH: Stakeholder perspectives on emerging donors in sub-Saharan Africa 
 
145 
 
Sridhar, D. 2010. Seven Challenges in International Development Assistance for Health and 
Ways Forward. Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics. 
Sridhar, D. & Gomez, E. J. 2011a. Health financing in Brazil, Russia and India: What role 
does the international community play? Health Policy and Planning, 26, 12-24. 
Sridhar, D. & Gomez, E. J. 2011b. Health financing in Brazil, Russia and India: what role 
does the international community play? Health Policy Plan, 26, 12-24. 
Sridhar, D. & Smolina, K. 2012. Motives Behind National and Regional Approaches to 
Health and Foreign Policy. In: PROGRAM, G. E. G. (ed.). Oxford, U.K.: University 
of Oxford. 
Sridhar, D. & Tamashiro, T. 2009. Vertical Funds in the Health Sector: Lessons for Education 
from the Global Fund and GAVI. Papers commissioned for the EFA Global 
Monitoring Report 2010. 
Steensen, S. 2014. Keeping ODA focused in a shifting world. In: COMMITTEE, T. D. A. 
(ed.) Development Co-operation Report 2014: Mobilising Resources for Sustainable 
Development. Paris, France: Organization for Cooperation and Economic 
Development. 
Stoianova, V. 2012. Private Funding: An emerging trend in humanitarian donorship. 
Somerset, U.K.: Global Humanitarian Assistance, . 
Strom, S. 2010. Pledge to Give Away Fortunes Stirs Debate. NYTimes, 10 November. 
Stuckler, D., Basu, S. & Mckee, M. 2011a. Global health philanthropy and institutional 
relationships: how should conflicts of interest be addressed? PLoS Med, 8, e1001020. 
Stuckler, D., Basu, S. & Mckee, M. 2011b. International Monetary Fund and aid 
displacement. Int J Health Serv, 41, 67-76. 
Stuckler, D., Basu, S., Wang, S. W. & Mckee, M. 2011c. Does recession reduce global health 
aid? Evidence from 15 high-income countries, 1975-2007. Bull World Health Organ, 
89, 252-7. 
The Brics Post. 2013. Jim O'Neill changes stand on SA in BRICS [Online]. London, U.K.: The 
BRICS Post. Available: http://thebricspost.com/jim-oneil-changes-stand-on-sa-in-
brics/#.WCCvii0rKK5 [Accessed 3 June 2013]. 
The Economist 2006. The birth of philanthrocapitalism: The leading new philanthropists see 
themselves as social investors. The Economist. London, UK. 
The Giving Pledge. 2016. The Giving Pledge [Online]. Available: https://givingpledge.org/ 
[Accessed 7 November 2016]. 
The Global Fund - Oig 2010. The Office of the Inspector General Progress Report for March - 
October 2010 and 2011 Audit Plan and Budget. In: OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR 
GENERAL (ed.). Geneva, Switzerland: The Global Fund. 
The Global Fund - Oig 2012. Audit of Global Fund Grants to the Republic of Mozambique. 
In: OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL (OIG) (ed.). Geneva, Switzerland: 
The Global Fund. 
The Global Fund - Oig 2016. The Global Fund Country Coordinating Mechanism. Audit 
Report. Geneva, Switzerland: The Global Fund. 
The Global Fund 2005a. The Global Fund's First Replenishment 2006 - 2007. The Global 
Fund Replenishment Conference. 
The Global Fund 2005b. The Global Fund Voluntary Replenishment 2005: A Technical Note 
on Financial Management of the Global Fund. Geneva, Switzerland: The Global Fund. 
The Global Fund 2007. The Global Fund's Second Replenishment 2008 - 2010. The Global 
Fund Replenishment Conference. 
The Global Fund. 2009a. Global Fund suspends grant to the Executive Secretariat of the 
National AIDS Committee in Mauritania [Online]. Geneva, Switzerland: The Global 
Fund. Available: http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/news/2009-09-
A. Warren PhD Dissertation                                                             DAH: Stakeholder perspectives on emerging donors in sub-Saharan Africa 
 
146 
 
09_Global_Fund_suspends_grant_to_the_Executive_Secretariat_of_the_National_AI
DS_Committee_in_Mauritania/ [Accessed 26 October 2015]. 
The Global Fund. 2009b. Global Fund suspends grants to Philippines foundation [Online]. 
Geneva, Switzerland: The Global Fund. Available: 
http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/news/2009-09-
24_Global_Fund_suspends_grants_to_Philippines_foundation/ [Accessed 26 October 
2015]. 
The Global Fund. 2010a. Donors commit US$11.7 billion to the Global Fund for next three 
years [Online]. Geneva, Switzerland: The Global Fund. Available: 
http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/news/2010-10-
05_Donors_commit_USD_11_7_Billion_to_the_Global_Fund_for_next_three_years/ 
[Accessed 26 October 2015]. 
The Global Fund. 2010b. The Global Fund confirms freeze on cash disbursements to Zambia 
Ministry of Health, grants to be transferred to UNDP [Online]. Geneva, Switzerland: 
The Global Fund. Available: http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/news/2010-06-
16_Global_Fund_confirms_freeze_on_cash_disbursements_to_Zambia_Ministry_Of_
Health_grants_to_be_transferred_to_UNDP/ [Accessed 26 October 2015]. 
The Global Fund 2010c. Global Fund Third Voluntary Replenishment 2011 - 2013. The 
Global Fund Replenishment Conference. 
The Global Fund 2011a. Global Fund Board adopts Panel recommendations calling for urgent 
reform. 
The Global Fund. 2011b. The Global Fund Board meets to consider 5-year strategy, reform 
agenda [Online]. Geneva, Switzerland: The Global Fund. Available: 
http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/news/2011-05-
10_The_Global_Fund_Board_meets_to_consider_5-year_strategy_reform_agenda/ 
[Accessed 26 October 2015]. 
The Global Fund. 2011c. Independent review of the Global Fund will be concluded by 
September [Online]. Geneva, Switzerland: The Global Fund. Available: 
http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/news/2011-05-
04_Independent_review_of_the_Global_Fund_will_be_concluded_by_September/ 
[Accessed 26 October 2015]. 
The Global Fund. 2012a. The Global Fund's Executive Director to step down in March 
[Online]. Geneva, Switzerland: The Global Fund. Available: 
http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/news/2012-01-
24_The_Global_Fund_Executive_Director_to_step_down_in_March/ [Accessed 26 
October 2015]. 
The Global Fund. 2012b. The Global Fund appoints Gabriel Jaramillo as General Manager: 
New Position Created to Implement the Organization's Transformation Plan [Online]. 
Geneva, Switzerland: The Global Fund. Available: 
http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/news/2012-01-
24_The_Global_Fund_appoints_Gabriel_Jaramillo_as_General_Manager/ [Accessed 
26 October 2015]. 
The Global Fund 2012c. The Global Fund Strategy 2012-2016: Investing for Impact. Geneva, 
Switzerland: The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. 
The Global Fund 2013a. Fourth Voluntary Global Fund Replenishment Pledges. The Global 
Fund Replenishment Conference. Washington, D.C. 
The Global Fund 2013b. The Global Fund's New Funding Model. The Global Fund to Fight 
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria: Fourth Replenishment (2014-2016). Geneva, 
Switzerland: The Global Fund. 
The Global Fund 2014. The Global Fund Governance Handbook. Geneva, Switzerland: The 
Global Fund. 
A. Warren PhD Dissertation                                                             DAH: Stakeholder perspectives on emerging donors in sub-Saharan Africa 
 
147 
 
The Global Fund. 2016a. Financials [Online]. Geneva, Switzerland: The Global Fund. 
Available: http://theglobalfund.org/en/financials [Accessed 26 October 2015]. 
The Global Fund. 2016b. Funding Model [Online]. Geneva, Switzerland: The Global Fund. 
Available: http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/fundingmodel/ [Accessed 26 October 
2015]. 
The Global Fund 2016c. Global Fund Donors Pledge Nearly $13 Billion to Help End 
Epidemics. News & Stories. Geneva, Switzerland: The Global Fund. 
The Global Fund. 2016d. Grant Portfolio [Online]. Geneva, Switzerland: The Global Fund. 
Available: http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/portfolio/ [Accessed 25 October 2015]. 
The Global Fund. 2016e. Impact [Online]. Geneva, Switzerland: The Global Fund. Available: 
http://theglobalfund.org/en/impact/ [Accessed 25 October 2015]. 
The Global Fund. 2016f. Implementing Partners [Online]. Geneva, Switzerland: The Global 
Fund. Available: http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/implementers/ [Accessed 25 
October 2015]. 
The Global Fund. 2016g. MOZ-202-G03-M-00 : Building Capacity to Scale Up Roll Back 
Malaria in Mozambique [Online]. Geneva, Switzerland: The Global Fund. Available: 
http://theglobalfund.org/en/portfolio/country/grant/?k=8dacfcaf-f44c-474f-af34-
3200847b2b54&grant=MOZ-202-G03-M-00 [Accessed 26 October 2015]. 
The Global Fund. 2016h. MOZ-202-G04-T-00 : Strengthening and expanding TB services in 
Mozambique [Online]. Geneva, Switzerland: The Global Fund. Available: 
http://theglobalfund.org/en/portfolio/country/grant/?k=29c2ec6e-85d5-4cad-99a2-
d6c942b3ff07&grant=MOZ-202-G04-T-00 [Accessed 26 October 2015]. 
The Global Fund. 2016i. MOZ-607-G05-H : Mozambican Initiative to expand coverage for 
prevention, care, support and treatment for people affected by HIV/AIDS [Online]. 
Geneva, Switzerland: The Global Fund. Available: 
http://theglobalfund.org/en/portfolio/country/grant/?k=3c9cdfd9-7517-4b8f-a41c-
b5da94ab8796&grant=MOZ-607-G05-H [Accessed 25 October 2015]. 
The Global Fund. 2016j. MOZ-708-G07-T : Reducing Tuberculosis Morbidity and Mortality 
in Mozambique by 2012, through strengthening of the National Tuberculosis Control 
Program at all levels [Online]. Geneva, Switzerland: The Global Fund. Available: 
http://theglobalfund.org/en/portfolio/country/grant/?k=bc98b2e4-5c3c-4cfc-95d5-
b8cf8e8a727b&grant=MOZ-708-G07-T [Accessed 25 October 2015]. 
The Global Fund. 2016k. MOZ-911-G10-H : Responding to the HIV epidemic in Mozambique 
through effective government - civil society partnerships [Online]. Geneva, 
Switzerland: The Global Fund. Available: 
http://theglobalfund.org/en/portfolio/country/grant/?k=cc45cd7f-6744-4689-af93-
d7c108d50a8c&grant=MOZ-911-G10-H [Accessed 26 October 2015]. 
The Global Fund 2016l. Operation Policy Manual. Geneva, Switzerland: The Global Fund. 
The Global Fund. 2016m. Organizational Structure [Online]. Geneva, Switzerland: The 
Global Fund. Available: http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/organization/structure/ 
[Accessed 25 October 2015]. 
The Global Fund. 2016n. Overview [Online]. Geneva, Switzerland: The Global Fund. 
Available: http://theglobalfund.org/eng/overview/ [Accessed 25 October 2015]. 
The Global Fund. 2016o. Pledges and Contributions [Online]. Available: 
http://www.theglobalfund.org/documents/core/financial/Core_PledgesContributions_L
ist_en/ [Accessed]. 
The Global Fund. Pledges at Global Fund Replenishment Conference.  The Global Fund 
Replenishment Conference, 16-17 September 2016p Montreal, Canada. 
The Global Fund. 2016q. Private & NGO Partners [Online]. Geneva, Switzerland: The 
Global Fund. Available: http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/privatengo/ [Accessed 25 
October 2015]. 
A. Warren PhD Dissertation                                                             DAH: Stakeholder perspectives on emerging donors in sub-Saharan Africa 
 
148 
 
The Global Fund. 2016r. Technical & Development Partners [Online]. Geneva, Switzerland: 
The Global Fund. Available: http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/technical/#related-
resources [Accessed 25 October 2015]. 
The Global Fund. 2016s. Technical Cooperation [Online]. Geneva, Switzerland: The Global 
Fund. Available: 
http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/fundingmodel/technicalcooperation/ [Accessed 25 
October 2015]. 
The World Bank 2011. Russian Federation Partnership: Country Program Snapshot. 
Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. 
The World Bank. 2016. World Bank Open Data [Online]. Washington, D.C.: The World 
Bank. Available: http://data.worldbank.org/ [Accessed 7 November 2016]. 
Tytel, B., Callahan, K., Gold, D., Zonana, V., Nayyar, A., Menezes, A., Saxena, C., Dubey, 
N., Harris, C., Humphrey, B., Mehra, C., Pawson, D., Payne, J., Wahl, B., Passarelli, 
C., Pimenta, C., Danishevskiy, K., Singh, S., Yan, G., Kaufman, J., Osih, R., Masire, 
M. & Venkatapuram, S. 2012. Shifting Paradigm: How the BRICS are Reshaping 
Global Health and Development. New York, NY: Global Health Strategies. 
Un 2011. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United 
Nations "Protect, Respect and Remedy" Framework. In: (UNHCR), U. N. O. O. T. H. 
C. (ed.). New York, NY: United Nations (UN). 
Un 2015. Taking Stock of the Global Partnership for Development. In: FORCE, M. G. T. 
(ed.) Millennium Development Goal 8. New York, NY: United Nations. 
Un. 2016. Sustainable Development Goal 3: Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for 
all at all ages [Online]. New York, NY: United Nations.  [Accessed 12 November 
2016]. 
Un General Assembly 2015. 70/1. Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September 2015. 
New York, NY: United Nations. 
Un Global Compact. 2016a. About the UN Global Compact [Online]. Geneva, Switzerland: 
United Nations (UN). Available: https://www.unglobalcompact.org/about [Accessed 
27 July 2015]. 
Un Global Compact. 2016b. The Ten Principles of the UN Global Compact [Online]. Geneva 
Switzerland: United Nations (UN). Available: 
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/mission/principles [Accessed 27 July 
2015]. 
Unaids. 2015. India and Africa Strengthen Partnership on Accessible and Affordable 
Medicines [Online]. Geneva, Switzerland: UNAIDS. Available: 
http://www.unaids.org/en/resources/presscentre/featurestories/2015/october/20151030
_india-africa [Accessed 22 November 2016]. 
Unctad 2011. Promoting standards for responsible investment in value chains. In: 
DEVELOPMENT, I. W. G. O. T. P. I. A. J. C. P. O. T. G. M.-Y. A. P. O. (ed.) Report 
to the High-Level Development Working Group. New York, NY: United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 
Unctad 2012. Corporate Social Responsibility in Global Value Chains: Evaluation and 
monitoring challenges for small and medium sized suppliers in developing countries. 
New York, NY: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 
Undp 2014. Philanthropy as an Emerging Contributor to Development Cooperation. New 
York, NY: UNDP. 
Undp 2015. Human Development Report 2015: Work for Human Development. New York, 
NY: United Nations Development Programme. 
Usaid 2009. How Will the Global Economic Crisis Impact the Health of the World's Poor? 
Washington, D.C.: United States Agency for International Development (USAID). 
A. Warren PhD Dissertation                                                             DAH: Stakeholder perspectives on emerging donors in sub-Saharan Africa 
 
149 
 
Usaid 2012. USAID's Global Health Strategic Framework: Better Health for Development 
FY2012-FY2016. Washington, D.C.: USAID. 
Van De Maele, N., Evans, D. B. & Tan-Torres, T. 2013. Development assistance for health in 
Africa: are we telling the right story? Bull World Health Organ, 91, 483-90. 
Vaz, A. C. & Inoue, C. Y. A. 2007. Emerging Donors in International Development 
Assistance: The Brazil Case. Ottawa, Canada: International Development Research 
Centre. 
Walz, J. & Ramachandran, V. 2010. Brave New World: A Literature Review of Emerging 
Donors and the Changing Nature of Foreign Assistance. Washington, D.C.: Centerfor 
Global Development. 
Waning, B., Diedrichsen, E. & Moon, S. 2010. A lifeline to treatment: the role of Indian 
generic manufacturers in supplying antiretroviral medicines to developing countries. 
Jounral of the International AIDS Society, 13. 
Warren, A., Wyss, K., Shakarishvili, G., Atun, R. & De Savigny, D. 2013. Global health 
initiative investments and health systems strengthening: a content analysis of Global 
Fund investments. 
Washington, R. A. 2013. The global economy: Welcome to the post-BRIC world [Online]. 
London, U.K.: The Economist. Available: 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2013/05/global-economy [Accessed 
11 November 2016]. 
Watkins, K. 2016. What would a Brexit mean for EU development assistance? [Online]. 
Washington, D.C.: Devex. Available: https://www.devex.com/news/what-would-a-
brexit-mean-for-eu-development-assistance-88265 [Accessed 22 November 2016]. 
Watson, N., Younis, M. & Spratt, S. 2013. What's next for the BRICS Bank? Rapid Response 
Briefing. Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies. 
Who 2012a. Official Development Assistance (ODA) for Health to Chad. Geneva, 
Switzerland: World Health Organization (WHO). 
Who 2012b. Official Development Assistance (ODA) for Health to Ghana. Geneva, 
Switzerland: World Health Organization (WHO). 
Who 2012c. Official Development Assistance (ODA) for Health to Mozambique. Geneva, 
Switzerland: World Health Organization (WHO). 
Who 2012d. Official Development Assistance (ODA) for Health to Tanzania. Geneva, 
Switzerland: World Health Organization (WHO). 
Who. 2016a. European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies [Online]. Geneva, 
Switzerland: World Health Organization (WHO). Available: 
http://www.euro.who.int/en/about-us/partners/observatory [Accessed 3 June 2013]. 
Who. 2016b. Global Health Observatory Data Repository [Online]. Geneva, Switzerland: 
World Health Organization (WHO). Available: 
http://apps.who.int/gho/data/node.main [Accessed 7 November 2016]. 
Who. 2016c. Health Accounts [Online]. Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Organization 
(WHO). Available: http://www.who.int/health-accounts/en/ [Accessed 1 September 
2015]. 
Who 2016d. Monitoring health for the SDGs. World Health Statistics. Geneva, Switzerland: 
World Health Organization (WHO). 
Williamson, O. E. 1975. Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications, New 
York, NY, The Free Press. 
Winkler, M. S., Krieger, G. R., Divall, M. J., Cissé, G., Wielga, M., Singer, B. H., Tanner, M. 
& Utzinger, J. 2013. Untapped potential of health impact assessment. Bulletin of the 
World Health Organization, 91, 298-305. 
Woods, N. 2009. The International Response to the Global Crisis and the Reform od the 
International Financial and Aid Architecture. Brussels, Belgium: European Parliament. 
A. Warren PhD Dissertation                                                             DAH: Stakeholder perspectives on emerging donors in sub-Saharan Africa 
 
150 
 
Woods, N. 2011. Rethinking Aid Coordination. In: PROGRAMME, G. E. G. (ed.). Oxford, 
U.K.: University of Oxford. 
Yang, H., Acharya, S. P., Liu, P. & Guo, Y. 2014. Development assistance for health given to 
Nepal by China and India: a comparative study. Globalization and Health, 10. 
Yiu, L. & Saner, R. 2011. Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) and the Health Sector. 
Journal of Poverty Alleviation and International Development, 1, 135-180. 
Zimmerman, F. & Smith, K. 2011. More Actors, More Money, More Ideas for International 
Development Co-operation. Journal of International Development, 23, 722-738. 
 
  
A. Warren PhD Dissertation                                                             DAH: Stakeholder perspectives on emerging donors in sub-Saharan Africa 
 
151 
 
9. Annex 
9.1 Annex 1. Semi-structured interview guide (for health ministry 
officials) 
Overview 
What have been the most influential shifts of external finance for health channelled through 
your Ministry (in terms of source and magnitude)? 
How have these affected resource allocation and the budget for health at the national level? 
Were the increases in assistance for health added to the budget or did the funds acts as a 
substitute? If yes, in which area? 
Have changes in development assistance for health led to an increase in interaction and 
coordination between the Ministries of Health, Finance, and Foreign Affairs in terms of 
communication and/or resource flows?  If yes, please describe.  (Follow-up: who initiates 
such coordination?  Is the coordination formalized? What are the mechanisms?  Results?) 
 
BRICS bilateral 
As defined by the G77’s Ministries of Foreign Affairs meeting in 2009, South-South 
Cooperation includes five key elements.  Could you comment on how your Ministry 
experiences BRICS partners in terms of the following: 
a) Partnership; 
b) Avoiding policy conditionality in governance, economic policy, or institutional 
reform; 
c) Structuring assistance to compliment foreign direct investment; 
d) Emphasizing individual project feasibility rather than long-term debt 
sustainability; 
e) Applying domestic development lessons? 
Many of the BRICS countries emphasize technical cooperation rather than financial 
assistance; how do you experience this within your Ministry?  Example? 
Is this a valued approach?   
What are the key influences of this finance channel on national health governance? 
 
Private finance 
Could you comment on how your Ministry experiences private and/or philanthropic partners 
for health in terms of the following: 
a) Partnership; 
b) Avoiding policy conditionality in governance, economic policy, or institutional 
reform; 
c) Structuring assistance to compliment direct investment; 
d) Emphasizing individual project feasibility rather than long-term debt 
sustainability; 
e) Applying domestic development lessons? 
What are the most notable differences in your Ministry’s experience of private and/or 
philanthropic partners for health when compared to conventional bilateral or multilateral 
partners? 
What are the key influences of this finance channel on national health governance? 
 
International Organizations 
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Could you comment on how your Ministry experiences public and/or private partners- such as 
the Global Fund, the GAVI Alliance, Medicines for Malaria Venture, and the World Health 
Organization- in terms of the following: 
a) Partnership; 
b) Avoiding policy conditionality in governance, economic policy, or institutional 
reform; 
c) Emphasizing individual project feasibility rather than long-term debt 
sustainability; 
d) Applying domestic development lessons? 
What are the most notable differences in your Ministry’s experience of public and/or private 
institutions when compared to conventional bilateral or multilateral partners? 
What are the key influences of this finance channel on national health governance? 
 
Concluding 
How does your Ministry record in-kind assistance for health in the mid-term expenditure 
framework? 
Are there structural/institutional changes needed within your Ministry for effective 
harmonization of these diverse assistance channels?  
Are there any other key points or concerns related to our project that you would like to share? 
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9.2 Annex 2. Non-BRICS emerging economies' activities in-country 
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Chad Ghana Mozambique Tanzania 
Colombia 
   
• tripartite collaboration, with 
Mexico (TZAcademic2) 
Cuba • physicians; salaries paid by 
Chad (TDConsultant1, 
TDOECDPartner1) 
• partnership for HSS is directly 
through health ministry 
(TDMultilateral1) 
• physicians; salaries paid by Cuba 
(GHAcademic1) or subsidized by 
Ghana (GHMultilateral6) 
• training (GHMultilateral6) 
• technical assistance for malaria 
control (GHGovernment2) 
• physicians subsidized by 
Mozambique 
(MZGovernment1) 
• physician training programs 
(MZOECDPartner1) 
• medical personnel for Zanzibar 
(TZMultilateral3 & 4) 
• malaria prevention, through 
vector control (TZMultilateral3 & 
4) 
• physicians (TZOECDPartner7 & 
8) 
Egypt 
   
• physician training 
(TZOECDPartner4, 5, & 6) 
Iran 
 
• nine hospitals (GHGovernment2) 
• first batch of ambulances 
(GHGovernment2) 
  
Islamic Development 
Bank 
• supports universal health 
coverage (TDOECDPartner1) 
   
A. Warren PhD Dissertation                                                              DAH: Stakeholder perspectives on emerging donors in sub-Saharan Africa 
 
155 
 
 Chad Ghana Mozambique Tanzania 
Israel 
 
• health infrastructure investment 
(GHMultilateral6) 
• training (GHMultilateral6) 
• not specified 
(MZMultilateral5) 
 
Japan* 
 
  
 
• strengthen capacity of regional 
medical teams / training and 
management (TZMultilateral3 
and 4) 
• technical support 
(TZOECDPartner1) 
Malaysia 
 
  
 
• procuring essential medicines 
(TZConsultant2) 
• tripartite collaboration with India, 
build capacity in research, social 
determinants of health 
(TZAcademic2) 
Mexico 
 
  • not specified 
(MZMultilateral5) 
• tripartite collaboration with 
Colombia (TZAcademic2) 
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 Chad Ghana Mozambique Tanzania 
Saudi Arabia   • medicines and sent 
(GHGovernment2) 
• personnel for technical assistance 
(GHGovernment2) 
  
South Korea* 
 
• not specified, but included 
"predominant bilateral actors in 
health" (GHMultilateral2 and 3) 
• physician training programs 
(MZOECDPartner1) 
• infrastructure and capacity 
development (TZOECDPartner4, 
5, and 6) 
• bring specialists to rural areas (6 
months to a year) 
(TZGovernment5) 
• facilities for open heart surgery, 
planned follow-up training and 
equipment. (TZGovernment5) 
Turkey   
 
• not specified 
(MZMultilateral5) 
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system  template including defined core indicators. 
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